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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This thesis examines four different topics in the area of international trade. Chapter 2 uses
Brazilian firm-level data to study the relation between quality upgrading and pricing across
firms and destination countries. Chapter 3 studies the links between income inequality and
the patterns of trade and export prices. Chapter 4 analyses how GATT/WTO (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization) membership affects the price
volatility of import and export countries. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at the Jewish Diaspora
to study the effect of Jewish networks on trade flows. Each Chapter is treated in a sepa-
rate, self-contained article, and chapters are connected through the microeconomic theory
and microeconometric methods applied. The thesis contributes to the literature on trade
flows and trade prices, firm heterogeneity, product quality, and networks in international
trade.
While Chapter 5 focuses on trade flows, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 offer explanations for the
sources of price variation across firms and countries, both from the demand and supply
side. Cross-border price differentials are one of the most strinking manifestations that the
economy remains largely segmented along the borders. In a world with perfect competition
and without product quality differentiation, prices across borders reflect production and
transportation costs and, hence, should vary according to these characteristics. Although,
when countries import and export different product qualities, and when there are market
imperfections such as market power, firm composition, and discrimination, prices across
destination markets also reflect those characteristics.
Chapter 2 studies the relation between product quality and pricing across products, firms,
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and destination countries. The relation between prices and product quality has attracted
a lot of attention from the literature. Many studies have found that prices vary systemati-
cally across destination countries and suggested that demand for product quality explains
this variation (countries with higher income have preferences over higher quality products,
and pay higher prices for them). Although, without direct information on product quality
variation, it has not been possible to disentangle product quality from other sources of
price variation, such as market competition, firm composition, and destination country
characteristics.
Chapter 2 uses direct evidence on producer quality upgrading over time, which makes
it possible to separate the quality effect from other sources of price variation. Using a
difference-in-difference-in-differences approach, that discerns quality upgrading by destina-
tion market and timing, Chapter 2 presents evidence of quality-based market segmentation,
by which firms raise quality and prices at high-income destinations. Results reveal that
differences in prices across destination countries are not driven by differences in markups,
market share, or elasticities of substitution, but by demand for high quality in high-income
countries. To my knowledge, the study presented in Chapter 2 is the first one to provide
direct evidence on quality upgrading over time and to sort out the different effects that
drive price variation across firms and destination countries.
One important simplification from Chapter 2 is the assumption that all individuals in a
country have similar preferences and consume the same type of quality, i.e., high (low) in-
come countries consume high (low) quality. Chapter 3, which is a joint work with Eckhard
Janeba, relaxes this assumption and studies the effect of the second moment of the income
distribution on trade and product prices. The contribution of Chapter 3 is to provide first
firm-level evidence of the links between income inequality and the patterns of trade and
export prices. To identify the mechanism behind these links, we propose a model in which a
country has a continuum of individuals, who differ in their skill/ability. We consider three
income groups (poor, middle income, and rich) with different preferences over high and low
quality products, and show that the aggregate demand depends on the distribution of skills
and income in a country. Because preferences over different types of goods depend on the
individual income, a more unequal income distribution leads to higher average prices. We
confirm this prediction using detailed firm-level data for Brazilian exporters and establish
new stylized facts. Results reveal that not only the first moment, but also the second
3moment of the income distribution in the destination country determines export prices:
Prices are sistematically higher in high income and more unequal destinations. This result
holds only for differentiated goods, and in particular for varieties with high vertical differ-
entiation. Results suggest that product quality and markups are adjusted to serve different
markets, and in particular to serve more distant, richer, and more unequal markets.
Chapter 4, which is a joint work with Vinh Cao, studies the importance of multilateral trade
agreements for price behavior, in particular the effect of GATT/WTO membership on the
volatility of import and export prices. Since Rose (2004), many researchers have questioned
the role of GATT/WTO for trade promotion and the advantages of adhering to the WTO
principles. Besides trade promotion, GATT/WTO may help for convergence in expecta-
tions and policy transparency in ways that promote stability. At the firm-level, reduction
in trade barriers by multilateral treaties may force competition and reduce the market
power of firms, such that producers can no longer pass along their production cost shocks.
Moreover, under multilateral trade agreements, firms can better react to market-specific
demand shocks by switching to alternative markets. Thus, multilateral trade agreements
may play a risk-reducing role and act as device for a more stability-oriented price setting
behavior. We show first empirical evidence of the effect of GATT/WTO membership on
world trade prices and on price volatility. Results suggest a surprisingly strong and robust
empirical regulatility: GATT/WTO membership reduces the volatility of prices over time
for both import and export countries. Using price levels, results reveal that GATT/WTO
membership increases prices over time for exporters, and this effect is captured solely by
differentiated goods. We find similar results for FTAs. Since the channel that explains the
effect of FTA and WTO membership on prices is alike, the results for FTA represent an
important verification of the importance of multilateral trade agreements for price behav-
ior.
Chapter 5, which is a joint work with Gabriel Felbermayr, shifts the attention from ex-
port prices to export flows and the importance of networks in international trade. Using
a newly build data on the Jewish population, which allows for a rich panel data analysis,
Chapter 5 studies the importance of informal networks in explaining bilateral trade flows.
Evaluating the effect of the Jewish Diaspora on trade is particularly interesting: (i) the
creation of the State of Israel provides high variation in the migration flows; (ii) the Jewish
population exhibits a deep and abiding commitment to life in community and is known for
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building strong networks. Using a theory-based gravity model and the pseudo-maximum
likelihood estimation as our main econometric strategy, we find robust trade creation effects
of networks. In our benchmark specification for the period 1951-2000, the jewish networks
lead to a trade creation of 0.85%, compared to 23.6% of trade creation due to free trade
agreements. We show that the high trade creation effects found in the earlier literature
are due to omitted variables bias, leading to overestimation of the network effect. Results
are robust to several specifications, and, using the tariff equivalent, we find no evidence
of a decrease of the network effect over time. The analysis shown in Chapter 5 adds to
the literature on the importance of trade barries, in particular informal trade barriers, for
international exchange.
The thesis is organized in such a way that the chapters can be read independently of each
other. References are collected in the bibliography.
Chapter 2
Quality Upgrading and Price
Heterogeneity: Evidence from
Brazilian Exporters
2.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature has documented a systematic variation in export prices across
destination countries. While the literature has suggested quality differences as one plau-
sible explanation,1 the lack of direct data on producer quality has limited the empirical
evidence to the use of proxies. Thus, it has not been possible to separate the quality effect
from other sources of price variation, such as market competition, firm composition, and
further destination country characteristics.2 3
1Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Hallak (2006) find that prices increase with exporter and importer
income per capita, respectively, suggesting that high-income countries consume and produce high quality
products. Similar evidence is found at the firm-level (see Manova and Zhang (2012) and Bastos and Silva
(2010b)), and using a structural approach such as Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011).
2Crozet, Head, and Mayer (2011) study French wine producers and offer the only direct evidence on
how quality ratings affect prices and exports. They focus on price variation across firms (rather than
across destination markets) in a cross-section analysis, which does not allow disentangling the sources of
price variation.
3Understanding the sources of price variation is crucial for policy analysis. The literature suggests
that countries with intermediate levels of productivity and product quality may be the big winners of
globalization: in the catch-up phase, wage, productivity and quality differentials in countries such as
Brazil, China and India create profit incentives for firms to increase product quality, and raise their gains
from trade (Sutton 2007). In particular for Latin-American economies, it has been argued that firms have
increased product quality to high-income countries, while the domestic market and neighboring low-income
5
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I use producer quality information of Brazilian exporters over time, proposing a new
methodology that allows sorting out product quality from other sources of price varia-
tion. Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach that discerns quality upgrad-
ing by destination market and timing, combined with matching techniques, I find evidence
of quality-based market segmentation: firms increase product quality and prices in high-
income destinations. The results reveal that differences in prices across destination coun-
tries are not driven by differences in markups, market share, elasticities of substitution, or
selection effects, but rather by demand for high quality in high-income countries. To my
knowledge, this is the first study that provides direct evidence on quality upgrading over
time, and that sorts out the different sources of price variation across firms and destination
countries.
To provide a framework for the empirical analysis, I present a stylized partial equilibrium
model that combines quality upgrading, skill upgrading, and product innovation invest-
ments. The model considers two markets heterogeneous in income, North (high income)
and South (low income), and heterogeneous firms that endogenously set prices and quality
to these markets. The model generates three testable predictions. First, for firms that
invest in product innovation it is optimal to increase product quality and product prices.
Second, due to the differing willingness to pay for quality across countries, firms have rel-
atively stronger profit incentives to increase product quality for high-income (Northern)
countries. For a sufficiently low income in Southern countries, consumers in the South only
consume low quality products. Thus, quality upgrading and market segmentation explain
higher prices in Northern countries. Third, producing high quality requires better qualified
workers. Hence, firms that upgrade quality also increase their share of skilled workers.
I test the model using novel and uniquely rich Brazilian firm-level data, which allows me
to build a direct and comprehensive measure of quality upgrading, rather than relying
on proxies. The data includes: (i) export price data by firm, product, and destination
country; (ii) employer-employee data with workers’ characteristics; and (iii) a detailed firm
innovation survey, including self-reported measures on the importance of product quality
upgrading.4 Additional variables such as world import and export flows help to control
countries have continued consuming low quality varieties (See Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010) and
Verhoogen (2008)). However, price variation across countries could also reflect markup pricing, as shown
by Simonovska (2010). The current literature does not allow disentangling these effects.
4The PINTEC (2000) firm innovation survey is available for a representative sample of 3,750 Brazilian
manufacturing exporters, and contains 154 questions related to product and process innovation. Some
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for changes in market shares and further time-varying characteristics. The richness of the
combined data enables the separation of the quality effect from other sources of price vari-
ation.
The econometric approach used to identify market segmentation through quality is a
difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy over the period 1997-2000. I use
matching techniques to control for self-selection in quality upgrading, and discuss several
identification issues in Sections 5 and 6. The DDD discerns firms that upgraded quality
from those that did not, by export market over time. I evaluate price changes due to
changes in product quality, mainly for the European Union (North) and Mercosur (South),
and conduct several placebo exercises to test whether the effect of quality on prices is driven
by other factors unrelated to quality.5 The period under analysis, 1997-2000, provides a
unique empirical setting. In this period, termed by Sutton (2007) as the catch-up phase
of trade liberalization in mid-level economies6, firms made important efforts to bridge the
quality gap. Their efforts to increase product quality were 30% higher in comparison to
later years (PINTEC 2003)7, and export orientation was the main determinant of product
innovation (Kannebley, Porto, and Pazello 2005). Anecdotal evidence suggests that many
firms created an export type product in this period, a higher quality variety to be exported
to high-income destinations.
Results show that producers raise quality and prices in high-income (Northern) countries,
and that demand for high quality explains higher prices in Northern countries, confirming
the first two predictions of my stylized model. I discuss the markup hypothesis, high-
lighting that price differences across destinations are driven by demand for quality, rather
than by markup pricing or different elasticities of substitution. In particular, the results
reveal that firms that do not upgrade quality do not receive a price premium in Northern
questions are specifically related to product quality upgrading and the firm’s export destination market.
5As quality is an endogenous variable, I achieve identification by evaluating differences across groups
over time, combined with firm-product-country fixed effects, period fixed effects and various time-varying
firm, product and destination country characteristics. Several placebo exercises confirm the validity of the
methodology.
6The first phase of trade liberalization occurred mainly until 1995, when tariffs fell from an average
of 29% in 1991 to zero in 1995. According to Sutton (2007), the second (catch-up) phase happens when
wage and capability differentials create profit incentives for firms in low-wage countries to build capability.
This process carries main benefits to mid-level economies.
7The most cited reasons for manufacturing exporters to innovate were: to improve product quality
(80% of the firms) and to maintain market share (82% of the firms) (PINTEC 2000). For 86% of the firms,
foreign consumers were the main source of information for product development (PINTEC 2000).
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countries, and those that upgrade quality only receive a price premium in Northern coun-
tries. Regarding the third prediction of the model, the results document that firms jointly
increasing product quality and workers’ skills charge higher prices.8
Several placebo exercises and robustness checks are conducted to deal with the concern of
endogeneity of quality upgrading. In particular, the results reveal that price differentials
across countries are not driven by self-selection of firms, are specific to quality upgrading,
and are not related to other changes at the firm-level, such as process innovation.9 The
analysis is extended in different ways. In particular, the Chapter shows that results are
not specific to the European Union and Mercosur, and that the effect of quality on prices
is captured by the firms’ main product (in terms of sales), for which the firm has higher
profit incentives to invest in quality.10
This Chapter is related to broad literature investigating the relationship between quality,
prices and trade, which has shown that prices and quality increase with exporter income
per capita (Flam and Helpman (1987) and Hummels and Klenow (2005)) and importer
income per capita (Hallak 2006). These results are supported by Khandelwal (2010) and
Hallak and Schott (2011), who relax the direct price-quality relation and infer quality from
both price and market share data. Their results suggest that high-income countries con-
sume and produce high quality products. With the availability of firm-level data, many
papers have uncovered several dimensions of firm-product price heterogeneity. Manova and
Zhang (2012) and Bastos and Silva (2010b) document a systematic price variation across
destination countries, attributing this price variation to quality sorting: firms export high
quality products to high income and distant countries.11 Recently, Crozet, Head, and
Mayer (2011) have focused on the wine industry, finding within a cross-section that firms
ranked as high-quality producers charge higher prices and export more to a larger number
8However, I show that quality and skills do not cancel out each other. Instead, the level effect of
quality upgrading remains significant, suggesting that skill upgrading might not entirely explain increases
in producer quality.
9For process innovation (technology upgrading), there is no price differential across destinations, sug-
gesting that firms receive a premium in Northern countries from increasing product quality, but not from
producing existing products with better technology.
10According to Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2011), a firm with quality competence may obtain
higher quality premia for the products closer to the core competence. Thus, incentives to invest in the
quality of the core variety are higher.
11Similar results are found by Görg, Halpern, and Muraközy (2010) for Hungarian firms.
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of markets.12 While they are interested in the variation across firms in a cross-section,
which does not allow to control for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, I study the firm
price variation across time and across destination countries. Combining data on quality
upgrading over time with price data, I offer a quality-based explanation for price variation
across destinations and industries, and separate the different sources of price variation.
This Chapter is also related to literature investigating product quality, wage inequality, and
the gains from trade for developing economies. The literature suggests that countries with
intermediate levels of productivity and product quality may be the big winners of global-
ization: in its catch-up phase, wage, productivity and quality differentials in countries such
as Brazil, China and India create profit incentives for firms to increase product quality,
with subsequent dynamics leading to gains from trade.13 Particularly for Latin-American
economies, it has been argued that firms increased product quality to high income coun-
tries after trade liberalization, while the domestic market and neighboring low income
countries continued consuming low quality varieties. For Mexican firms, Verhoogen (2008)
finds that more productive firms export more and pay higher wages, suggesting that these
firms produce higher quality to export to high income destinations. A similar argument
is shown by Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010) in explaining the skill composition of
Argentinean firms. I build on a similar argument for the Brazilian economy, although this
chapter differs in directly considering price data and producer quality information over
time, which allows sorting out the quality effect without relying on proxies for quality.
Finally, this Chapter is also related to literature on firm heterogeneity, a central feature in
the trade literature over the past decade. An additional evidence of this Chapter relates
to the isomorphism between different heterogeneous firm models. I empirically show that
firms are indeed heterogeneous in quality, and confirm the predictions from the theoretical
literature. However, by showing that quality varies not only across firms, but also within
firms across destination countries, I show that efficiency sorting models (with heterogeneity
in productivity)14 and quality sorting models (with heterogeneity in the ability to produce
12Their cross-section results focus on effects across firms (rather than across countries). Moreover, the
cross-section analysis does not allow sorting out different sources of firm and price heterogeneity.
13See Sutton (2007) for a discussion on the winners of globalization. Sutton (2007) argues that trade
liberalization per se does not benefit countries in the intermediate range. However the dynamics that
follow with subsequential phases of liberalization, with foreign direct investment, and capability transfers,
may determine the big winners of globalization.
14Examples of such models are Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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product quality)15 may be non-isomorphic.16
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. Section
3 provides the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy.
Section 5 shows the results and Section 6 provides further extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Product innovation and market segmentation
To provide a framework for the empirical analysis, this section presents a partial equilibium
model of trade, product quality upgrading, and market segmentation. The model combines
product quality (as in Verhoogen (2008)), workers skills (similar to Brambilla, Lederman,
and Porto (2010)), and fixed innovation costs (similar to Bustos (2011)).
The model has two important sources of heterogeneity. From the production side, some
firms pay a fixed product innovation cost F I and increase product quality. From the
demand side, income differences lead to a different willingness to pay for quality. Firms
endogenously set prices and quality.
2.2.1 Demand
The demand side of the model follows Verhoogen (2008). There are two markets, North and
South. In each market, indexed by c = N,S, there are K statistically identical consumers,
indexed by k. The utility that each consumer k in country c derives from consuming a
product from firm j is given by:
Ukjc = u(xo) + θjc + kjc (2.1)
where xo is the consumption of the numeraire good, kjc is a consumer-specific random
deviation, and θjc is the quality parameter of one unit of a product consumed in country
c and sold by firm j.
Consider the optimization problem for an individual with income yc. After paying pjc to
buy one unit of his most preferred differentiated product, the individual spends the residual
15Examples of such models include Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2011).
16For these models to be isomorphic, one would need to assume that firm-level technological change
is also destination country specific. However, in my results, I show that the asymmetric effect across
countries is specific to quality upgrading. It does not hold for other firm-level changes, such as technology
upgrading.
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income (yc − pjc) on the numeraire good. Optimization yields the indirect utility17
Vkjc = θjc − pjcu′(yc) + kjc (2.2)
where u′(yc) is the marginal utility of income. The inverse of u′(yc) captures the quality
valuation: the lower u′(yc), the higher is the willingness to pay for quality.18
As is standard in discrete choice models19, for kjc a random deviation that follows a type
1 extreme-value distribution, the expected demand for each good can be represented as a
standard multinomial-logit formulation:
xjc =
Kc exp
[
1
µ
(θjc − pjcu′(yc))
]
∑
z∈Zc exp
[
1
µ
(θzc − pzcu′(yc))
] (2.3)
where Kc is the mass of consumers in country c, Zc is the set of all available products in c
and µ is a parameter that captures the degree of differentiation between goods.20
2.2.2 Production
For simplicity, there is a fixed number of firms J in the source country producing a dif-
ferentiated product. Similar to Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010), to produce one
unit of a product, the firm needs standard manufacturing inputs and activities, as well
as inputs and activities to differentiate the product and produce a certain level of quality.
The first requires a units of labor. The second requires bθβjc units of labor, with β > 1.21 θjc
is the vertical differentiation parameter, i.e., the quality level the firm decides to produce.
Thus, producing higher quality requires more skilled workers. For simplicity, I assume,
as Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010), that standard manufacturing activities require
only unskilled labor, while producing a certain level of quality requires skilled labor. Wages
17As shown in Verhoogen (2008), product price pjc needs to be small relative to the consumer’s income
yc. Then the first-order expansion of the sub-utility yields equation (2.2). Note that u(yc) does not affect
the choice probability and will drop out of the aggregate demand, leading to equation (2.2).
18For a given quality level θjc, individuals with lower u′(yc) are willing to pay higher prices.
19See McFadden (1974), McFadden (1978).
20As µ→ 0, the model approaches perfect competition (see Verhoogen (2008)).
21There are decreasing returns of vertical differentiation. When quality increases, there are diminishing
returns of reaching an additional consumer (search efforts are higher and shifting the demand function
becomes more difficult). This assumption follows Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010), for quality
differentiation, and Arkolakis (2010), for marketing investments. In Arkolakis (2010), as marketing ex-
penditure increases, marketing efficiency declines and it becomes more difficult to shift demand. Higher
values of β correspond to more intense diminishing returns.
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of the unkilled workers are normalized and wages of the skilled workers are denoted by w.22
I distinguish firms according to the innovation costs. Some firms pay a fixed innovation
cost F I to increase product quality. Since firms innovate to upgrade quality, the innova-
tion cost does not affect the production of standard manufacturing activities (conducted
by unskilled workers), but only the costs of producing the quality differentiated variety
(activities performed by the skilled workers).23 24
Firms that incur cost F I can more efficiently produce a certain quality level, by a factor
γj > 1 (a firm-specific random draw). Firms with sufficiently low γj will not incur the
innovation cost to increase product quality. The total cost functions TC for innovative
firms I and non-innovative firms NI are, respectively,
TCIj =
a+ bθβjcw
γj
xj(θjc, pjc) + F I (2.4)
TCNIj =
(
a+ bθβjcw
)
xj(θjc, pjc) (2.5)
with γj > 1 for innovative firms and aggregate demand (demand in North and South) for
a firm j defined as xj = xjN + xjS.
Firms with γj > 1 will incur the fixed cost F I ; for firms with sufficiently low γj it is not
optimal to pay the fixed innovation cost F I . The maximization problem for innovative I
and non-innovative NI firms follow:
Innovative firms I maximize profits piIj = piIjN +piIjS−F I , where piIjN and piIjS are the profits
before fixed cost in each destination country c = N,S:
piIjc =
(
pjc − a− bθ
β
jcw
γj
)
xjc(θjc, pjc), with c = N,S.
Non-innovative firms NI maximize profits piNIj = piNIjN + piNIjS , where piNIjN and piNIjS are the
profits before fixed cost in each destination country c = N,S:
22There is a large homogeneous goods sector that employs skilled and unskilled workers in fixed pro-
portions. This pins down wages, as in Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010).
23The innovation costs differ from the technological upgrading in Bustos (2011), where the fixed cost
represents a standard process innovation.
24F I could be, for instance, investment in softwares for product design or product engineering. These
costs will not affect standard manufacturing activities but will increase the productivity of the skilled
workers (e.g., after the innovation cost, designers have more time for product development, will be more
creative and able to produce highly differentiated products). Thus, one can think of the innovation cost
as a skill-biased innovation, which will lead to the production of higher quality.
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piNIjc =
(
pjc − a− bθβjcw
)
xjc(θjc, pjc), for c = N,S.
Firms choose pjc and θjc and maximize profits for each country of destination c. The
vertical differentiation parameter θjc is chosen to equalize its marginal cost to the inverse
of u′(yc), which represents the quality valuation. Using equation (2.3), the solution for θjc
is given by:
θjc =
(
γj
βbw
1
u′(yc)
) 1
β−1
(2.6)
with γj = 1 for non-innovative firms.
The parameter θjc increases with the quality valuation 1u′(yc) : firms produce high quality
for markets willing to consume high quality. θjc also increases with γj: for firms that invest
in product innovation, for which γj > 1, it is optimal to increase product quality. For firms
that did not incur the innovation cost, it is too costly to increase product quality by the
same amount. Note that, because of a higher optimal θjc, innovative firms (that initially
reduced marginal costs by γj) increase marginal costs by γ
1
β−1
j by producing a higher qual-
ity level.
The solution for prices follows
pjc = a+
1
u′(yc)
+
(
γj
bw
) 1
β−1
(
1
βu′(yc)
) β
β−1
(2.7)
with γj = 1 if the firm does not incur the F I innovation cost.
2.2.3 Product quality and export destinations: effect on the pro-
file of prices
I derive three predictions from the model, which are tested empirically using Brazilian
firm-level data. I study which firms upgrade product quality and to which markets they
upgrade quality, i.e., whether firms segment the market and offer higher quality at higher
prices to Northern countries. These predictions can be summarized as follows:
Prediction 1: Innovative firms sell higher quality at higher prices after innovation.
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Heterogeneity in γj leads innovative firms to produce higher quality at higher prices. From
the solution for θjc, if a firm innovates, it optimally produces a higher level of θjc, since
γj > 1. A higher γj leads to higher quality (from equation 2.6) and to higher prices (from
equation 2.7). Thus, innovative firms jointly increase price and quality.
Prediction 2: Northern consumers buy the quality upgraded product and pay higher prices.
For a sufficiently low income yS, Southern consumers choose low quality products and pay
low prices.
Since Northern consumers have a higher quality valuation ( 1
u′(yN ) >
1
u′(yS)), it is optimal
for the firm to choose a higher θjc to sell in Northern countries. From equation (2.7),
1
u′(yN ) >
1
u′(yS) implies that pN > pS for a given firm j.
From equation 2.7, since γj > 1,
∂pIjc
∂ 1
u′(yc)
>
∂pNIjc
∂ 1
u′(yc)
: the difference in prices is higher for inno-
vative firms. For a sufficiently low yS and a residual income yS − pjc, Southern consumers
can only afford consuming the low quality product with price pL, such that xo + pL ≈ yS
and u(yS − pH) ≈ 0, for pH the price of a high quality product.25
An important caveat of the model refers to the non-innovative firms exporting to Northern
countries. The model predicts that pIjN > pNIjN > pNIjS . Given a different willingness to pay in
North and South, non-innovative firms would increase (by less than innovative firms) prices
to the North. This result follows from the equation for prices pjc = a+ 1u′(yc) +
θjc
(βu′(yc))β
and
may be interpreted as a markup pricing, such as shown in Simonovska (2010) for Internet
prices across countries. In the empirics, I show that the difference pNIjN − pNIjS is not sta-
tistically significant for the set of non-innovative firms. For a more complete analysis, one
could extend the model to an approach similar to Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman
(2011), in which consumers are heterogeneous within a country, and quality and prices
increase in income. In this case, there would be a share of the population in Northern
countries consuming low quality at low prices, as I show in the empirics.
Prediction 3: Innovative firms jointly increase product quality and the share of skilled
workers and hire γ
1
β−1
j more skilled workers than non-innovative firms. The increase in
costs affects the profile of prices.
25Note that prices may not be too similar to income, such that the first-order expansion of sub-utility
in equation 2.1 holds.
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By assumption of the model, quality differentiation activities are performed by skilled
workers, while standard manufacturing activities are performed by unskilld workers. Us-
ing the solution for θjc, the demand for skilled workers for innovative firms is given by:
bθβjc
γj
=
(
γj
b
) 1
β−1
(
1
βwu′(yc)
) β
β−1 . Thus, relative to non-innovative firms, innovative firms hire
more skilled workers by a factor of γ
1
β−1
j , and charge higher prices.26
2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Brazilian economy in the 1990s
The period under analysis in the empirical part of the Chapter is 1997-2000. To under-
stand firms’ behavior in this period, I provide a background on the Brazilian economy in
the 1990s.
The 1990s represent a particular moment for the Brazilian economy: economic stability
after the end of decades of inflation, trade liberalization, the introduction of the Real as
the new currency in 1994, high increases in productivity, and a sharp currency devalua-
tion in 1999. Trade liberalization created opportunities for Brazilian exporters but also
represented a challenge, once they faced tougher competition and needed to adapt their
products to be able to compete in tougher markets.27 The local currency, pegged to the
U.S. dollar until 1999, was overvalued in the last years of this period. Thus, firms were able
to import better technology at lower prices and to adapt their production to international
standards. In 1999, the change in the exchange rate regime to free float culminated in a
sharp devaluation that created additional incentives for firms to export.
Firm internal R&D activities were 40% higher in the period 1998-2000 in comparison to the
later years (PINTEC 2003). As shown in Figure 2.1, among the reasons for manufacturing
exporters to innovate, the most cited in the period 1998-2000 were (1) to maintain their
26For simplicity, the demand for unskilled workers does not change.
27Mündler (2004) studies the effects of trade barriers on the productivity of Brazilian firms in the period
1986-98. His results indicate that foreign competition pressures are an important source of productivity
change. Bloom, Draca, and Rennen (2011) look at the effect of competition with Chinese products on
innovation rates in developed countries. They find that trade liberalization caused developed countries to
increase their investments in technology due to competition. Martin and Méjean (2011) study the effect
of low-income countries’ competition on quality upgrading of French firms.
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market share and, (2) to improve product quality (PINTEC 2000).28 When asked about the
most important market and the most important strategic change, most firms answered they
innovate to meet foreign consumers requirements and innovate to change product design,
respectively.29 Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that many firms created an export
type product in this period, a variety associated with higher quality and in conformity with
the international quality standards, such as requested in Japan and European countries.
Firms adapted their production lines to reach consumers with high willigness to pay for
quality, while Mercosur countries continued consuming the low quality varieties as before.
The anedoctal evidence is supported by the PINTEC (2000) innovation survey used in
this Chapter. If we consider firms that exported exclusively to Mercosur, very few of them
did product innovation. Moreover, out of 472 firms that exported exclusively to Mercosur
in the year 2000, only 6 of them reported high efforts to increase product quality and to
meet foreign consumer requirements (PINTEC (2000) innovation survey).30 These num-
bers support the anecdotal evidence that firms increased product quality to meet demand
for quality in high-income countries. Firms exporting only to neighbor markets had low
profit incentives to increase product quality.
A similar argument for futher Latin-American economies is found in Verhoogen (2008) and
Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010). Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010) claim
that exporting to high-income countries requires higher quality and better skilled workers,
while selling to neighboring Mercosur countries may require the same quality level from
the domestic sales. Verhoogen (2008) uses a similar argument for the Mexican economy in
the 1990s. 31
28These informations are available for 3750 exporters surveyed in the period 1998-2000. For instance,
concerning the market, firms were asked whether they innovated to maintain their market shares, to enter
new markets or to increase their market shares. Most firms answered to maintain their market shares.
29For instance, concerning strategic changes, firms are asked whether they changed (i) the organizational
structure, (ii) the marketing strategies, (iii) the product design or (iv) certifying norms. The highest mean
of positive responses was attributed to changes in product design, followed by certifying norms.
30This number if higher if one considers general efforts of the firm to increase product quality, not
related to foreign consumers. However, the innovation rate is still much smaller for firms that exported
exclusively to Mercosur. The innovation rate in this case is of roughly 10% for firms that exported
exclusively to Mercosur in the year 2000, compared to roughly 45% for the rest of the sample.
31 Verhoogen (2008) focuses on the effect of quality upgrading on wage dispersion. Verhoogen (2008)
argues that after trade liberalization, Mexican firms had one product for the home market and one to be
exported to the United States. The argument is illustrated with the example of the enterprise Volkswagen.
Volkswagen produced at that time the Original Beetle with old technology to sell in the home market, and
the New Bettle and Jetta with state-of-the-art technology to export to the U.S. market.
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The period was also marked by high increases in productivity: the productivity increase
in 2000 was of 6.5% and in the years before it outnumbered 10% per year in some in-
dustries (Bonelli, 2001). Moreover, in an attempt to protect the home industry and to
increase exports, the government implemented several programs to support firms to meet
international standards, upgrade quality and be able to compete in tougher markets. Some
important policies in this period were: (i) sectoral policies that included export financing
facilities from the BNDES (the Brazilian Development Bank); (ii) the creation of the Min-
istry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) in 1999; and (iii) special R&D
incentives from the Ministry of Technology (Bonelli, 2001).32
2.3.2 Data sources
The data set is uniquely rich and combines three main information of Brazilian firms: (i)
the three dimensional export and price data, (ii) information on process and product in-
novation, and (iii) workers characteristics. The firm-level data is matched with additional
information, including the NBER-UN World Bilateral Trade Data and further data de-
scribed in 3.2.2, which provide a set of control variables for product, sector, and country
characteristics.
Firm-level data: innovation, export prices, and workers data
The firm-level data is matched using the unique CNPJ tax number. The main data sources
used are the Brazilian three dimensional exports data from SECEX (Foreign Trade Secre-
tariat) and the PINTEC Survey (Brazilian Firm Industrial Innovation Survey). The data
also contains further firm characteristics and information on formally employed workers at
the firm.
SECEX exports data:33 Contains annualized data on export sales, quantities and weights
(mainly kilograms) by firm, product and destination country for the universe of Brazilian
32Moreover, many other policies were created to help small and medium sized exporters, many of them
specific to the European market.
33The data comes from the Brazilian customs declarations for merchandize exports that is collected for
every exporting firm by the SECEX (Secretaria de Comércio Exterior - Foreign Trade Secretariat).
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manufacturing exporters. The period used is 1997-2000. The classification of products
follows the 8 digit level NCM classification (Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul). The first
six digits of NCM correspond to the first 6 digits HS classification (international Harmo-
nized System), which allows comparison with international databases.34
All export values are reported in U.S. dollars (USD) free on board (f.o.b.). Values are
deflated by the US CPI (United States Consumer Price Index) from August 1994.35
With the SECEX data, I create a measure of average prices as Upricefcgt = V aluefcgtQuantfcgt , in
which V aluefcgt represents sales and Quantfcgt the quantity sold of product g by firm f to
country c at time t. Thus, Upricefcgt represents the yearly average price by g, f , c and t.
The precise steps to build the SECEX dataset are explained in the online Data Appendix.
Table 2.1 shows price variation in terms of standard deviations. Since most results shown
in the empirical section refer to European Union and Mercosur, the standard deviation in
Table 2.1 refers to these markets. The upper part of the table shows that the standard
deviation of log prices across destinations for a firm-product pair is on average 0.188 in the
year 1997 and 0.200 in the year 2000. The lower part of Table 2.1 shows that the deviation
of log prices within product-country pairs across firms is, on average, 0.459 and 0.486 in
the years 1997 and 2000, respectively.36 As expected, in both cases the variation is high
for differentiated goods and low for homogeneous goods.
PINTEC Industrial Innovation Survey: the PINTEC (Pesquisa Industrial de Inovação Tec-
nológica) conducts a triennial innovation survey among Brazilian firms. In this Chapter I
use the wave 1998-2000, which contains detailed information concerning the firms’ innova-
tive efforts in the period 1998-2000.37 Overall, there are 154 questions related to product
and process innovation. For instance, for product innovation, firms are asked whether they
improved a product in the period 1998-2000.38 Firms are also asked about the impor-
34The correspondence between the NCM 6 digit and the HS 6 digit allows matching the Brazilian data
with the NBER-UN bilateral world trade data documented by Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005),
as well as with the Rauch (1999) classification of goods. I match the information of the HS classification
with the SITC classification (Standard International Trade Classification) in order to be able to use the
Rauch (1999) classification of goods and the NBER-UN world trade data.
35The reason for the base August 1994 is the introduction of the new currency, the real, in July 1994.
36The standard deviation is small comparing to the results reported by Manova and Zhang (2012) for
Chinese firms. In the case of Chinese expoters, the standard deviation within firm-product across countries
and within product-country across firms are, respectively, 0.46 and 0.90.
37The innovation questionnaire is available at:
http://www.pintec.ibge.gov.br/downloads/PUBLICACAO/Publicacao%20PINTEC%202000.pdf.
38Corresponds to Questions 7 and 8 from the survey. In Question 7 firms are asked whether they
improved a product already existent in the market (already sold by other firms). In Question 8 firms are
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tance of product innovation to improve product quality and asked for which market they
innovate (domestic versus foreign).39 The main variables used for the quality treatment
are described in Table 2.2. Moreover, many other questions allow for robustness checks,
including information on the main destination market (EU, Asia, Mercosur, US, other
american countries), whether the firm invested in product design and whether the firm in-
novated to maintain the market share40. The questions also allow evaluating asymmetries
across products (e.g., the share of sales of the innovated product in the domestic and in the
foreign market). See description of main variables in Table 2.2. For further information,
see the online Data Appendix.
The data also contains several characteristics of workers formally employed at the firms.
The employer-employee data form the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais provides, at
the firm level, the following variables of interest: (i) average wages, (ii) share of workers
with primary, high-school and tertiary education, (iii) number of workers as a proxy for
firm size, and (iv) share of workers by occupation, according to the International Labour
Office (ILO) ISCO-88 classification of occupations. The variables are summarized in Table
2.3. More information is found in the online Data Appendix.
Since this Chapter is interested in manufacturing exporters, all other industries are left
out of the sample, which makes the data comparable to other studies on the Brazilian
economy, such as Arkolakis and Muendler (2011). Figure 2.2 shows the share of exports of
the main industries that exported products to European Union and Mercosur. Firms are
divided into industries according to their decision to upgrade product quality.41
The SECEX exports data and the employer-employee data are available for the universe of
Brazilian manufacturing exporters. The Innovation Survey from PINTEC is available for a
representative sample of 3,750 manufacturing exporters.42 Of those, 3,070 exported in the
asked if they improved a product that was new to the market
39Question 77 asks the importance of product innovation to increase product quality. Question 106 asks
where are located the consumers to which the firm innovated. Most firms that innovated answered they
innovated to meet foreign consumers requirements.
40Firms are asked whether they innovated to maintain the market, to increase market share, to enter
new markets, to increase the scope of product, to increase production capacity or production flexibility, to
reduce labour costs, to reduce energy costs, among others.
41The list of industries used is found in the Data Appendix.
42The survey was conducted with manufacturing exporters, non-manufacturing exporters and domestic
firms, with a total of 10,658 firms. The interest of this work lies in manufacturing exporters, and therefore
the sample includes 3,750 firms. Note that also intermediaries and their commercial resales of manufactures
are removed from the sample. Thus, the products and firms from the sample are comparable to the sample
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year 2000 and 2,868 exported in the year 1997. In order to identify the quality upgrading
effect over time (before and after the innovation survey), only permanent exporters are
kept in the sample. This reduces the sample to 2,443 firms. New exporters and quitters
are analyzed separately only for robustness checks.43
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics for the 2,443 permanent exporters, for the years 1997
and 2000, by innovative behavior and year. Innovative firms have higher revenues and sell
more products in more destination markets. Although, an interesting fact from Table 2.4
is that the two groups have similar trends from the year 1997 to 2000. Despite for the
variables related to workers’ characteristics, the variation over time for the two groups fol-
low similar patterns. Moreover, the fact that workers’ characteristics face different trends
in the two groups is an interesting result: as stated in Prediction 3, innovative firms need
better skilled workers to produce higher quality, and therefore would also increase workers
skills over time.
Control variables
World bilateral trade flows: The bilateral trade flows data comes from the NBER-UN yearly
trade data, documented by Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005). The NBER-UN
trade data provides an accurate measure of trade flows using the Standard International
Trade Classification (SITC 2 - Division), 4 digits, which is matched with the HS classifica-
tion.44 The one-by-one mapping between the first six digits of the Brazilian NCM product
classification and the first 6 digits HS (international Harmonized System) classification
allows the concordance with the world trade data. The values are mainly reported by the
importing country, leading to a more accurate measure (because of differences between
c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices , s. Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)).
With the NBER-UN data it is possible calculate different measures of market power and a
used in other studies, as Arkolakis and Muendler (2011) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004).
43For the comparison between European Union and Mercosur, I keep only firms that exported to both
groups of countries in both years (1997 and 2000). Thus, I also drop all firms that exported exclusively
to Mercosur, which represent 472 firms in the year 2000. Thus, the sample reduces to 1,400 firms. As a
comparison regarding sample size, in the study on innovation and technology upgrading with Argentinian
firms, Bustos (2011) uses a sample of 1,639 surveyed firms.
44The U.S. Imports data from the NBER-UN provides a concordance concordance between SITC 2 and
the HS 6 digits classification.
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proxy for production (measured by the importance of each sector in the destination mar-
ket). The variables are defined in Table 2.3.
World trade elasticities: Data on import demand elasticities from Broda, Greenfield, and
Weinstein (2010). The elasticities are available at the 3-digit HS for 73 countries.
GDP per capita: Data on GDP per capita (CGDPc) comes from the Penn World Table
(PWT) 6.2. The version 6.2 uses the year 2000 as the base year.
Income inequality: Income inequality data (Gini coefficient and income deciles) comes
from the UNO-WIDER (United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Re-
search)45. In case of duplicate values for a year-country pair, I choose the highest quality
rating, keep the latest revision, keep if the area covered is the whole country, and give
preference to disposable income information.46 47
To classify products between differentiated and non-differentiated goods, I use the Rauch
(1999) classification of goods.48
2.4 Empirical strategy
The identification strategy to test Predictions 1, 2 and 3 follows a difference-in-difference-
in-differences (DDD) strategy. To control for the possible endogeneity and non-random
self-selection of quality upgrading, I combine the DDD with matching techniques. More-
over, Sections 5 and 6 discuss several robustness checks and placebo exercises to address
the endogeneity concern. For the DDD, the price outcome is compared between the years
45Data available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en GB/wiid/.
46The precise steps to drop duplicate values are: (i) keep the highest quality rating, (ii) keep the latest
Revision, (iii), keep if the area covered is the whole country, (iv) keep if the income unit is the household,
(v) keep if the statistical unit is the person, (vi) keep if the income definition is Disposable Income, (vii)
drop if information on currency is not available.
47Information on the Gini coefficient is available for all countries in the sample of EU and Mercosur
countries, except for Paraguay in the year 2000. For Paraguay I use the information from the year 1999. For
robustness checks using additional countries, I need to expand the Gini coefficient in case the information
is missing for a given year: for the cross-section 2000, for instance, information on the Gini coefficient was
available only for 73 countries. Thus, in case the information for the year 2000 is missing, I use information
from the years 1999 and 2001, respectively. Similar for 1997, which increases the sample to 91 countries.
48Rauch (1999) uses the 4 digit SITC product classification (issued by the United Nations) to aggregate
the trade data in three groups of commodities: (i.) w, homogeneous (organized exchange) goods: goods
traded in an organized exchange; (ii.) r, reference priced goods: not traded in an organized exchange,
but which have some quoted reference price, as industry publications; and (iii.) n differentiated goods:
without any quoted price.
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1997 (t0, before treatment) and 2000 (t, after treatment) for the EU (treated) and Mercosur
countries (control group) for firms that upgraded product quality (treated) and firms that
did not (control group). Figure 2.3 presents in a simple way the structure of the treatment
effects. A further layer for identification refers to differentiated (treated) and homogeneous
goods (control group). The main assumption is that, controlling for firm-product-country
fixed effects, period fixed effects, and several time-varying variables, the price effect iden-
tifyed is due to quality differences across groups. To test Prediction 3 from the stylized
model, the treated group is represented by firms that did both skill and quality upgrading
over time.
Since the identification requires variation over time, only permanent exporters active in
the destination markets of interest are kept in the sample. Most of the results refer to EU
and Mercosur, and in Section 6 the analysis is extended to further destination countries.
Mercosur and EU are used in the main analysis for two main reasons. First, besides the
United States, the EU and Mercosur represent the main markets for Brazilian products.
Second, following the motivation from Section 3.1, EU and Mercosur represent the ex-
tremes of the quality varieties exported by Brazilian firms. For the EU, a market with a
high share of high-income individuals, firms are willing to innovate and to upgrade quality.
For Mercosur, a market with a high share of low-income individuals, firms have low profit
incentives to introduce their high quality product (e.g. because of entry and marketing
costs, or production capacity constraints). Thus, for these two groups, there is a lower
probability that the firm ships a mix of quality products to the same market.49 50
2.4.1 Quality upgrading
A firm upgrades product quality from time t0 to t if the following questions are answered
affirmatively in the innovation survey: (1) undertook product innovation and (2) product
innovation was important to increase product quality. Table 2.2 describes the questions.
49In some South American countries as Chile, for instance, it is less clear whether consumers buy the
low quality variety or the high quality variety. This is also the case of some new European countries not
in the European Union by 2000.
50Robustness checks are carried using only the EU countries with similar (high) income per capita and
same currency: France, Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria. The effect is slightly higher in
magnitude, but the significance does not change.
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For Qualft0 the initial level of quality of a firm f , if the firm answers positively both
questions, then Qualf,t > Qualft0 . The dummy variable for quality upgrading over time
follows:
Upgradeft =
 1 if t > t0 ∧Qualft > Qualft00 if t < t0 ∨Qualft = Qualft0
As alternative treatment measures for Upgradeft, different questions from the PINTEC
(2000) innovation survey are used for robustness checks. Since most firms are multiproduct
firms, I also use information on the importance (percentage of sales) of the innovated prod-
uct in the export volume. Further questions from the innovation survey refer to changes
in product design changes to adapt to international rules and certifying norms.
According to Prediction 1 from the theoretical model, if a firm invests in product in-
novation and increases product quality (Upgradeft = 1), then ∆t,t0Upricefcgt > 0, for
Upricefcgt the yearly average export price of product g from firm f sold to country c in
time t (see variables description in Table 2.2). For simplicity of exposition, the stylized
model from section 3 assumed that each firm produces one variety. In the sample used
in the estimations, around 77% of the firms are multiproduct firms. Thus, products are
indexed by g and firms by f . Asymmetries across products are discussed later in this
section.
Firms that did not upgrade quality over time, for which Upgradeft = 0 ∀t, are used as a
control group. Note that Upgradeft = 0 ∀f in t0. Selection issues are discussed in Sections
5 and 6. A vector of variables Xfcgt controls for many firm, product, and market charac-
teristics that might vary over time, described in Table 2.3. The DD specification follows:
log(Upricefcgt) = Upgradeftγdd + log(Xfcgt)β + δfcg + µt + ufcgt (2.8)
where the TREATED group is composed by firms that upgraded product quality over time
(Upgradeft = 1); log(Xfcgt) is a vector of control variables described in Table 2.3; δfcg is
a firm-product-country unobserved heterogeneity; µt is a time-varying intercept; and ufcgt
is an error term.
The coefficient of interest, γdd, shows the effect of quality upgrading on the profile of prices,
expected to be positive.
Moreover, according to Prediction 2, firms increase product quality to attend demand
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from Northern countries. The motivation and plausibility for this prediction has been
discussed in Section 3.1. As a hypothesis, products sold to the EU by innovative firms
received the quality treatment, while products exported to Mercosur did not receive the
treatment over time (control group). The DDD specification follows:
log(Upricefcgt) = Upgradeft∗EUγddd+Upgradeftα1+EUα2+log(Xfcgt)β+δfcg+µt+ufcgt
(2.9)
where the TREATED group are the products exported to the (EU = 1), by firms that
upgraded product quality over time (Upgradeft = 1).
In the DDD specification, the coefficient of interest is γddd. The effect is expected to be
positive: higher prices in the EU are explained by imports from firms that innovate and
upgrade product quality.
Since the treatment is not a random assignment, I combine the DDD with matching tech-
niques in Section 6. Section 5 discusses the markup hypothesis and the role of the elasticity
of substitution, and several robustness checks and placebo exercises are conducted in Sec-
tions 5 and 6.
Results for equation (2.9) are shown for different types of goods, using the Rauch (1999)
classification of goods. Since homogeneous goods do not have (or have little) scope for
quality differentiation, the coefficient of γddd is expected to be positive and significant only
for differentiated goods. For non-differentiated goods (the sum of reference priced goods
and homogeneous goods) results are expected to be non-significant.51
2.4.2 An integrated quality and skill upgrading mechanism
According to Prediction 3, producing higher quality requires a higher share of skilled
workers.52 Thus, by increasing the level of quality θjc, firms also increase the quality of
their workers.
The prediction on complementarity is tested using a skill upgrading mechanism. The
51
52Firms that upgrade product quality need better qualified workers. Similar cases were analysed in the
literature before by, e.g., Yeaple (2005) for technology choice, and Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2010)
for quality choice.
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variation in workers skills over time (skill upgrading) is proxied by the increase in the
firm’s share of workers with tertiary education (∆t,t0ShareHighEducf ), the increase in
the firm’s share of professionals (∆t,t0ShareProfessionalsf ) and the increase in firm’s
average wages (∆t,t0Wagesf ) between 1997 (t0) and 2000 (t). The variation over time is
compared to the median of the industry i, taken as the threshold.53 The dummy variable
for skill upgrading follows:
Skillsft =

1 if t > t0 ∧
∆t,t0ShareProfessionalsf > median(∆t,t0ShareProfessionals)i∧
∆t,t0ShareHighEducf > median(∆t,t0ShareHighEduc)i∧
∆t,t0Wagesf > ∧median(∆t,t0Wages)i
0 otherwise
Skillsft means that a firm upgraded the quality of the labor force from t0 to t if the variation
in workers characteristics is higher than then median variation in the same industry i.54
Prediction 3 of the model suggests that skill upgrading over time (Skillsft = 1) leads to
increases in prices, ∆t,t0Upriceft > 0.
The effect of quality and skill upgrading on prices is estimated as follows:
log(Upricefcgt) = Skillsft∗Upgradeftγdds+Skillsftβ1+Upgradeftβ2+log(Xfcgt)β3+δfcg+ufcgt
(2.10)
where the TREATED group is composed by firms that upgraded product quality and
workers’ skills over time (Skillsft ∗ Upgradeft). The coefficient of interest is γdds and is
expected to be positive. Firms that jointly increase product quality and workers’ skills
charge higher prices. The variable Skillsft is also tested separately.
One important critique to the skill upgrading mechanism could be that wages may be de-
termined ex post and they would, in this case, reflect rent-sharing and not skill upgrading.
53If a firm increased these shares and the average wages more than the industry median between 1997
(t0) and 2000 (t), then the firm upgraded workers’ skills in this period.
54With this assumption, it might happen that some firms below the median upgraded workers’ skills
too, what would underestimate the results. Although, the assumption rules out a possible bias due to
trends in specific industries. Another concern with this specification relates to negative values of the
median (in case the whole industry had a negative shock). Thus, alternatively, I estimate the results only
for the industries that have not suffered negative shocks in the period. I also estimate results without
wages. Results are robust in both cases.
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See, for instance, the discussion of rent-sharing in Frías, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009).
As a robustness check, the same analysis is conducted without wages, using the vari-
able Skillsnowageft . This variable considers only the ∆t,t0ShareProfessionalsf (measure of
white-collar occupation) and ∆t,t0ShareHighEducf (measure of education), which are ex
ante decisions of the firm, as follows.
Skillsnowageft =

1 if t > t0 ∧
∆t,t0ShareProfessionalsf > median(∆t,t0ShareProfessionals)i∧
∆t,t0ShareHighEducf > median(∆t,t0ShareHighEduc)i∧
0 otherwise
2.5 Results
This section presents evidence of quality-based market segmentation: firms increase prod-
uct quality and prices to high-income countries, and the effect is not driven by markups,
elasticities of substitution, or firm selection. The section is divided as follows. Section
5.1 confirms prediction 1 from the stylized model: firms jointly increase product quality
and product prices. Section 5.2 confirms prediction 2 from the model: firms that upgrade
quality raise quality and prices to high-income countries. Section 5.3 shows that higher
prices in high-income countries are not driven by different markups or elasticities of substi-
tution, but are rather a result from quality upgrading and market segmentation. Finally,
Section 5.4 discusses prediction 3 from the model on the complementarity between quality
upgrading and workers’ skills.
Results in Section 5 are shown for European Union and Mercosur and, in Section 6, they
are extended to further countries. Since I am interested in the variation over time, results
are reported for permanent exporters to the EU and Mercosur.55 The control variables
xgfc used are described in Table 2.3.
55Permanent exporters are firms exporting to these markets in all years.
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2.5.1 Quality upgrading as an explanation for price differences
across firms
Table 2.5 confirms the first prediction from the model: firms that increased product quality
over time charge higher prices. The estimation strategy is the DD described in equation
2.8. Estimations are shown using firm-product-country fixed effects, a period dummy and
various control variables, described in Table 2.3.56 Columns (1) to (3) include different
measures of market share. Columns (1) to (3) show results for differentiated goods and
include different firm-product and country characteristics. Columns (4) to (6) show results
for homogeneous goods. As expected, the effect on prices is only observed for differentiated
goods, with scope for quality differentiation. The results are robust to several measures of
market power and to other firms’ characteristics.
2.5.2 Market segmentation: innovative firms upgrade quality to
Northern countries
Table 2.6 shows the results for the DDD, which corresponds to Prediction 2 from the model.
Northern countries have a high demand for high quality products. Thus, firms increase
product quality to attend this demand, which implies higher costs and higher prices. In
particular, in the period of the Brazilian economy under analysis, firms innovated to adapt
to foreign consumer requirements and to maintain their foreign markets, as discussed in
Section 3.1. As shown in Columns (1) to (3), for differentiated goods the effect of quality
upgrading on prices is captured by products sold to the EU. This is shown by the inter-
action term Upgradeft ∗ EU : firms increased product quality and product prices to EU
countries. As expected, results for homogeneous goods are not significant.57
56The data is clustered at the firm level. Alternatively, clustering by firm-product level does not change
the significance of the results.
57Note that the level effect, Upgradeft is not significant but even negative. This reinforces the fact that
firms upgraded quality to Northern countries, since EU captures the whole effect.
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2.5.3 Further evidence of market segmentation: higher prices in
Northern countries can not be explained only by markups
The markup hypothesis
One important concern is pricing to market. It could be that the observed price variation
across countries reflects markups and not quality shifts, yet the analysis controls for several
measures of market power and market competition. Variation in markups across countries
has been shown, e.g., by Simonovska (2010). To overcome this caveat, I present further
evidence that supports the quality hypothesis.
As a first falsification exercise, I compare sales of non-innovative firms across markets. If
the price effect is due to a (first degree) price discrimination in European countries and not
due to quality upgrading, non-innovative firms should receive a price premium from their
exports to the EU. Using a EU dummy, Table 2.7 shows that there is no significant price
difference across destination for non-innovative firms over time. EU is not significant.58
Thus, the variation in prices across countries can not be attributed to higher markups in
Northern countries.
This analysis also rules out the possibility that prices are driven by market-specific shocks
in Northern countries, or by changes in transportation costs: in this case, we would observe
also for non-innovative firms an increase in prices to the EU. In contrast, results are not
significant, as shown in Table 2.7.
A second falsification exercise is to compare sales to the South for firms that upgraded
product quality compared to those that did not.59 It could be that, after incuring the in-
novation cost to increase product quality, firms also sell the high quality variety to Southern
markets. And, in case firms export high quality to the South, they should receive a price
premium in the South. Thus, Table 2.8 studies whether innovative firms increase prices to
the South after quality upgrading (in comparison to firms that did not upgrade quality).
Interestingly, the variable Upgradeft has no effect on prices, i.e., firms that upgrade quality
do not receive any price premium in the South in comparison to firms that did not upgrade
quality. Thus, if there is only a small demand for high quality in Southern countries, firms
have low incentives to introduce the high quality variety in the South. Results from Table
58The effect is also not significant for the COREPRODUCTft (the firms’ most important variety,
defined in Table 2.2).
59Innovative and non-innovative firms are active in both markets.
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2.8 support the hypothesis that the price premium is driven by exports to the EU.
Markups and the elasticity of substitution
Using the 3 HS digit demand elasticities computed by Broda, Greenfield, and Weinstein
(2010), Table 2.9 studies whether results are robust to different elasticities of substitution
across countries. In case the demand elasticity is different across countries, price variation
across markets could reflect pricing to market, and not quality differences.
To test whether the effect is driven by the elasticity of substition, the HS 3 digit sectors
are divided according to the similarity in the demand elasticity in the EU and Mercosur,
resulting in two groups:
SimilarHIGH = 1 if both Mercosur and EU have a relatively high demand elasticity in a
given HS 3 digit sector. An elasticity is defined as high if it is above the median elasticity
in the HS 3 digit sector. The median is computed across all countries for which elasticity
data is available (73 countries).
SimilarLOW = 1 if both Mercosur and EU have a relatively low demand elasticity in a
given HS 3 digit sector. An elasticity is defined as low if it is below the median elasticity
in the HS 3 digit sector. Also in this case, the median is computed across all countries for
which data is available.
Thus, SimilarHIGH and SimilarLOW are measures of relative similarity in the elasticity,
comparing to other countries in the world.
Finally, the sample is divided according to the relative similarity in the elasticity (both
high and low). The first sample corresponds to observations for which SimilarHIGH = 1
or SimilarLOW = 1 (in this case EU and Mercosur have similar elasticities, high or
low). The second sample corresponds to observations for which SimilarHIGH = 0 or
SimilarLOW = 0 (in this case EU and Mercosur have relatively different elasticities,
either high or low).
If the price effect is not a result from different elasticities across destinations (implying
markup pricing), the effect of Upgradeft ∗EU will hold for sectors in which Mercosur and
EU have relatively similar elasticities (either SimilarHIGH = 1 or SimilarLOW = 1).
Results in Table 2.9 shows that this is the case. Columns (1) to (3) reveal that the effect of
quality upgrading on prices is significant for sectors with relatively similar elasticities across
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countries. Columns (4) to (6) present results for sectors with different elasticities. Thus,
results can not be explained only by different elasticities of substitution across countries.
2.5.4 An integrated quality and skill upgrading mechanism: up-
grading workers’ skills reinforces the effect of quality on
prices
Innovative firms need more skilled workers to produce higher quality, a result shown in
Prediction 3 of the model. Table 2.10 shows the results for the unified quality and skill
upgrading mechanism.
Columns (1) and (2) show the results for Skillsft: increasing workers’ skills leads to higher
prices. In Columns (3) and (4), the interaction term combining quality and skill upgrading
Skillsft ∗ Upgradeft is added. Results reveal that firms jointly increasing product quality
and workers’ skills charge higher prices. While the level effect of Skillsft is not significant
and even negative, the level effect for the variable Upgradeft remains significant, suggesting
that the complementarity among quality upgrading and skills is not perfect. Thus, factors
different from workers’ skills help explaining the effect of product quality on prices.
The analysis shown in columns (1) to (4) includes information on wages. As discussed
in Frías, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2009), wages might reflect rent-sharing. In this case,
it would not capture skill upgrading. Thus, columns (5) to (8) present results including
the interacton term Skillsnowageft ∗ Upgradeft (using only information on workers educa-
tion and occupation, ex ante decisions of the firm). Results in columns (6) and (8) sug-
gest that using information on wages might generate an upward bias in the coefficient of
Skillsnowageft ∗ Upgradeft, even though the significance of the results does not change 60.
The level effect of Skillsnowageft is even negative and significant once the interaction term
with quality is added. This negative result might capture observations for which skill up-
grading is related to process innovation and not to product innovation.61 Thus, while the
effect of quality upgrading has a positive and robust effect on prices, the effect of skill
upgrading on prices might reflect process upgrading as well.
60Although, further analysis is needed to study which firms are in each of the groups.
61One can easily imagine cases in which skill upgrading is related to technology upgrading, and not
directly to product upgrading.
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2.6 Identification of the Price Variation
2.6.1 Price variation across countries is not observable for other
sources of firm heterogeneity unrelated to quality
Results in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show that price differences across firms and countries are
not observable to other changes in firms’ characteristics, but are rather specific to quality
upgrading. In particular, I look at process innovation for comparison.
The PINTEC (2000) innovation survey contains information on process innovation activi-
ties, as described in Table 2.2. The variable for process innovation Processft is constructed
in a similar way to Upgradeft:
Processft = 1 for firms that answered they did process innovation in time t, and zero
otherwise.
Results in Table 2.11 reveal that Processft is not significant, which is a plausible re-
sult. Following the efficiency sorting models of trade62, more productive firms have lower
marginal costs and charge lower prices. Thus, these models would predict a negative effect
of process innovation (technology upgrading) on prices. Importantly, controlling for effi-
ciency, Upgradeft remains positive and significant in all specifications.
The interaction term Processft ∗EU in Table 2.12 reveals that differences in prices across
countries are not driven by process innovation. As expected, prices are not higher in
Northern (EU) countries for firms that increased production efficiency, wich supports the
hypothesis of a quality-based market segmentation. The only significant value is found
at the 10% level, without controlling for important changes in country characteristics.63
Results suggest that differences in prices across countries can be attributed to quality
upgrading.
62Such as Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
63Similar robustness checks are carried using further questions from the innovation survey. For instance,
whether the firm changed the organizational structure (question v150 from the innovation survey). Results
are similar to the ones reported in Table 2.12.
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2.6.2 A placebo exercise using 1998 (year before treatment) as
the treatment year: The effect of quality on prices is not
driven by firms’ characteristics
Table 2.13 shows that the results are not driven by firm selection. The results from
Table 2.6 could be driven by firm-specific characteristics not related to quality upgrad-
ing. To overcome this issue, the price variation in the period 1997-1998 (before treat-
ment) is evaluated for the firms that received the treatment in the later period, com-
pared to the control group that did not receive the treatment. The variable of interest
is defined as UpgradePlaceboft, where UpgradeP laceboft = 0 in the year 1997 for all
firms, and UpgradeP laceboft = 1 in the year 1998 for firms that received the treatment
(Upgradeft = 1) in the subsequent period (1998-2000). Results in Table 2.13 reveal that
the effect of the placebo variable UpgradeP laceboft on prices is not significant, which sup-
ports the hypothesis that the effect on prices is not firm-specific, but rather quality-driven.
2.6.3 Results using different set of countries: The quality effect
is not driven by EU and Mercosur
The results from Section 5 are extended to different groups of countries. The variable
Group is defined as Group = 1 for Northern countries, and Group = 0 for Southern
countries. The groups are defined as:
Group1 = 1 if country is EU or United States; zero if Mercosur.
Group2 = 1 if country is United States; zero if Mercosur.
Group3 = 1 if country is United States or Canada; zero if Mercosur.
Group4 = 1 if country is EU, United States or Canada; zero if South America.
Results are shown in Table 2.14. In all cases, the interaction term Upgradef,t ∗ Group
is positive and significant, which confirms that results are not specific to the EU and
Mercosur.
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2.6.4 Propensity score matching and self-selection into quality
upgrading
An additional strategy to address the possible endogeneity of quality upgrading is to control
for self-selection into quality ugprading. The causal effect of quality upgrading on prices
assumes that E(lupricetreated − lupricecontrol|Upgrade = 1) = E(lupricetreated|Upgrade =
1) − E(lupricecontrol|Upgrade = 1), i.e., the difference in prices of firms that increased
product quality, compared to the outcome of firms had they not increased quality. The
problem is that the outcome of any firm is observed under either quality upgrading or not,
but never both, leading to a missing counterfactual.
The concern with self-selection is less severe in this Chapter given the additional within-
firm treated and control group of North and South countries, which generates additional
counterfactuals within the firm. However, the possible selection bias from the missing
counterfactural is addressed by creating control groups using matching techniques.
The intuition behind finding an appropriate control group is to find a group that is as close
as possible to the firm that increased product quality in terms of the predicted probability
to increase product quality. The underlying assumption for validity is that conditional
on a vector of firm observable characteristics X, potential outcomes with and without the
treatment are independent of the treatment status, i.e., outcome of treament firms p1 and
control firms p0 are orthogonal to the greatment status (Upgrade): (po, p1) ⊥ Upgrade|X.
The variables used for the the vector X are: number of employees, total revenues, num-
ber of products, foreign ownership information, share of white collar workers, and average
wages. I match within a year and within industries, and therefore the control group is
created within narrowly defined industries, instead of using the whole manufacturing in-
dustry. The matching technique used is the nearest neighbor matching.
The matching combined with the difference-in-differences approach controls for divergence
in the paths of performance between the firms that increased product quality and the
matched control firms that had similar characteristics in the pre-quality treatment year.
In this way it is possible to control for observed and unobserved effects. Examples of
papers using propensity score matching combined with the DD approach are Arnold and
Javorcik (2009) and De Loecker (2007). As discussed by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000),
while matching accounts for differences in observable characteristics, the combination with
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the DD provides scope for an unobserved determinant of participation as long as it can be
represented by separable individual- and/or time-specific components of the error term.
Results reveal that the propensity score matching performs well in correcting the bias. The
average probability to participate in the treatment for all the individuals is roughly 40%.
The calculated bias before and after matching for each variable shows that the change in
the bias is of 20% on average. The differences between treatment group and control group
are reduced considerably in case of variables with a large bias before matching. In this way,
the control group is similar enough to the treatment group to be used for the estimation
of the average treatement effect on the treated (ATT).
Table 2.15 shows the results for the nearest neighbor matching strategy. Results for the
ATT reveal that individuals in the treated group realized an increase in prices of 52%. A
similar treatment is considered for sales to the EU, compared to sales to Southern coun-
tries. In this case, the results reveal that the treated group realized an increase in prices of
55%. Note that these numbers are much higher than the results found in Tables 2.5-2.16,
without the propensity score matching. One reason for the higher coefficients is the sample
of firms used for the matching, since not all firms could be matched. Using the smaller set
of firms for estimations as in Table 2.6 reveals a sightly higher coefficient. Moreover, the
propensity score matching puts more weight on cells with a high share of treated, while
the former estimations with a full vector of control variables gives more wight to cells with
balanced numbers of treated and control individuals. Importantly, in both cases estima-
tions are positive and statistically significant, confirming the hypothesis of the effects of
quality upgrading on prices and the asymmetric increases in product quality.
2.6.5 Asymmetries across products, sectors and the importance
of the core product for quality upgrading
In the sample used in this Chapter, 77% of the firms in the sample are multiproduct firms.
For those firms, it is possible to identify in the innovation survey the importance of the
innovated product to total sales of the firm. Table 2.17 show that the results are robust to
firms tat export few products, as well as to firms for which the percentage of sales of the
innovated product is higher than 50%. Moreover, Table 2.16 shows results for asymmetries
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across products for multiproduct firms.
Columns (1) to (4) from Table 2.17 show the results for firms for which the percentage
of exports of the innovated product is higher than 50%. The underlying idea is to use a
cleaner quality treatment, since multi-product firms may upgrade quality of only a set of
their products. For this purpose, in columns (1) to (4) I use the following question from the
PINTEC (2000) innovation survey: what is the percentage of foreign sales of the innovated
product.64 Results reveal similar effects for this sample of firms. Moreover, columns (5) to
(8) shows results for the intensive margin of products. In these columns, I use a sample
of firms that exported at most two HS 8-digit products in the period, for European Union
and Mercosur. Asymmetric effects of quality on prices across countries are again confirmed
for firms with few products, yet the magnitude of the results is much larger.
Table 2.16 presents further results of asymmetries across products. According to Eckel,
Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2011), firms invest more in the quality of the products
closer to their core competence, since they may obtain higher margins with these prod-
ucts. Thus, the profile of prices is positively correlated with the profile of sales and
the effect of Upgradeft on prices is expected to be higher for the core product. The
COREPRODUCTft is defined as the 8-digit variety representing the firm’s highest sales.65
66
This hypothes is isconfirmed in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.16, for differentiated goods.
The core product captures the effect of quality upgrading on prices, a result shown by the
interaction term COREPRODUCT ∗Upgradeft. As expected, for homogeneous goods no
effect is observed, as shown in columns (5) and (6).
The results for the core product are plausible, given the importance of the core variety
for firms’ sales. Around 77% of the firms in the sample are multiproduct firms. The core
product represents more than 75% of exports for 38% of the multiproduct firms, and more
64This question refers to the variables v74 and v75 from the innovation survey. With this variables, I
create the variable HighShareXft, shown in Table 2.2.
6577% of the firms in the sample are multiproduct firms. For 60% of the multiproduct firms, the
coreproduct corresponds to more than 50% of the sales
66In the period under analysis, only 2 firms from the sample changed their 8 digit COREPRODUCTft.
This does not imply that there is no product level dynamics within the firm. First, I find evidence of changes
in the product mix for varieties that are not in the core. Second, there is quality variation within an 8-digit
product and, most likely, product churning within an 8-digit product. Third, I evaluate only permanent
exporters, which have less variation in their core business. Thus, the fact that the core product remains
stable for those firms does not contradict the results from Iacovone and Javorcik (2010), Bernard, Redding,
and Shott (2011) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008) on product level dynamics within the firm.
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than 50% of exports for 73% of the multiproduct firms. Thus, sales are highly concentrated
in the core product.67
Columns (3) and (4) show results for asymmetries across sectors, using the Khandelwal
(2010) classification of short and long quality ladders (LADDERst, for a sector s and
time t). The long quality ladders are classified as sectors with higher scope for quality
differentiation (sectors above the median ladder). Thus, the effect of quality upgrading on
prices should be magnified for these sectors. As shown in columns (3) and (4) in Table
2.16, for differentiated goods the effect of quality upgrading on prices is captured by the
sectors classified as long quality ladders. This result is shown by the interaction term
LADDERst ∗ Upgradeft. For homogeneous goods, no effect is observed, as expected.
The results are in line with Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2011). They study
multiproduct Brazilian exporters between 1997 and 2006 and find that, with a real exchange
rate depreciation, firms adapt prices and quantities across products. Produts closer to the
firms’ core competence perceive higher increases in markups, since for the core product
the firm has lower marginal costs of production. However, they do not find any evidence
of variation across countries. Moreover, for the purposes of their study, they do not make
use innovation data, and, thus, can not sort out markups from quality differences.
Concerning possible effects of the exchange rate shock from 1999, two important facts must
be mentioned. First, there are no exchange rate differences across markets following the
devaluation of the real Brazilian exchange rate: a graphical analysis of the exchange rates
reveals that the size of the devaluation does not vary across countries. Thus, the difference
in prices between the two markets can not be due to the devaluation. Second, the exchange
rate shock was largely unexpected, which rules out the possibility that some exporters were
able to foresee higher revenues after the devaluation.
2.7 Conclusion
This Chapter investigates whether firms segment the market and adapt product quality
and product prices according to market conditions. Direct and detailed information on
self-reported quality upgrading over time allows studying whether the observable product
67These results are in line with the results reported in Arkolakis and Muendler (2011).
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price variation is due to quality variation, or to other factors, such as markups, elasticities
of substitution, destination country characteristics, or selection effects.
Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach, the Chapter finds evidence of quality-
based market segmentation, by which firms raise quality and prices to high-income coun-
tries. Results reveal that differences in prices across countries are not driven by markups,
but by demand for high quality.
The Chapter discusses self-selection into quality upgrading and shows several robustness
checks and placebo exercises that confirm the validity of the DDD strategy. The analysis
is extended in different ways. First, using different North/South countries, the Chapter
shows that results are not specific to the EU and Mercosur. Second, it shows that price
differences across countries are specific to quality upgrading, and do not hold for other
changes in firm’s characteristics. Third, asymmetries across products reveal that the core
product captures the whole effect of quality upgrading on prices.
In a nutshell, by sorting out different sources of price variation, the Chapter shows that
quality is a relevant margin of firm level adjustment and that firms segment destination
markets. Controlling for market structure and firms’ characteristics, where the firm exports
to matters. In particular, this is true despite different markups across destinations.
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Table 2.1: Variation in export prices. Standard deviation for the years 1997 and 2000
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Variation in export prices across destinations within firm-product pairs
Standard deviation of prices across destinations:
Total trade, year 1997 9902 0.188 0.407 0 4.321
Differentiated goods, year 1997 8514 0.196 0.410 0 4.321
Homogeneous goods, year 1997 214 0.056 0.223 0 2.638
Total trade, year 2000 16030 0.200 0.464 0 5.705
Differentiated goods, year 2000 13025 0.201 0.454 0 5.705
Homogeneous goods, year 2000 245 0.094 0.272 0 2.019
Variation in export prices across firms within country-product pairs
Standard deviation of prices across firms:
Total trade, year 1997 6611 0.459 0.772 0 5.766
Differentiated goods, year 1997 5321 0.499 0.797 0 5.766
Homogeneous goods, year 1997 168 0.072 0.179 0 1.746
Total trade, year 2000 10768 0.486 0.824 0 6.150
Differentiated goods, year 2000 8173 0.511 0.821 0 6.150
Homogeneous goods, year 2000 203 0.212 0.618 0 4.015
Table 2.2: Description of the dependent variable and main explanatory variables
Variable Variable description Data
Source
Average prices:
Upricefcgt Average US dollars f.o.b. export prices by firm f , country c and product g at time t: SECEX
V aluefcgt
Quantfcgt
, where V aluefcgt is the export value and Quantfcgt the export quantity.
Quality Upgrading and Product and Process Innovation:
Upgradeft Upgradeft = 1 if t > t0 and if PINTEC
Firm did product innovation (questions v07 and v08 from PINTEC (2000) Survey)
AND product innovation was important to increase product quality (question v77)1
Processft Processft = 1 if t > t0 and if PINTEC
Firm did process innovation (questions v10 and v11 from PINTEC (2000) Survey)
HighShareDft Share of domestic sales of the innovated product (questions v71 and v72)2 PINTEC
HighShareXft Share of foreign sales of the innovated product (questions v74 and v75) PINTEC
Coreproduct:
Coreproductft First ranked 8 digit NCM product according to the firm’s world sales SECEX
Notes: The innovation survey is available at:
http://www.pintec.ibge.gov.br/downloads/PUBLICACAO/Publicacao%20PINTEC%202000.pdf
1. Question v77 us according to the importance of product quality: (i) high, (ii) medium, (iii) low or (iv) did not do
product innovation. I assume that product innovation was important if the firm answered either (i) or (ii).
A robustness check using only with (i) does not change the main results.
2. Alternatively, question v73 refers to the share of domestic sales of the non-innovated products.
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Table 2.3: List of control variables xgfc
Variable Variable description Data
Source
Country characteristics:
GDPc GDP of country c (measure of country size) PWT 6.2
CGDPc GDP per capita of c PWT 6.2
Ginic Gini coefficient in c UNO-WIDER
Distc Distance to country c CEPII
Contiguityc Contiguity to country c CEPII
Languagec Common official primary language CEPII
Firm-product characteristics:
Scopefc Scope of the firm: number of goods sold by f in each destination c. SECEX-Brazil
Ndestgf Extensive margin of entry: number of c to which the firm f exports good g. SECEX-Brazil
Quantgfc Intensive margin: quantity exported of good g to country c by firm f . SECEX-Brazil
Revenuesf Total export revenues of f (measure of firm size). SECEX-Brazil
Wagesf Annualized average december wages of workers in firm f ,
deflated to the US-CPI August 1994. RAIS-Brazil
Nworkersf Number of workers in f (measure of firm size). RAIS-Brazil
ShareHighEducf Share of workers in f with tertiary education. RAIS-Brazil
ShareProfef Share of professional workers in f (ISCO-88 classification). RAIS-Brazil
ShareWhitef Share of white collar workers in f . RAIS-Brazil
ShareBluef Share of blue collar workers in f . RAIS-Brazil
Mktsharegfc Market share of fg in c with respect to the sum of firms exporting g to c. SECEX-Brazil
Other market characteristics:
ShareImpc,s
Impcsi∑
j 6=i Impcsj
. Share of imports of c in sector si with respect to all sectors j 6= i NBER-UN
ShareExpc,s
Expcsi∑
j 6=i Expcsj
. Share of exports of c in sector si as proxy for production in c NBER-UN
Mktsharefc,s Share of imports in si from Brazilian firms with respect to
total imports from the World NBER-UN
Nfirmsgc Number of Brazilian firms selling g in country c (competition measure) SECEX-Brazil
Notes
1 The distance from firm f to country c is assumed to be the same for all Brazilian firms.
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Figure 2.1: Reasons for firms to innovate. Set of firms that did product innovation, ac-
cording to the PINTEC (2000) innovation survey, wave 1998-2000
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Importance for product differentiation Increase product quality
Foreign consumers as the main source of information Maintain market share
Significant changes in product design New methods to meet certifying rules
Adapt to rules in foreign markets Changes in strategic management
Reduce labour costs (as very important) Reduce input costs (as very important)
Table 2.4: Firm-level summary statistics for permanent exporters: by innovative behavior
and year
Innovative Firms Non-innovative Firms
1997 2000 1997 2000
Variable Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
Revenuesft 1.41e+08 2.38e+08 1.40e+08 3.99e+08 2.17e+07 4.44e+07 1.56e+07 4.12e+07
FDIft 0.428 0.495 0.559 0.496 0.195 0.396 0.221 0.415
Ndestinationsgft 30.240 18.198 30.043 18.201 16.945 15.317 16.662 1
Nproductsft (scope) 176.220 162.581 144.295 154.230 44.766 84.695 41.600 77.996
Nworkersft 4049.300 5740.197 2972.693 3763.597 908.570 2019.499 673.194 1355.703
ShareHighEducft 0.169 0.118 0.203 0.128 0.119 0.107 0.141 0.129
ShareProfessionalsft 0.128 0.067 0.135 0.084 0.097 0.078 0.0100 0.087
ShareTechniciansft 0.146 0.070 0.155 0.083 0.123 0.084 0.136 0.105
Wagesft 9204.780 4486.152 5240.148 2534.877 5681.827 3576.581 3815.166 2466.484
Number of firms 1166 1166 1277 1277
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Figure 2.2: Share of exports to the EU and Mercosur of the 10 top manufacturing industries.
Industries divided according to the firms’ decision to upgrade quality (year 2000).
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Table 2.5: Effect of Quality Upgrading (Upgradeft) on Prices.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Non-differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgradeft 0.0515*** 0.0483*** 0.0584*** -0.122 -0.159 -0.127
(0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0389) (0.160) (0.161) (0.164)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0615* 0.0708** 0.0488 0.428** 0.475*** 0.629***
(0.0328) (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.169) (0.168) (0.212)
log(CGDPct) 0.952*** 0.855*** 0.945*** -0.117 0.0198 0.403
(0.220) (0.219) (0.219) (0.990) (0.987) (1.000)
log(Ginict) -0.130 -0.113 -0.0991 0.486 0.463 0.692
(0.230) (0.229) (0.230) (0.940) (0.940) (0.955)
log(Ndestinationsgft) 0.00119 0.0198 0.0145 -0.356** -0.504*** -0.437**
(0.0385) (0.0401) (0.0388) (0.167) (0.180) (0.172)
Mktsharefct,s 0.153 -1.407**
(0.101) (0.582)
ShareImpct,s -4.469 70.63
(5.294) (47.51)
ShareExpc,s -4.500 44.60
(6.606) (86.75)
log(Scopefct) -0.0414 0.258*
(0.0312) (0.151)
Mktsharegfct 0.108*** 0.160*
(0.0281) (0.0925)
log(Nfirmsgct) -0.0143 -0.224*
(0.0267) (0.132)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.586 0.0220
(0.386) (1.532)
ShareHighEducft -0.179 -0.422
(0.169) (0.929)
log(Wagesft) -0.0289 0.0444
(0.0385) (0.191)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 37,234 37,234 37,234 4,209 4,209 4,209
R-squared 0.106 0.110 0.106 0.085 0.072 0.096
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.6: Effect of Quality Upgrading on Prices, for EU (North) and Mercosur (South).
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Non-differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgradeft ∗EU 0.148*** 0.128*** 0.144*** 0.229 0.268 0.157
(0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0235) (0.253) (0.252) (0.257)
Upgradeft 0.0181 0.0198 0.0266 -0.230 -0.284 -0.200
(0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0410) (0.200) (0.199) (0.203)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0620* 0.0710** 0.0487 0.420** 0.465*** 0.611***
(0.0328) (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.169) (0.168) (0.214)
log(CGDPct) 0.243 0.247 0.249 -1.202 -1.261 -0.357
(0.354) (0.351) (0.357) (1.555) (1.560) (1.597)
log(Ginict) -0.0932 -0.0795 -0.0653 0.428 0.390 0.638
(0.231) (0.230) (0.230) (0.942) (0.943) (0.959)
log(Ndestinationsgft) 0.00161 0.0198 0.0147 -0.351** -0.500*** -0.431**
(0.0385) (0.0401) (0.0388) (0.168) (0.180) (0.172)
Mktsharefct,s 0.157 -1.420**
(0.101) (0.582)
ShareImpct,s -5.308 66.76
(5.302) (47.71)
ShareExpc,s -4.691 48.23
(6.604) (86.86)
log(Scopefct) -0.0402 0.261*
(0.0312) (0.151)
Mktsharegfct 0.105*** 0.164*
(0.0282) (0.0925)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.606 -0.0145
(0.386) (1.534)
log(Nfirmsgct) -0.00474 -0.218
(0.0270) (0.133)
ShareHighEducft -0.175 -0.456
(0.169) (0.931)
log(Wagesft) -0.0303 0.0432
(0.0385) (0.192)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 37,234 37,234 37,234 4,209 4,209 4,209
R-squared 0.107 0.111 0.107 0.084 0.072 0.095
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.7: Effect of EU on Prices for the Sample of Non-Innovative Firms.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Homogeneous goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU 0.0555 0.0219 0.0439 -0.305 -0.260 -0.300
(0.0668) (0.0750) (0.0799) (0.213) (0.213) (0.231)
log(Nworkersf t) -0.00866 0.0136 -0.0417 0.488 0.332 0.264
(0.111) (0.115) (0.120) (0.310) (0.381) (0.312)
log(CGDPct) 0.0253 -0.0247 -0.0265 0.108 0.165 0.154
(0.0967) (0.0738) (0.0712) (0.223) (0.219) (0.211)
log(Ginict) 0.103 0.0862 0.0824 0.164 0.211 0.196
(0.221) (0.208) (0.205) (0.435) (0.437) (0.439)
log(Ndestinationsgft) -0.0383 0.00445 -0.0158 -0.454 -0.612 -0.471
(0.0927) (0.0931) (0.0769) (0.471) (0.754) (0.497)
Mktsharefct,s 0.115 -0.236
(0.0795) (0.171)
ShareImpct,s -1.604 0.964
(1.378) (8.435)
ShareExpc,s 0.350 -1.263
(2.529) (11.47)
log(Scopefct) -0.0970 0.291
(0.0834) (0.601)
Mktsharegfct 0.0901** 0.117**
(0.0424) (0.0541)
ShareProfessionalsft -1.301 -3.905
(1.276) (2.779)
log(Nfirmsgct) -0.00430 -0.0769
(0.0193) (0.0681)
ShareHighEducft 0.0240 -0.0341
(0.306) (0.594)
log(Wagesft) -0.0526 0.181
(0.0636) (0.207)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 17,325 17,325 17,325 1,937 1,937 1,937
R-squared 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.942 0.942 0.942
Notes: *R2 include the contribution of fixed effects.
Notes: Differentiated goods are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.8: Effect of Quality Upgrading on Prices for Sample of Sales within Mercosur.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Non-differentiated goods
Upgradeft 0.0481 0.0498 0.0547 -0.227 -0.315 -0.247
(0.0437) (0.0435) (0.0443) (0.261) (0.260) (0.269)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0278 0.0317 0.0118 0.348 0.448* 0.809**
(0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0414) (0.244) (0.241) (0.335)
log(CGDPct) 1.977 0.524 0.544 -13.15 -6.921 -4.818
(3.107) (2.993) (3.029) (21.17) (20.90) (21.05)
log(Ginict) -2.838 -0.931 -1.031 15.96 9.421 9.855
(3.757) (3.610) (3.642) (25.03) (24.74) (24.91)
log(Ndestinationsgft) -0.0278 -0.00904 -0.0147 -0.380 -0.564** -0.539**
(0.0410) (0.0429) (0.0413) (0.234) (0.252) (0.244)
Mktsharefct,s 0.183* -1.720**
(0.104) (0.715)
ShareImpct,s -7.929 30.16
(5.904) (55.51)
ShareExpc,s -3.928 -54.64
(8.611) (157.9)
log(Scopefct) -0.0315 0.310
(0.0348) (0.210)
Mktsharegfct 0.404*** 0.188
(0.0648) (0.141)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.599 0.565
(0.408) (2.143)
log(Nfirmsgct) 0.00218 -0.307
(0.0317) (0.208)
ShareHighEducft -0.120 -0.0399
(0.177) (1.200)
log(Wagesft) -0.0345 0.0471
(0.0395) (0.229)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 21,427 21,427 21,427 2,824 2,824 2,824
R-squared 0.121 0.121 0.121 0.171 0.174 0.222
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.9: Effect of Quality Upgrading on Prices within Sectors of Similar/Different Elas-
ticities of Substitution. Differentiated Goods.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt Similar elasticities Different elasticities
across countries across countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgradeft ∗EU 0.188** 0.205** 0.205** 0.287** 0.290** 0.329**
(0.0805) (0.0798) (0.0811) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133)
Upgradeft -0.133** -0.126** -0.143** -0.0586 -0.0643 -0.0757
(0.0631) (0.0630) (0.0634) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0532 0.0615 0.0533 0.0332 0.0117 0.0245
(0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0413) (0.0912) (0.0928) (0.0965)
log(CGDPct) 0.0114 -0.0415 -0.125 -0.176 -0.0892 -0.372
(0.504) (0.497) (0.508) (0.813) (0.811) (0.828)
log(Ginict) -0.0925 -0.120 -0.0925 0.0985 0.175 0.125
(0.310) (0.307) (0.308) (0.577) (0.572) (0.575)
log(Ndestinationsgft) 0.00710 0.0324 0.0147 0.181* 0.155 0.195*
(0.0550) (0.0580) (0.0554) (0.105) (0.110) (0.106)
Mktsharefct,s 0.125 0.696***
(0.133) (0.241)
ShareImpct,s 16.34 -4.935
(12.16) (7.090)
ShareExpct,s -1.062 -18.73*
(10.74) (11.37)
log(Scopefct) -0.0749* 0.0806
(0.0445) (0.0850)
Mktsharegfct 0.283*** 0.372***
(0.0772) (0.116)
log(Nfirmsgct) 0.00736 0.0811
(0.0364) (0.0598)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.542 -0.784
(0.505) (0.972)
ShareHighEducft 0.0742 0.438
(0.206) (0.392)
log(Wagesft) -0.0195 -0.0721
(0.0467) (0.0919)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 22,254 22,254 22,254 9,836 9,836 9,836
R-squared 0.117 0.120 0.116 0.084 0.084 0.080
Notes: Differentiated goods are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.10: Effect of Skill Upgrading on Prices: An Integrated Quality and Skill Upgrading
Mechanism.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Upgradeft 0.147*** 0.152** 0.243*** 0.234**
(0.0570) (0.0608) (0.0933) (0.102)
Skillsf,t ∗Upgradeft 0.395*** 0.376***
(0.105) (0.108)
Skillsft 0.113** 0.146*** -0.0592 -0.0274
(0.0499) (0.0512) (0.0590) (0.0609)
Skillsnowage
f,t
∗Upgradeft 0.259** 0.246**
(0.116) (0.124)
Skillsnowage
ft
0.391*** 0.384*** -0.339*** -0.264***
(0.0658) (0.0693) (0.0324) (0.0433)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0106 0.0591 0.00905 0.0480 0.0296 0.0976 0.0648 0.120
(0.0713) (0.0774) (0.0709) (0.0770) (0.104) (0.114) (0.105) (0.114)
log(CGDPct) 0.899*** 0.828** 0.0588 0.121
(0.340) (0.342) (0.537) (0.537)
log(Ginict) -0.0537 -0.179 -0.108 -0.193
(0.369) (0.367) (0.664) (0.665)
log(Ndestinationsgft) -0.125* -0.0893 -0.236* -0.206
(0.0658) (0.0659) (0.133) (0.133)
Mktsharefct,s 0.137 0.121 -0.0552 -0.0574
(0.143) (0.142) (0.230) (0.230)
Mktsharegfct 0.439*** 0.409*** 0.341*** 0.365***
(0.0749) (0.0755) (0.117) (0.118)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 32,090 32,090 32,090 32,090 32,090 32,090 32,090 32,090
R-squared 0.048 0.051 0.052 0.057 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.057
Notes: Differentiated goods are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.11: Effect of Quality Upgrading and Process Innovation on Prices.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Non-differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgradeft 0.0251*** 0.0351*** 0.0212*** -1.279* -0.966 -1.280*
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.737) (0.760) (0.737)
Processft -0.0327 -0.0271 -0.0208 -0.298* -0.324* -0.308*
(0.0304) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.179) (0.179) (0.180)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0551 0.0689* 0.0556 0.429* 0.400 0.355
(0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0370) (0.245) (0.250) (0.271)
log(CGDPct) 0.934*** 0.836*** 0.946*** 1.205 1.291 1.853
(0.245) (0.244) (0.244) (1.313) (1.288) (1.306)
log(Ginict) -0.183 -0.155 -0.174 0.922 0.787 1.246
(0.262) (0.261) (0.261) (1.252) (1.253) (1.268)
log(Ndestinationsgft) -0.00573 0.0249 0.00103 -0.485** -0.660*** -0.491**
(0.0474) (0.0498) (0.0478) (0.229) (0.251) (0.227)
Mktsharefct,s 0.186* -1.810**
(0.112) (0.732)
ShareImpct,s -5.984 0.654
(5.615) (74.09)
ShareExpc,s -7.391 -15.38
(7.144) (102.4)
log(Scopefct) -0.0706* 0.272
(0.0386) (0.202)
Mktsharegfct 0.107*** 0.129
(0.0292) (0.0983)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.253 -0.780
(0.436) (1.974)
log(Nfirmsgct) -0.0104 -0.451**
(0.0300) (0.175)
ShareHighEducft 0.174 -0.999
(0.179) (1.015)
log(Wagesft) -0.0487 0.0743
(0.0407) (0.205)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 37,234 37,234 37,234 4,209 4,209 4,209
R-squared 0.103 0.105 0.109 0.050 0.035 0.111
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.12: Effect of Quality Upgrading and Process Innovation on Prices, for EU and
Mercosur.
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Non-differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgradeft ∗EU 0.171** 0.141* 0.166** 0.0647 0.0743 0.0343
(0.0727) (0.0725) (0.0738) (0.458) (0.458) (0.458)
Upgradeft -0.0184 -0.00122 -0.0218 -1.311 -1.004 -1.268
(0.0853) (0.0852) (0.0857) (0.818) (0.838) (0.814)
Processft ∗EU 0.0463 0.0561 0.0484 -0.119 -0.148 -0.308
(0.0797) (0.0792) (0.0797) (0.369) (0.368) (0.377)
Processft -0.0412 -0.0371 -0.0308 -0.255 -0.270 -0.191
(0.0335) (0.0333) (0.0339) (0.225) (0.224) (0.230)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0563 0.0698* 0.0561 0.421* 0.390 0.333
(0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0370) (0.248) (0.253) (0.275)
log(CGDPct) -0.0877 -0.0369 -0.0678 1.154 1.259 2.583
(0.451) (0.449) (0.464) (3.058) (3.052) (3.091)
log(Ginict) -0.117 -0.0961 -0.111 0.967 0.845 1.447
(0.263) (0.262) (0.263) (1.273) (1.274) (1.298)
log(Ndestinationsgft) -0.00407 0.0256 0.00225 -0.485** -0.657*** -0.483**
(0.0474) (0.0499) (0.0478) (0.229) (0.251) (0.228)
Mktsharefct,s 0.205* -1.807**
(0.112) (0.735)
ShareImpct,s -6.529 -1.357
(5.632) (74.56)
ShareExpc,s -7.267 -17.27
(7.149) (103.4)
log(Scopefct) -0.0694* 0.270
(0.0386) (0.202)
Mktsharegfct 0.104*** 0.131
(0.0293) (0.0989)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.260 -1.009
(0.437) (2.002)
log(Nfirmsgct) 0.00710 -0.477***
(0.0307) (0.179)
ShareHighEducft 0.181 -0.900
(0.179) (1.024)
log(Wagesft) -0.0513 0.0685
(0.0407) (0.206)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 37,234 37,234 37,234 4,209 4,209 4,209
R-squared 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.051 0.035 0.051
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.13: Effect of Quality Upgrading on Prices for a Placebo Year (pre-treatment year
as the treatment year, UpgradeP laceboft).
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods Non-differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UpgradePlaceboft ∗EU -0.0157 -0.0175 -0.0154 -0.110*** -0.120*** -0.107***
(0.0214) (0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0329) (0.0368) (0.0320)
UpgradePlaceboft 0.00485 0.00375 0.0146 0.0150 0.0112 0.0208
(0.0312) (0.0320) (0.0263) (0.0440) (0.0426) (0.0403)
log(Nworkersf t) -0.0259 -0.0294 -0.00460 -0.0381 -0.0307 -0.0392
(0.0507) (0.0508) (0.0582) (0.0425) (0.0326) (0.0533)
log(CGDPct) 0.118 0.240 0.292 -0.543 -0.494 -0.671
(0.255) (0.252) (0.227) (0.630) (0.572) (0.666)
log(Ndestinationsgft) 0.0323 0.0212 0.0211 -0.0306 0.0248 -0.0194
(0.0511) (0.0560) (0.0576) (0.0341) (0.0339) (0.0310)
Mktsharefct,s -0.0306 0.300***
(0.0392) (0.0903)
ShareImpct,s 16.05 4.284
(12.41) (5.626)
ShareExpct,s -11.49 33.64
(8.571) (30.49)
log(Scopefct) 0.00783 -0.195
(0.0368) (0.133)
Mktsharegfct 0.407*** -0.0202
(0.112) (0.103)
log(Nfirmsgct) -0.00791 0.000902
(0.0204) (0.0555)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.166 -0.800
(1.190) (0.490)
ShareHighEducft 0.318** 0.465**
(0.135) (0.185)
log(Wagesft) 0.197 0.0523
(0.190) (0.0918)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 34,477 34,477 34,442 3,446 3,446 3,446
R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.033 0.046 0.038
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.14: Effect of Quality Upgrading on Prices for different North/South groups of
countries.
Differentiated goods
Group1: Group2: Group 3: Group 4:
EU, Mercosur Mercosur Mercosur, Canada, USA,
Dependent variable: and USA and USA Canada and USA EU and South America
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Upgradeft ∗Group1 0.233*** 0.231***
(0.0675) (0.0678)
Upgradeft ∗Group2 0.234*** 0.221***
(0.0451) (0.0721)
Upgradeft ∗Group3 0.239*** 0.213***
(0.0501) (0.0698)
Upgradeft ∗Group4 0.241*** 0.249***
(0.0475) (0.0484)
Upgradeft -0.0591* -0.031 -0.0488 -0.0499 -0.0169 -0.0166 -0.0731* -0.0609
(0.0307) (0.046) (0.0359) (0.0370) (0.0598) (0.0565) (0.0397) (0.0396)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0387 0.0427 -0.00257 -0.00896 0.0108 0.00871 -0.0156 -0.0139
(0.0351) (0.0355) (0.0399) (0.0350) (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0294) (0.0293)
log(CGDPct) -0.0648 -0.0279 4.678 0.469 0.879 0.819 -0.297 -0.262
(0.401) (0.412) (3.149) (0.356) (1.105) (1.101) (0.267) (0.264)
log(Ginict) -0.0201 -0.0418 -6.595* -1.439*** -2.112 -2.239 -0.192 -0.196
(0.262) (0.267) (3.801) (0.529) (1.449) (1.519) (0.169) (0.182)
log(Ndestinationsgft) 0.0532 0.0681 0.0275 0.0259 0.0309 0.0347 0.0269 0.0427
(0.0501) (0.0585) (0.0410) (0.0391) (0.0506) (0.0545) (0.0376) (0.0401)
Mktsharefct,s 0.236** 0.245** 0.288** 0.0825
(0.115) (0.103) (0.115) (0.0968)
ShareImpct,s -0.0538 -2.984 -3.069 -1.801
(5.712) (5.423) (6.249) (5.029)
ShareExpc,s -4.442 2.899 -0.743 -7.681
(7.321) (8.811) (9.449) (7.084)
log(Scopefct) -0.0382 -0.0167 -0.0104 -0.0583
(0.0391) (0.0323) (0.0419) (0.0632)
Mktsharegfct 0.329*** 0.312*** 0.259*** 0.355***
(0.0626) (0.0659) (0.0812) (0.0469)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 44,586 44,586 28,779 28,779 29,900 29,900 64,627 64,627
R-squared 0.106 0.109 0.104 0.090 0.125 0.125 0.097 0.101
Notes: Differentiated goods are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
Table 2.15: Effect of the ATT using Propensity Score Matching combined with the DDD
Sample Treated Controls Difference
A.
Unmatched 3.0639 3.2993 -0.2353
ATT 3.0639 2.5408 0.5232
B.
Unmatched 3.3859 3.1639 0.2220
ATT 3.3859 2.8271 0.5588
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Table 2.16: Asymmetries across Products (core product CORE) and Sectors (sector ladder-
length LADDER).
Dependent variable: Differentiated goods
ln(uprice)fcgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Upgradeft 0.0394 0.0374 0.0455 0.0400 0.0375 0.0470
(0.0451) (0.0465) (0.0500) (0.0458) (0.0469) (0.0505)
CORE ∗Upgradeft 0.0833** 0.0786** 0.0805**
(0.0334) (0.0321) (0.0321)
LADDER ∗Upgradeft 0.0516** 0.0472** 0.0524***
(0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0179)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.0555 0.0653 0.0441 0.0635 0.0728 0.0507
(0.0565) (0.0582) (0.0553) (0.0538) (0.0558) (0.0523)
log(CGDPct) 0.926** 0.838** 0.926** 0.947*** 0.850** 0.936**
(0.355) (0.362) (0.366) (0.341) (0.350) (0.354)
log(Ginict) -0.121 -0.105 -0.0918 -0.140 -0.124 -0.111
(0.345) (0.330) (0.339) (0.335) (0.320) (0.329)
log(Ndestinationsgft) 0.00637 0.0251 0.0187 0.00123 0.0198 0.0148
(0.0523) (0.0495) (0.0505) (0.0520) (0.0489) (0.0496)
Mktsharefct,s 0.132 0.161
(0.101) (0.103)
ShareImpct,s -4.948 -3.636
(3.784) (3.734)
ShareExpc,s -4.715 -4.700
(9.604) (9.386)
log(Scopefct) -0.0435 -0.0408
(0.0461) (0.0463)
Mktsharegfct 0.105 0.108
(0.0720) (0.0746)
ShareProfessionalsft -0.544 -0.595
(0.737) (0.752)
log(Nfirmsgct) -0.0173 -0.0120
(0.0201) (0.0201)
ShareHighEducft -0.141 -0.192
(0.498) (0.519)
log(Wagesft) -0.0319 -0.0277
(0.0476) (0.0444)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 37,234 37,234 37,234 4,209 4,209 4,209
R-squared 0.106 0.110 0.106 0.106 0.110 0.106
Notes: Products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Table 2.17: Effect of Quality Upgrading on Prices: Asymmetries across Products.
Sample of firms for which the percentage of exports Sample of firms that export at most
of the innovated product is higher than 50% 2 HS8 products
Upgradeft ∗EU 0.263*** 0.241*** 4.577** 5.271*
(0.0600) (0.0550) (1.978) (2.749)
Upgradeft 0.205* 0.288*** 0.249** 0.335*** 0.581*** 0.708*** 0.314** 0.649
(0.117) (0.0893) (0.111) (0.0845) (0.0949) (0.1023) (0.117) (0.409)
log(Nworkersf t) 0.134* 0.144* 0.139* 0.149** -1.823*** -1.512 -2.946*** -1.957**
(0.0742) (0.0747) (0.0695) (0.0708) (0.180) (1.044) (0.585) (0.823)
log(CGDPct) 0.992** 0.896** -0.485 -0.455 0.624 1.554 -16.09** -19.55
(0.437) (0.431) (0.465) (0.448) (0.577) (3.167) (7.194) (11.66)
log(Ginict) -0.562 -0.509 -0.402 -0.359 9.672*** 6.092 27.54*** 27.85**
(0.525) (0.503) (0.468) (0.454) (1.839) (4.932) (8.427) (10.97)
log(Ndestinationsgft) -0.0794 -0.0607 -0.0825 -0.0629 1.552*** 0.304 1.767*** 0.196
(0.0699) (0.0658) (0.0714) (0.0672) (0.257) (0.429) (0.364) (0.405)
Mktsharefct,s 0.134 0.149 -3.518*** -4.795***
(0.126) (0.129) (0.516) (1.118)
ShareImpct,s -7.139** -8.178** 62.62** 102.3*
(2.976) (3.230) (29.78) (51.39)
ShareExpc,s -1.860 -2.214 424.6*** 178.8*
(8.402) (8.490) (100.7) (103.8)
log(Scopefct) -0.0441 -0.0451
(0.0471) (0.0467)
Mktsharegfct 0.0869 0.0818 0.945*** 0.724
(0.0671) (0.0640) (0.335) (0.584)
Period FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm-product-country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 23,996 23,996 23,996 23,996 2,214 2,214 2,214 2,214
R-squared 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.065 0.937 0.524 0.967 0.660
Notes: Differentiated goods are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of goods.
The R-squared reported in columns (5) to (8) refer to the LSDV estimator, which includes the firm-product FE.
Robust t-statistics in absolute value within parentheses, based on standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Clustering at the firm-product or at the industry CNAE level do not change the robustness of the results.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Dependent variable ln(uprice)fcgt is the (log) free on board export price by firm, product and destination.
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Figure 2.3: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences: Quality upgrading in the EU and Mer-
cosur
Before and After
6
-
1
:
Treated
Potential outcome of Treated
w/o Treatment
Upricefcg
t0 t
Difference-in-Difference
6
-
1
:
Treated
Potential outcome of Treated
Upricefcg
t0 t
: Control
Treatment effect= (d′1 − d1)− (d′0 − d0)
d1
′
d1
d0
′
d0
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference
6
-
1 Treated
Upricefcg
t0 t
: ControlEU
: ControlMercosur
d1
′
dE1
dM1d0
′
dE0
dM0
Chapter 3
Income Inequality and Export Prices
across Countries
3.1 Introduction
The relation between income distribution and the demand for high quality products has
attracted a lot of attention in the trade literature.1 Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman
(2011) have derived conditions under which a richer, or more unequal, country has a larger
demand for high quality goods. They provide a demand-based explanation for the patterns
of trade in goods of different quality. Empirically, virtually every paper studying firm-level
export prices predicts a positive relation between a country’s income per capita and the
consumption of high quality products. Although, preferences for quality vary not only
across countries, but also within a country: wealthier consumers have a lower marginal
utility of income and are willing to pay more for high quality products. This channel, i.e.
the role of the second moment of the income distribution (income inequality), has been
neglected by the empirical literature.
This Chapter provides first firm-level evidence of the links between income inequality and
the patterns of trade and export prices, and identifies a theoretical mechanism behind
these links. In our model, a country has a continuum of individuals, who differ in their
skill/ability. Individuals have preferences over a homogeneous and a differentiated good,
1See, for instance, Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011), Dalgin, Trindade, and Mitra (2008),
Rauch and Trindade (2002).
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which comes in two varieties, with high and low quality. We consider three income levels
(poor, middle income, and rich), and show that the aggregate demand depends on the
distribution of skills and income in a country. We also discuss the importance of markups
for the distribution of prices. Because preferences over different types of goods depend on
the individual income, a more unequal income distribution leads to higher average prices.
We test this theoretical prediction using detailed data for Brazilian manufacturing ex-
porters, with information at the firm and product level by destination country. We es-
tablish new stylized facts. In particular, we find that not only the first moment, but also
the second moment of the income distribution in the destination country is an important
determinant of export prices. Export prices are sistematically higher in high income desti-
nations and, controlling for income, prices are higher in destinations with a more dispersed
income distribution. These results hold only for differentiated goods, and in particular
for varieties with high vertical differentiation. Results suggest that both mark-ups and
product quality are adjusted to market conditions, and in particular to serve more distant,
richer, and more unequal markets. We interpret the results in terms of the existing litera-
ture of trade with quality differentiation, and discuss competing hypotheses. In particular,
Simonovska (2010) and Verhoogen (2008) present theoretical predictions consistent with
our main findings, that exporters may adjust product quality and markups depending on
the market conditions.
Moreover, we show that the strongest effect of income inequality on prices is driven by
income inequality among middle income economies. As discussed in Dalgin, Trindade, and
Mitra (2008), when the income expansion path is curved, income distribution becomes a
determinant of aggregate demand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many middle-income
economies experienced a sharp increase in the number of rich, which are willing to devote
a higher share of income to brands, luxury, and positional goods. With curved income-
expansion paths, the new rich will buy proportionately more high quality goods. Moreover,
firms may charge even higher markups for those goods: as individuals get wealthier, they
are willing to pay more for high quality goods.
Of course, using product prices to explain non-homothetic preferences and product quality
is not novel in the literature. Our contribution is to show for the first time empirical evi-
dence at the firm level of the importance of the second moment of the income distribution
for demand patterns, and to find a theoretical link that explains this fact. Using firm-level
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data, we are able to use a high level of product disaggregation, to track firm behavior, and
to control for supply-side unobserved heterogeneity.2
A large literature has documented the relation between export prices and destination coun-
try characteristics. Many of those studies find a strong positive relationship between the
price of the good and the country’s level of income and income per-capita (Hallak (2006,
2010), Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Fieler (2011)), and attribute higher prices to
higher quality. However, these papers focus on income per capita, and do not discuss the
role of income distribution within the country.
Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2012) study the effect of importer income per capita on
traded prices, and test the predictions of three different theories using the effect of income
inequality on prices. Using aggregate data on import prices, they find support for the hier-
archic demand model, and contradict the quality and ideal variety theories. As individuals
become richer, more goods become indispensable, wich decreases the price elasticity of
these goods and raises markups. Thus, through the reduction in the price elasticity, they
find that an increase in income inequality increases market prices. These empirical results
are inconsistent with models incorporating demand for quality, such as Fajgelbaum, Gross-
man, and Helpman (2011). Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) show that, under
certain conditions, richer, or more unequal, countries have a larger demand for high quality
goods. Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2012) suggest that their results do not fasify the
quality theory, but that the markup effect explains great part of the variation in prices. We
discuss the role of markups in determining the price variation across importing countries,
and show that both quality and markups explain our results. We show that, when prices
are endogenous and average costs are decreasing in inputs, the effect of income inequality
on prices is reinforced by the markup effect: both higher quality and higher markups ex-
plain higher prices in more unequal destinations.3
The results from this Chapter are also related to a new and rapidly growing literature on
2Even though empirical evidence at the aggregate level is robust, prices aggregated to the country level
might fog some important unobserved characteristics related to the firm, product, and market, not related
to the quality of the good.
3When prices are endogenous, the effect of income inequality on prices can go in either way, since
it depends on how prices change when the middle class shrinks and the number of rich increases. Al-
though, following standard monopolistic competition models with average costs decreasing in inputs, more
inequality leads to higher prices.
58 CHAPTER 3. INCOME INEQUALITY AND EXPORT PRICES
the firm-level sources of price variation across destination markets.4 Some relevant contri-
butions are Bastos and Silva (2010b), Manova and Zhang (2012), Kugler and Verhoogen
(2011) and Martin and Méjean (2010), which study the sources of price variation across
and within firms. Bastos and Silva (2010b) show evidence of quality differentiation due
to distance to the destination country, while Manova and Zhang (2012) test empirically
different models from the literature. Manova and Zhang (2012) find within-firm effects
that cannot be reconciled with heterogeneous firms models and suggest that firms adjust
not only markups but also product quality for richer and more distant destination mar-
kets. Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) use data for Colombian firms and show convincing
evidence that input quality and plant productivity are complementary in generating out-
put quality. Martin and Méjean (2010) use French firm-level data and show that quality
upgrading of french firms may be a result of low-wage countries competition (in particular
of Chinese competition). Our empirical results confirm the predicions from the empiri-
cal literature regarding distance and income per capita for differentiated goods and show
novel predictions for income inequality. Moreover, our results hold for differentiated goods,
while non-differentiated goods follow a different pattern, which can be explained by a cost-
competence versus quality-competenc model, as in Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary
(2011).
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 describes the data and shows descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents
the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Theory
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of individuals. There are two goods:
a homogenous good and a differentiated good, which comes in two varieties/qualities i =
4Even though firm heterogeneity is a stylized fact, the empirical analysis of firm-level price variation
across destination markets is a new and rapidly growing literature. Theoretically, two main types of mod-
els explain exporters’ performance: (i) Efficiency sorting models, such as Melitz (2003) and Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), which attribute better export performance to firms with higher productivity and lower
marginal costs; (ii) Quality sorting models, such as Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Antoniades (2008), and
Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011)., which add the quality dimension to models with hetero-
geneous firms and explain why large productive exporters pay higher wages, use better inputs and have
marginal costs increasing in quality.
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L,H, called low L and high H. The homogenous good is the numeraire whose price is
normalized to one. The prices of the differentiated good are qH and qL, with qH > qL > 0,
and for now we assume that these prices are set in the world market. We later discuss how
changes in demand for differentiated goods affect pricing decisions of firms when prices are
endogenously determined. To simplify matters assume that the economy produces only the
numeraire good, which is exported, and imports the differentiated good (although this is
not essential for the argument below). The homogenous good is produced under constant
returns to scale with labor as only input. All markets are perfectly competitive.
The society consists of a continuum of individuals (whose size is normalized to one) who
share identical preferences but differ in their skill/ability. The latter is described in more
detail below. An individual has preferences over the numeraire good and the differentiated
good. We assume that the individual buys at most one unit of each quality, but may
purchase any number of the homogenous good. We postulate the following utility function
u = c(1 + v), (3.1)
where c is the number of units of the homogenous good and v = (1 − δH)δLvL + (1 −
δL)δHvH ≥ 0 is an utility index of consuming the differentiated good.5 vi > 0 is the benefit
of consuming the differentiated good of quality i, and δi is a dummy variable taking the
value of one if the individual buys quality i, and zero if quality i is not bought.
Letting y refer to income, the budget constraint of a consumer can be written as
c+
∑
i
δiqi ≤ y. (3.2)
Conditions (1) and (2) have immediate implications: i) A consumer never buys both types
of the differentiated good at the same time, as the purchase of each is costly, but the joint
purchase does not give any additional utility over consuming only the numeraire good.6 ii)
Individuals with incomes less or equal to qL do not buy the differentiated good. Utility is
positive if and only if c > 0. We can therefore focus on the following cases: i) no purchase
of the differentiated good is made, and utility is simply u(c) = y, and ii) one unit of one of
5The utility function could be generalized to assuming u = h(c)(1 + v), with the function h(c) being
increasing, concave and h(0) = 0.
6We could allow for some positive benefit when consuming both qualities, as long as the benefit is
sufficiently small relative to the prices of quality.
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the differentiated goods is purchased, leading to utility u(c) = (y− qi)(1+vi) when quality
i = H,L is consumed. The optimal consumer choice can now be derived by comparison of
these three utility levels.
To characterize optimal consumer behaviour let us introduce the following two income
thresholds
y∗ = qL(1 + vL)
vL
(3.3)
y∗∗ = qH(1 + vH)− qL(1 + vL)
vH − vL .
It is straightforward to show that the optimal consumption decision regarding the differ-
entiated good is given by:
δL = δH = 0 if y < y∗
δL = 1, δH = 0 if y∗ ≤ y < y∗∗
δL = 0, δH = 1 if y∗∗ ≤ y,
(3.4)
We simply refer to the three cases as no purchase, low quality, and high quality purchase.
The three income ranges shown in (4) are called poor, middle income, and rich.
We see it as an advantage of our model that the quality good (either high or low) is not
always purchased, but rather the purchase depends on income. In poor societies, many
households will be restricted to purchases of absolute necessities. As income per capita
grows, more individuals will be able to afford the low quality good, and some even the
most expensive variety.
We assume in the following that the condition
qH
qL
>
vH
1 + vH
1 + vL
vL
(3.5)
holds, which implies y∗∗ > y∗. When a consumer with income between y∗ and y∗∗ exists,
the low quality good is purchased in equilibrium.
The production of the numeraire good is using labor only and exhibits constant returns
to scale. This implies that the wage per unit of labor is unity. Individuals differ in the
effective units of labor x they own and supply, where x can be interpreted as productivity
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or skill. Let F (x) be the cumulative distribution function of skills with support [x,x]. With
a unit wage the distribution of incomes is the same as the distribution of skills, and thus
the maximum and minimum incomes are identical to the maximum and minimum of skills.
We are now in a position to state aggregate demand for the differentiated good in terms of
the distribution of skills and income. As shown in (4), there are three types of consumers
regarding the purchase of the differentiated good, which are ordered by income. Let nj be
the fraction of society that corresponds to the three income classes in (4)
nP = F (y∗)
nM = F (y∗∗)− F (y∗) (3.6)
nR = 1− F (y∗∗),
where j = P,M,R refers to poor, middle class, and rich. Poor individuals consume only
the homogenous good, the middle class buys the low quality good, and only the rich buy
the high quality good.
We will from now on assume that the average income yj in each of the three classes j is
independent of the distribution of the class strength nj.7 This holds trivially if there are
only three skill levels, one each in the three segments or classes. The assumption may also
hold when the density is stritly positive for all possible values of x. For example, when
the density of skills f j(x) = kj is constant within each segment j, the class strength is
nj = kj(yu − yl), where yu and yl refer to the upper and lower bound of income in each
class. In this case average income in each income group can be stated as
yp =
y + y∗
2 , yM =
y∗ + y∗∗
2 , yR =
y + y∗∗
2 .
The independence of average income in each class yj and size of each class nj allows us to
compare economies which differ only in the distribution of class sizes without making an
analysis of of average incomes per class necessary.
The purpose of our analysis is now to establish a link between income inequality and
average price of the differentiated good, holding overall average income constant. Recall
7To see the role of this assumption, consider, for example, the case of poor individuals. Average income
of a poor person is given by yP =
∫ y∗
y
f(y)ydy/nP , and thus in general depends on nP .
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that we assume for now that prices of the quality goods are set in world markets and
thus our result is completely driven by the composition of households in the three income
brackets.
We define three variables to prove our main result. First, we denote average (and total)
income as
Y =
∑
j
njyj ∈ [yP , yR], (3.7)
recalling ∑j nj = n = 1. Second, the average price of the differentiated good is determined
by the purchases of the two groups that consume the differentiated good and equals
q = nMqL + nRqH
nM + nR
∈ [qL, qH ]. (3.8)
Finally, we need a concept of income inequality. Society consists of three groups. Let pk be
the cumulative fraction of households up to group k, and zk its cumulative income share.
The Gini coefficient G for this economy8 takes the value
G = 1− 2
3∑
k=1
(∫ pk
pk−1
[(
zk − zk−1
pk − pk−1
)
(p− pk−1) + zk−1
]
dp
)
= (nP + nM)
(
1− nPyP
Y
)
− (1− nP )
(
npyP + nMyM
Y
)
∈ [0, 1], (3.9)
where p0 = 0, p1 = nP , p2 = nP + nM , p3 = 1 and z0 = 0, z1 = nPyP/Y, z2 = (nPyP +
nMyM)/Y and z3 = 1.
We now establish the main result of our model by comparing two different countries that
differ only in the Gini coefficient due to a different distribution of class sizes.
Proposition 1. Consider two countries A and B that are identical in all respects including
the overall average income (Y A = Y B) and the average income in each class (yAj = yBj ),
except for the distribution of class sizes ncj, c = A,B. If country A has the more unequal
distribution of incomes compared to country B, that is GA > GB, then the average price
of the differentiated good in A is higher than in B: qA > qB.
Proof: We prove the result in two steps. Our proof exploits the proporty that G and q
8The Gini coefficient equals the area between the diagonal in a Lorenz diagramm and the Lorenz curve
relative to the area under the diagonal. In the case of three groups the Lorenz curve is piecewise linear
with three segments. The slope of the Lorenz curve changes at two values: the cumulative fraction of the
population of nP and nP + nM . The corresponding income shares are nP yP /y and (nP yP + nMyM )/y .
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are monotonic in nR and hence we can rely on differentiation. Our first result establishes
a link between the changes in the number of rich individuals and average price.
Lemma 1. sign(dq) = sign(dnR).
Proof of Lemma 1: Constant average income together with the adding up constraint∑
j nj = 1 imply via differentiation of (7)
dnM =
(yP − yR)
yM − yP dnR =: kdnR, (3.10)
where k = yP−yR
yM−yP < −1. Hence, the number of rich and middle class cannot move in the
same direction without affecting average income.
The change in the average price follows from differentiation of (8) to give
dq = (qH − qL)(nMdnR − nRdnM)(nM + nR)2 . (3.11)
Condition (11) implies that the average price increases when the relative change of rich in-
dividuals dnR/nR is larger than the relative change of middle income individuals dnM/nM .
Plugging (10) into (11) to eliminate dnMand collecting terms gives
dq = (qH − qL)(nM − knR)(nM + nR)2 dnR, (3.12)
which proves the Lemma because qH > qL and k < 0.
Lemma 1 demonstrates the positive correlation between the number of rich and the average
price. The result is established by making use of constant average income.
Our second step establishes a positive correlation between the changes of the size of the
rich class and the Gini coefficient.
Lemma 2. sign(dG) = sign(dnR).
Proof of Lemma 2. Differentiating (9), substituting dnP = −d(nM + nR) and (10), and
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then collecting terms gives
dG =
[(
1− 2nPyP
Y
)
+
(
1− nRyR
Y
)]
dnP +
(
1− nPyP
Y
)
dnM + (1− nP )dnR
= [yR − (2 + k)yM ]nM
y
dnR,
which proves the Lemma because k < −1 and yM < yR.
Together Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that a simultaneous increase in the number of rich leads to
an increase in inequality and the average price of the differentiated good, that is sign(dG) =
sign(dq). This completes the proof of our main result.
Proposition 1 is silent about the causal relationship between the three variables of interest.
In our view the natural way of thinking about the relationship, however, is that a change
in the composition of households by income is the cause of observed adjustments in average
price and income inequality.
So far we assumed that the prices of quality goods are exogenously given in order to
emphasize the demand composition effect. In practice prices may vary with demand, as
firms adjust to a new environment. It is therefore important to elaborate on endogenous
price adjustments, as markups will play a role in the empirical part of this Chapter.
To analyze the role of endogenous prices, recall that we established a positive correlation
beween inequality, average price and the number of rich. Suppose that the size of the
rich class increases indeed. Then, condition (10) shows that the number of middle class
households must fall to keep average income constant. The total change in average price can
be represented by the sum of i) the change in the number of individuals (the composition
effect), as shown in (11), and ii) the additional effect from endogenous pricing. The latter
can be written as
dq
dnR
=
nM
dqL
dnM
dnM
dnR
+ nR dqHdnR
nM + nR
, (3.13)
where dnM/dnR = k < 0 is derived via (10). We implicitly assume that the number
of rich and middle class households affect prices of quality goods only directly, that is,
the pricing decision of high quality producing firms depends only on the number of high
quality consumers but not on those consuming low quality (and analogously for low quality
producing firms). This assumption keeps the analysis tractable.
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Rather than fully specifying the supply side and thus the pricing decision of firms, we offer
some general insights based on (13). Note that the two effects in the numerator of (13)
are likely to go in opposite direction, as sign(dqL/dnM) = sign(dqH/dnR) seems a natural
assumption and dnM/dnR < 0. The sign (i.e., upward or downward sloping supply curves)
and magnitude (i.e. slope) of the two individual price changes are thus critical.
We now wish to establish a sufficient condition for (13) to be positive, thus reinforcing the
positive price effect, as shown in (11): nM ≥ nR and 0 > dqH/dnR ≥ dqL/dnM . In this
case, we can simplify the numerator in (13) as follows:
nM
dqL
dnM
dnM
dnR
+ nR
dqH
dnR
≥ dqL
dnM
(knM + nR) > 0.
The condition that prices fall with the quantity consumed is consistent with results from
models of monopolistic competition and models with external economies of scale, where
average cost are falling with output.
By contrast, when the supply curve is upward sloping, as in standard models with decreas-
ing returns to scale, the reduction in the middle class would tend to lower the average
price when the middle class is larger than the number of rich. This would not necessarily
overturn our general conclusion, as the composition effect pushes in the opposite direction,
but it would reduce its strength.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.3.1 Brazilian firm-level data
We use a three-dimensional firm-level data for all Brazilian manufacturing exporters in the
year 2000. The data comes from the Foreign Trade Secretariat (SECEX), and contains
information by firm, product, and destination country on export values and quantities.
The data comes from the Brazilian customs declarations for merchandize exports that is
collected for every exporting firm by the SECEX. All export values are reported in U.S.
dollars (USD) free on board (f.o.b.). For the purposes of this Chapter, we use only manu-
facturing exporters. The precise steps to build the SECEX exports data are described in
the Appendix.
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Firms in the SECEX export data are identifyed by the unique CNPJ tax number. Brazil-
ian products are coded according to the 8-digit NCM classification of goods (NCM-SH
Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul, Sistema Harmonizado). The first 6 digits of the NCM
correspond to the HS (international Harmonized System), which is the international stan-
dard for the classification of goods.9
The variable average unit prices (Upricefcg) is generated using sales (V aluefcg) and quanti-
ties (Quantfcg): the new variable Upricefcg represents the average price of good g exported
by firm f to country c. Upricefcg is defined as Upricefcg = V aluefcgQuantfcg , where V alue repre-
sents total sales of f with good g in country c and Quant is the total quantity exported of
g by firm f to country c.
Firm-level 8-digit products are classified according to the Rauch (1999) classification of
goods.10
Table 3.1 shows the variation in prices (Upricefcg) in terms of standard deviations. The
standard deviation of log prices across destinations is on average 0.10 for a firm-product
pair (fg). For comparison, the second part of Table 3.1 presents the deviation of prices
within product-country pairs across firms. The variation across firms is higher, as one
would expect from the trade literature with firm heterogeneity previously discussed. As
expected, the price variation comes mostly from differentiated goods 11, and the variation
is smaller within the European Union.
As an illustration for the price variation, Figure 3.1 shows the Kernel density of firm-
product price variation across destinations computed in 1997 and 2000. The example in
Figure 3.1 is of the leather industry 12. Two important facts should be noticed in Figure
9Since the first six digits coincide with the 6-digit HS classification, it is possible to match the HS and
NCM classification with the SITC classification (Standard International Trade Classification). Thus, the
data can be matched with the Rauch (1999) classification of goods and the NBER-UN World trade data.
Moreover, the similarity in classification between NCM and HS allows better comparison to the literature.
10Rauch (1999) uses the 4-digit SITC classification (issued by the United Nations) to aggregate the trade
data in three groups of commodities: (i.) w, homogeneous (organized exchange) goods: goods traded in
an organized exchange; (ii.) r, reference priced: goods not traded in an organized exchange, but which
have some quoted reference price, as industry publications; and (iii.) n differentiated: goods without any
quoted price. With this classification, goods are divided in 349 reference priced goods, 146 homogeneous
goods and 694 differentiated goods. As shown in Bastos and Silva (2010a), the Rauch (1999) classification
of goods is well suited for capturing quality differentiation.
11Those values in Table 3.1 are smaller than the ones reported in Manova and Zhang (2012), respectively,
0.46 and 0.90 for the variation across destinations and across firms.
12Price deviation is calculated as Pdcfg = Pcfg1
n
∑n
i=1
Pifg
and represents the price gap of good g exported
by firm f to country c with respect to the mean price of fg to all countries. All prices are free on board
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3.1: (i) the within firm-product price dispersion across countries is non neglectable (shown
in the Figure as the deviations from mean value x) and represents 0.107 in terms of average
standard deviation for a firm-product pair; (ii) price dispersion varies over the years that
follow trade liberalization. This variation in prices is only conditional on firm-product
pairs and does not (necessarily) mean quality variation. We are interested in the causes of
this price variation, studied throughout the Chapter.
Table 3.1: Variation in export prices - standard deviation
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variation in export prices across destinations within firm-product pairs
Standard deviation of prices across destinations:
Total trade 54619 0.1073 0.2180 0 1.5677
Differentiated goods 45271 0.1099 0.2201 0 1.5677
Reference priced goods 4623 0.0754 0.1814 0 1.4623
Homogeneous goods 1203 0.0607 0.1331 0 1.0653
Only european countries (total trade) 9562 0.0614 0.1642 0 1.5159
Variation in export prices across firms within country-product pairs
Standard deviation of prices across firms:
Total trade 43525 0.2106 0.3211 0 1.5955
Differentiated goods 34314 0.2268 0.3282 0 1.5955
Reference priced goods 5304 0.1097 0.2476 0 1.5301
Homogeneous goods 924 0.1048 0.2089 0 1.5032
Only european countries (total trade) 6419 0.1527 0.2835 0 1.5052
3.3.2 Country-level variables and world trade data
Income inequality data: Data on income inequality (Gini coefficient and income deciles)
comes from the UNO-WIDER (United Nations World Institute for Development Economics
Research)13. The main variable of interest is the Gini coefficient, Ginic, measured on a
scale of 0 to 100. For the purposes of this Chapter, information on disposable income
was preferred, when available. According to a recent study by Aguiar and Bils (2011),
consumption inequality has largely tracked income inequality in the last years and may
thus explain variation in income inequality. Detailed information on the construction of
(f.o.b.).
13Data available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/ .
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Figure 3.1: Kernel density: firm-product price variation across countries. Comparison
1997-2000 for the leather industry.
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the index is available in the Appendix to this Chapter.
Spatial data and country codes: The bilateral gravity regressors come from the CEPII -
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. The main variable of in-
terest is distance to Brazil, Distc. The same source gives the international cty country
codes.
World trade elasticities: Data on import demand elasticities (Sigmac,s) from Broda, Green-
field, and Weinstein (2010). The elasticities are estimated at the 3-digit HS for 73 countries
in the world.
World export and import data, bilateral flows: Data on bilateral imports and exports come
from NBER-UN yearly bilateral trade data (www.nber.org/data), documented by Feen-
stra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005). The NBER-UN trade data gives an accurate
measure of trade flows by sector SITC2 (defined as sector s)14, since the values are mainly
reported by the importing country - which is a better measure due to the differences be-
tween c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices (s.Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)). The world
trade data allows to calculate different measures of market power of Brazilian firms, as well
as a proxy for production in the destination country and a measure of the importance of
each sector in each country. All variables are described in Table 3.7.
Income per capita: Data on GDP per capita (CGDPc) comes from the Penn World Table
14The NBER-UN data uses the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC 2 - Division), 4
digits.
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(PWT 6.2 for 188 countries. The version 6.2 uses the year 2000 as the base year).
The main explanatory country variables are described in Table 3.2. Countries are divided
according to the tertile of the income distribution.
Figure 3.2 shows the correlation between income per capita and the Gini coefficient. One
could argue that the Gini coefficient does not provide much additional information to prices
when controlling for income per capita. Although, for the sample of countries used in this
Chapter15, the correlation between the Gini coefficient and the income per capita is -0.193
for rich countries, and 0.149 for poor countries. This result is not surprising: according to
the Kuznets curve (see Kuznets (1955)), there is a natural cycle of inequality and income
per capita, leading to an inverted u-shaped curve (with Gini on the Y axis and income per
capita on the X axis).
Table 3.2: Main explanatory variables, according to the tertile of the income distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
First tertile of the distribution of CGDPc
GDPc 329,513,308 1,003,365,021 2,606,171 5,052,199,936 31
CGDPc 2,635.498 1,383.968 513.906 4,732.128 31
Distc 8,881.426 4,478.001 2,380.92 18,396.479 31
Ginic 44.687 9.625 26 62.5 31
Second tertile of the distribution of CGDPc
GDPc 198,419,970 283,274,398 2,040,752 1,352,476,032 30
CGDPc 8,201.286 2,102.586 4,753.42 11,430.188 30
Distc 8,400.192 4,163.122 1,134.65 16,409.975 30
Ginic 42.53 10.179 24.3 57.8 30
Third tertile of the distribution of CGDPc
GDPc 714,360,206 1,786,852,465 5,536,964 9764,800,512 30
CGDPc 24,095.87 6,835.66 13,616.582 48,217.272 30
Distc 10,338.795 2,393.837 6,343.316 18,821.258 29
Ginic 32.767 6.627 24.8 57.5 30
The Appendix to descriptive statistics contains a thorough description of the main vari-
ables and the prediction according to the literature. Table 3.7 in the Appendix presents a
brief summary of the variables.
15The sample used in this Chapter includes all destination countries of Brazilian exports, for which
there is available information on the Gini coefficient. A detailed description is found in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.2: Gini and in-
come per capita for differ-
ent tertiles of income per
capita
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3.4 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the econometric approach and empirical predictions of the theoretical
model. We show that prices are sistematically higher in high income and more unequal
destination countries. These results hold only for differentiated goods, and are magnified
for products with higher scope for quality differentiation.
The econometric specification is similar to Manova and Zhang (2012) and Bastos and Silva
(2010b). Bastos and Silva (2010b) use a cross-section of Portuguese firms and find convinc-
ing evidence that f.o.b. prices increase in distance; Manova and Zhang (2012) test different
trade theories at the firm level and suggest quality differentiation as an explanation for
differences in prices of differentiated goods.16
3.4.1 Econometric specification for cross-section analysis
We use fixed effects transformation as the methodology to study the determinants of f.o.b.
prices across destination countries by firm-product pairs. From the linear unobserved
16Many studies have found that price variations across countries are related to non-homothetic prefer-
ences. Hallak (2006, 2010) and Hummels and Klenow (2005) find that prices are positivelly correlated to
exporter per capita income, which suggests that countries with higher income have a comparative advan-
tage in producing goods of higher quality. Fieler (2011) studies both demand and supply side and find
that unit prices increase both with importer and exporter income per capita, i.e., for the same commodity
category, unit prices increase with importer income per capita. This result indicates that countries with
higher income produce and consume goods of higher quality Fieler (2011). Although, all those studies are
at the country level; new studies as the ones mentioned from Manova and Zhang (2012) and Bastos and
Silva (2010b) are the new attempts to study price variation using firm-level data.
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effects model Ycgf = Xcgfβ + δgf + ucgf , the averages of firm f and product g over C
countries follow:
C−1
C∑
c=1
Ycgf︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y¯gf
= C−1
C∑
c=1
Xcgf︸ ︷︷ ︸
X¯gf
β + δgf + C−1
C∑
c=1
ucgf︸ ︷︷ ︸
u¯gf
(3.14)
where Ycgf = upricecgf represent unit values ( V aluefcgtQuantfcgt ) and Xcgf is the vector of control
variables described in Table 3.7.
In terms of deviations from the mean, Y¨cgf = Ycgf − Y¯gf , it follows:
Y¨c(gf) = X¨c(gf)β + u¨c(gf) (3.15)
For linear models, the within estimator from equation 3.15 is equivalent to the least-squares
dummy-variable estimator (LSDV) and allows to control for all firm-product unobserved
heterogeneity. Thus, the LSDV and the fixed effects transformation may be used inter-
changeably once the standard errors are clustered in the correct way, given the sample
dimensions.17 Errors are clustered by destination country.
3.4.2 Price variation across destination countries: homogeneous
versus differentiated goods
This section presents the results for the main proposition of the theoretical model. We
expect that countries with a more unequal income distribution pay higher average prices
for differentiated goods. The results follow the within estimator from equation 3.15, in
logs if applicable. We confirm the predictions from our model in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
We show that differentiated goods (Table 3.3) follow different patterns if compared to ho-
mogeneous goods (Table 3.4). In particular, the second moment of the income distribution
17The only difference between the two estimators refers to the cluster-robust standard errors because of
different small-sample correction. Consider the LSDV model: Ycgf =
(∑N
n=1 αcgfdn,cgf
)
+ Xcgfβ + ucgf ,
where n = 1, ..., N are N firm ∗ product specific indicator variables, dn,cgf , with dn,cgf = 1 for the nth
firm ∗ product pair observation, and zero otherwise.
The inference in the least-squares dummy-variable estimator is designed for N fixed and C →∞, while in
the within estimator C is fixed and N →∞. See Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
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(Ginic) is positive and significant in all specifications shown in Table 3.3, for differentiated
goods. Firm-product average prices are higher in richer countries (measured by the income
per capita) and, controlling for income per capita, the effect of income inequality on prices
is positive and significant. In the benchmark specification in Column (2), the magnitude
of the Gini coefficient, measured from 1 to 100, means that 1 percentage increase in the in-
come inequality leads to an increase in prices of differentiated goods by 0.44%. For income
per capita, results mean that a 1% increase in the income per capita leads to an increase
in export prices of 4.56%. Thus, prices are systematically higher not only in richer desti-
nations, but also in more unequal destinations. As expected, there is no effect of income
or income inequality on prices for homogeneous goods (Table 3.4).
Assuming for a moment that the results from Table 3.3 reflect quality variation across desti-
nations, results could be interpreted as a market-specific quality differentiation. If country
A has a higher share of wealthy individuals (given in the model by nR) than country B,
with a high willingness to pay for quality, the demand for high quality products in country
A will be higher. Thus, average prices in country A (shown in equation 8) will be higher,
which confirms the predictions from our model.18 Our model also adds an interpretation
for variable markups. With downward sloping supply curves (which is consistent with mo-
nopolistic competition and external economies of scale), markups are adjusted such that
more unequal countries pay higher prices. Thus, firms may adjust markups and quality to
more unequal destinations, as predicted in Simonovska (2010) and Verhoogen (2008).
In the next section, we discuss whether this result holds for all countries, and discuss which
countries are driving the results of income inequality on prices. We also discuss competing
hypotheses to the product quality and markup hypotheses.
For the first moment of the income distribution (income per capita), our results are in line
with trade models with non-homothetic preferences. If preferences are non-homothetic,
consumers in wealthier countries have a lower marginal utility of income and are willing to
pay more for high quality products. Thus, the income level will determine the choice for
quality, which will be embodied in the price charged by firms. This result has been shown,
e.g., by Manova and Zhang (2012) and Bastos and Silva (2010b).
At the aggregate level, Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2012) confirm the result that
18Note that, in our model, the poor individuals (low income) can not afford the differentiated good,
while the middle income and the rich individuals will consume the low and high quality varieties of the
differentiated good.
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higher income leads to higher average prices. They use the second moment of the income
distribution (income inequality) to differentiate three competing models and find empirical
support for a hierarchic demand model: as individuals become richer, more goods become
indispensable, which decreases the price elasticity of these goods and raises markups. Thus,
they find support for market prices decreasing with income inequality, which is opposite
to the results found in our empirical analysis. Bekkers, Francois, and Manchin (2012)
suggest that their results do not fasify the quality theory, but rather stress the importance
of markups. Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) build a model with different
quality levels and variable markups and discuss that prices are unambiguously higher for
higher quality products, but that the effect of markups on prices can go in either way. Ac-
cording to their predictions, more income inequality leads to more demand for high quality
products, which is inline with our results. In our model, when prices are endogenous, the
effect of markups on prices can go in either way, depending on the shape of the supply
curve, but prices are, by assumption, higher for products with higher quality. Empirically,
we find that higher income inequality leads to higher prices. We interpret this finding as a
result both of demand for high quality (once inequality increases) and of higher markups
if firms have decreasing average costs (downward sloping supply curve).19 The advantages
of the firm-level approach, used in this Chapter, are to have a higher level of product
disaggregation (8-digit product), to be able to track firm behavior, and to control for the
supply-side unobserved heterogeneity.
At the aggregate level for trade flows, Francois and Kaplan (1996) have shown that in-
come distribution, and in particular income inequality, has an important effect on trade
flows. They find that, in developing countries, the share of imports of manufactured goods
from developed countries increases with the inequality of the developing country. Dalgin,
Trindade, and Mitra (2008) use a gravity approach and show that income distribution helps
explaining import demand. They construct a classification of luxury goods and show that
the difference in import demand of luxuries versus necessities varies with income inequality.
This results are inline with our quality interpretation.
Distance to destination and the market size confirm the predictions from the literature (a
similar interpretation is found in Manova and Zhang (2012) and Bastos and Silva (2010b)).
19If firms have upward sloping supply curves, our empirical results for income inequality would mean
that the quality effect outweighs the markup effect.
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Consider first the predictions for differentiated goods. For distance Distc: with per unit
transaction costs, the relative price of the high quality products decreases with distance
(Alchian and Allen (1964) effect). Thus, the highest quality is shipped to distant coun-
tries.20 The prediction for market size (GDPc) may be related to the toughness of the
market: as the market grows large, competition gets tougher and leads to lower prices
(i.e., firms may adjust markups). As shown below, competition and market power are
considered in different ways.21
Empirically, the predicted income effect for differentiated goods can not be explained only
by higher markups because of greater market power, since the variable Mktsharefcg (Col-
umn (3), Table 3.3) controls for the firm’s market share, as also shown in Manova and
Zhang (2012). Controlling for the firm-product market share in a specific country, the
results for GDP per capita remain robust. One important concern with this measure of
market share is the high correlation between prices and Mktsharefcg. Thus, we use alter-
native measures to control for market power, shown in columns (4) and (5).
Column (4) adds ShareImpc,s a proxy for production in country c using the NBER-UN
World Trade data. It controls for the importance of sector si in the total imports from
country c. Column (5) adds ShareExpc,s, which controls for the importance of sector si in
total exports of destination country c, as a proxy for production in country c. Moreover,
ln(Nfirms)cg controls for the number of firms selling the same product in each market
as a proxy for competition. The coefficients for income per capita and income inequality
remain significant in all specifications.
The results are also robust controlling for the elasticity of substitution measured by Broda,
Greenfield, and Weinstein (2010), as shown in column (7).
For homogeneous goods, the patterns of distance and market size are the opposite com-
pared to the results for differentiated goods, as we show in Table 3.4. For Distc, higher
distances imply lower prices. This prediction could be a result of more productive firms
being the only ones that make it to export to more distant markets. Since more productive
firms have lower marginal costs for non vertically differentiated products, they also charge
20In the literature of price variation across firms, the argument of the quality sorting literature is that
more productive firms sell higher quality, and high observed prices indicate high competitiveness; thus,
marginal costs increase in distance, as argued in Verhoogen (2008) and Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
21Heterogeneous firms models with linear demand (see Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)) predict that
markups decrease as the market sizes increases, since competition gets tougher.
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lower prices for the homogeneous product. For GDPc, the positive effect may be a result
of economies of scale, as long as firms have higher revenues in those markets.
Table 3.3: Variation in export prices within firm-product pairs across countries for Differ-
entiated goods
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(uprice)fcg
Ginic 0.00175** 0.00444*** 0.00507*** 0.00354*** 0.00346*** 0.00399*** 0.00444***
(0.000804) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00111) (0.00112)
ln(CGDP )c 0.0456*** 0.0482*** 0.0316* 0.0310* 0.0426*** 0.0452***
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0161)
ln(Dist)c 0.0478*** 0.0275* 0.0466*** 0.0477*** 0.0764*** 0.0473***
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0168) (0.0135)
ln(GDP )c -0.0218*** -0.0169*** -0.0278*** -0.0288*** -0.0282*** -0.0216***
(0.00595) (0.00601) (0.00667) (0.00663) (0.00621) (0.00596)
Mktsharefcg 0.122***
(0.0262)
ShareImpc,s -1.680
(1.094)
ShareExpc,s -0.544
(1.025)
ln(Nfirms)cg 0.0275***
(0.0106)
Sigmac,s 0.000129
(0.000218)
Constant 2.911*** 2.387*** 2.375*** 2.637*** 2.648*** 2.264*** 2.391***
(0.0371) (0.206) (0.206) (0.223) (0.223) (0.212) (0.206)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 82,716 82,716 82,716 82,716 82,716 82,716 62,055
R-squared 0.924 0.926 0.926 0.928 0.928 0.926 0.926
Number of countries 90 90 90 90 90 90 62
Number of products 3226 3226 3226 3226 3226 3226 2780
Number of firms 6186 6186 6186 6186 6186 6186 4560
NOTES:
1. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
2. The R-squared reported refer to the LSDV estimator, which includes the firm-product FE.
The within effect of the estimations using fixed effects transformation is, on average, 0.03 and,
thus, similar to (although strictly greater than) the within effect reported in Bastos and Silva (2010b)
in their working paper.
3. Since the focus of the paper is the variation across countries for a firm-product pair,
all observations for which the number of destinations is less than 2 are dropped.
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Table 3.4: Variation in export prices within firm-product pairs across countries for Homo-
geneous goods
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(uprice)fcg
Ginic 0.000149 0.000149 0.000165 0.000208 0.000321 -0.000260
(0.00185) (0.00185) (0.00187) (0.00197) (0.00196) (0.00195)
ln(CGDP )c 0.00591 0.00566 -0.00481 -0.00303 0.00828
(0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0158)
ln(Dist)c -0.0723** -0.0718** -0.0711** -0.0613* -0.0615* -0.0798**
(0.0314) (0.0341) (0.0343) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0346)
ln(GDP )c 0.0185*** 0.0175*** 0.0172*** 0.00803 0.00818 0.0208***
(0.00613) (0.00600) (0.00653) (0.00600) (0.00586) (0.00714)
Mktsharefcg -0.00724
(0.0514)
ShareImpc,s -0.428
(1.285)
ShareExpc,s -1.062**
(0.536)
ln(Nfirms)cg -0.0169
(0.0129)
Constant 5.343*** 5.298*** 5.300*** 5.514*** 5.491*** 5.332***
(0.277) (0.374) (0.374) (0.383) (0.385) (0.377)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2,107 2,107 2,107 2,107 1,872 1,872 2,107
R-squared 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.983
Number of countries 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Number of products 158 158 158 158 158 158 158
Number of firms 521 521 521 521 521 521 521
NOTES:
1. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
2. The R-squared reported refer to the LSDV estimator, which includes the firm-product FE.
The within effect of the estimations using fixed effects transformation is, on average, 0.03 and, thus, similar to
(although strictly greater than) the within effect reported in Bastos and Silva (2010b) in their working paper.
3. Since the focus of the paper is the variation across countries for a firm-product pair,
all observations for which the number of destinations is less than 2 are dropped.
3.4.3 Are the effects asymmetric across groups of countries?
Table 3.3 has presented a positive and robust effect of income inequality of the destination
country on export prices. To facilitate the analysis of the effect of income inequality on
export prices, we divide the destination countries according to the tertiles of the distribu-
tion of the income per capita. As shown in Table 3.2, average income for the first, second,
and third tertiles are, respectively, 2,635, 8,201, and 24,096 US dollars.
Results for the different tertiles of income are shown in Table 3.5. Results give further sup-
port to our quality hypothesis. We find the strongest effect for the middle income group.
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The fact that results are not significant for the first tertile of income (poor countries) is
not contradictory: for those countries, what matters is the income per capita (shown in the
results with significant CGDPc, and not income inequality), as shown in Table 3.5. As our
theoretical model predicts, poor individuals will not buy the differentiated good. If very
poor countries (with average income of 2,635 dollars in our sample, in the first tertile of
the income distribution) have a high enough share of low income individuals, the effect of
the middle income and rich individuals in those countries might be too small to generate
enough consumption of the differentiated good. For the third tertile, results are similar to
the results for the second tertile, but less robust. The reason why results are not significant
is probably the fact that, for economies in the third tertile, there is very little variation in
the Gini coefficient, as shown in Figure 3.2. Thus, the effect is less precisely estimated.
Similar results hold dividing the sample in three groups: developing with income below
the median, developing with income above the median, and developed (all with income
above the median). In this case, results are positive and significant only for the group of
developing countries with income above the median. See the results in Table 3.11 in the
Appendix.
Many facts may explain our results. As discussed in Dalgin, Trindade, and Mitra (2008),
when the income expansion path is curved, income distribution becomes a determinant
of aggregate demand. Many middle-income economies experienced a sharp increase in
the number of rich. With curved income-expansion paths, the new rich will buy propor-
tionately more high quality goods than before. Moreover, firms may charge even higher
markups for those goods: as individuals get wealthier, they tend to devote a higher share
of income to brands, luxury, and positional goods, and will be willing to pay more for those
goods.
For middle income and rich countries, anecdotal evidence supports the fact that increase
in inequality is driven by the rich. In most rich economies, increases in income inequality
have been associated with the rise in income of the 20% wealthiest, as is the case of the
United States (i.e., the rich are getting richer). In most middle income countries, income
inequality has been associated with the increase in the number of rich.22
22This fact may be a further reason why results are not significant for rich countries: instead of having
more rich individuals, there is an increase in the wealth for the already rich individuals, for which the
increase in comsumption of high quality may not be enough to generate variations in demand.
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Table 3.5: Variation in export prices within firm-product pairs across countries for the
tertiles of the income per capita
Dependent variable: First Tertile Second Tertile Third Tertile
ln(uprice)fcg (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ginic -0.00215 -0.00128 0.00431** 0.00457** 0.000762 0.00121
(0.00473) (0.00481) (0.00209) (0.00209) (0.00556) (0.00553)
ln(CGDP )c 0.165** 0.165** 0.00812 0.00480 0.201 0.192
(0.0745) (0.0743) (0.0649) (0.0650) (0.122) (0.122)
ln(Dist)c 0.0990* 0.0741 0.0648** 0.0550* -0.0965 -0.103
(0.0530) (0.0545) (0.0273) (0.0286) (0.152) (0.153)
ln(GDP )c -0.0907*** -0.0847*** -0.0450*** -0.0440*** -0.0206 -0.0143
(0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0227) (0.0228)
Mktsharefcg 0.112* 0.0641 0.0867
(0.0665) (0.0526) (0.0729)
Constant 2.488*** 2.509*** 2.945*** 3.009*** 2.505 2.473
(0.944) (0.943) (0.731) (0.733) (1.655) (1.655)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 18,290 18,290 43,328 43,328 21,098 21,098
R-squared 0.953 0.953 0.947 0.947 0.959 0.959
NOTES:
1. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
2. The R-squared reported refer to the LSDV estimator, which includes the firm-product FE.
3.4.4 Are the effects asymmetric across groups of products?
We have shown that our results for the first and second moment of the income distribution
hold only for differentiated goods. Among differentiated goods, we are also interested in
asymmetric effects across products with lower or higher scope for vertical differentiation.
Khandelwal (2010) characterizes industries according to the scope for quality differentia-
tion. Industries are classified as long and short quality ladders, i.e., with long and short
scope for quality differentiation. We use this classification of industries to analyse whether
the effect of income inequality on prices is higher for sectors classified as long quality lad-
ders. Thus, we expect that the effect of Ginic on prices is magnified for sectors classified
as long quality ladders, associated with higher vertical differentiation. Results are shown
in Table 3.6.
Using the interaction term Ginic ∗ Ladders, we show that the effect of income inequality
on prices is captured by sectors with high scope for quality differentiation. This result pro-
vides further support to the quality hypothesis: for long quality ladders, prices are higher
in more unequal countries.
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Table 3.6: Variation in export prices within firm-product pairs across countries for different
quality ladders
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
ln(uprice)fcg
Ladders ∗Ginic 0.00129* 0.00124* 0.00130*
(0.000665) (0.000667) (0.000668)
Ginic -0.00199 -0.00120 -0.00115
(0.00129) (0.00142) (0.00142)
ln(CGDP )c 0.0150 0.0155
(0.0113) (0.0113)
ln(Dist)c 0.0362*** 0.0425*** 0.0367***
(0.00779) (0.00902) (0.00959)
ln(GDP )c -0.00902*** -0.0127*** -0.0113***
(0.00309) (0.00406) (0.00414)
Mktsharefcg 0.0345*
(0.0179)
Constant 3.108*** 2.957*** 2.956***
(0.0902) (0.145) (0.145)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y
Observations 56,222 56,222 56,222
R-squared 0.970 0.970 0.970
NOTES:
1. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
2. The R-squared reported refer to the LSDV estimator,
which includes the firm-product FE.
3.4.5 Robustness checks:
Region/country effects: In order to rule out region or country effects, we exclude im-
portant trade partners from the sample at a time. Results are shown in Table 3.9 in the
Appendix: results are significant exluding the United States, Argentina, Mercosur as well
as the European Union. Thus, results are not specific to countries or regions in the sample.
Intra-firm trade: We show that results are not driven by intra-firm trade. Since infor-
mation on final consumers is unobservable, we use information on foreign ownership status
of firms in the period 1997-2000 as a rough proxy for intra-firm trade. The dummy FDIf
is one if the firm has foreign ownership status, and zero otherwise. More information is
found in the data Appendix.
As shown in Table 3.10 in the Appendix, the effect of Ginic on prices is not completely
captured by the dummy FDIf , which means that results are not driven by intra firm trade.
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Moreover, we show that the interaction term FDIf ∗Ginic is positive and significant, which
is not a surprising result: firms that receive FDI are in general larger, export to more mar-
kets, are more productive and produce higher quality products. As we show in Table 3.10,
firms with foreign ownership do not drive the effects, but the effect is magnified for those
firms.
Market share, endowment and production effects: As already shown in Table
3.3, the price variation across countries can not be explained only by the market share
Mktsharefcg of Brazilian firms. Moreover, using information on World trade flows by
SITC sector, the control variable ShareImpc,s in Table 3.3 implies that the results are
not driven by sectors in which Brazil has a comparative advantage in comparison to other
countries; and the control ShareExpc,s implies that the results are also not driven by sec-
tors in which destination country c has a comparative advantage.
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter shows first firm-level evidence of the links between income inequality and
export prices. We provide a theoretical framework to explain why countries with higher
income inequality demand products with higher average prices. The mechanism behind
this result is the demand for different types of products: individuals have preferences over
homogeneous and differentiated goods, with different levels of quality and different prices
associated to them. An increase in the number of poor individuals, and/or in the number of
rich individuals in a country lead to more income inequality, and to higher average prices.
We also consider the role of markups for the pricing decision.
We show that the first and the second moment of income distribution have a positive and
significant effect on prices. Countries with higher income per capita purchase products at
higher prices and, given the income per capita, prices are systematically higher in more
unequal countries. These results hold only for differentiated goods, and in particular for
products with high scope for quality differentiation.
We address several issues not mentioned in the firm-price literature before and that might
affect price variation across countries. In particular, results are robust to intra-firm trade,
the quality ladder length, the elasticity of substitution in different markets, and different
3.5. CONCLUSION 81
measures of market power and the structure of industries in different markets.
Our empirical results suggest that the second moment of the income distribution is impor-
tant to explain the patterns of trade, and that market-specific quality differerentiation, as
well as market-specific markup pricing, are important margins of firm-level adjustment.
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3.A Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.7: Main control variables xgfc:
xgfc Variable description
Country characteristics:
GDPc GDP of country c (measure of country size)
Distc Distance to country c
CGDPc GDP per capita of c
Ginic Gini coefficient in c
Firm and market characteristics:
Quantgfc Intensive margin: quantity exported of good g to country c by firm f
SumRevf Total export revenues of f (measure of firm size)
Mktsharegfc Market share of fg in c with respect to the sum of firms exporting g to c
ShareImpc,s
Impcsi∑
j 6=i Impcsj
. Share of imports of c in sector si with respect to all sectors j 6= i
ShareExpc,s
Expcsi∑
j 6=i Expcsj
. Share of exports of c in sector si as proxy for production in c
Mktsharefc,s Share of imports in si from Brazilian firms with respect to total imports from the World
Nfirmsgc Number of Brazilian firms selling g in country c (competition measure)
Sigmac,s Import demand elasticities at the 3-digit HS for each country c
3.B Data Appendix
3.B.1 SECEX firm-level data for the year 2000: data construc-
tion
The Brazilian SECEX exports data contains information on agricultural sector and obser-
vations without information on quantities. The procedure to construct the data for the
cross-section 2000 follows:
1. If the observation relates to agricultural and mining sector, it was dropped from the
sample. The same if the observation refers to commercial intermediates. Thus, only man-
ufacturing firms are considered. This procedure removed 11,192 observations.
2. If the observation contains zero exporting value, it was removed from the sample. As
described in Arkolakis and Mündler (2011), these observations correspond to reporting
errors or shipments of commercial samples. As in Arkolakis and Mündler (2011), 484 ob-
servations are removed.
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3. If the observation contains no information on export quantities, it was removed from the
sample. This procedure removed 37,903 observations. Without information on quantities,
it is not possible to construct unit values, defined as pfcg = V aluefcgQuantityfcg , for f the firm, g the
product and c the destination country of the f.o.b. exported value V aluefcgl and quantity
Quantityfcg. Importantly, the lack of information on quantities is not systematic by sector
or type of product. Thus, there is no concern with sample selection. 23.
A product g is defined as a NCM 8-digit product. An example of such a product, in the
textile industry, follows:
• 63090010 (8-digit NCM classification) Articles of apparel, clothing accessories and
parts thereof.
• 630900 (6-digit NCM classification) Worn clothing and other worn articles.
• 63 (2-digit NCM classification) Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing
and worn textile articles; rags..
Table 3.8 presents a brief summary of average number of destinations and number of
products by firm. Column 2 shows that firms that export to more than 10 destinations
export on average 26.29 different NCM 8-digit products. And, from Column 3, firms that
export more than 10 products export to 8.77 destinations on average.
Table 3.8: Average number of destinations and number of products by firm
Average number of products Average number of destinations
by number of destinations by number of products exported
1 2.83 1.70
2 3.40 2.84
3 4.25 3.84
4 5.04 4.62
5 6.21 5.57
10+ 26.29 8.77
Average 4.69 1.70
23As a robustness check to the results, I reestimate the results after removing extreme unit values.
The data trimming removes observations for which the unit value pfcg is either 5 times above or 5 times
below the median unit price by product g, as in Khandelwal (2010); Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto
(2010). This second step drops 19,960 observations 5 times above and 18,184 observations 5 times below
the median (for all types of goods). Results remain robust
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3.B.2 Methodology for construction of the Gini coefficient:
I use the income inequality data from the WIID2 UNO-WIDER (United Nations World
Institute for Development Economics Research). Although, the data contains many dupli-
cate values and missing values for some countries. In case of duplicate values for a country,
I keep the variables that satisfy the following criteria (in this order):
Step 1. Highest quality rating (variable Quality = 1, otherwise 2, 3 or 4). The quality
rating in the WIID2 was evaluated according to the following criteria: (a) whether the con-
cepts underlying the observations are known; (b) the coverage of the income/consumption
concept; and (c) the survey quality. A observation receives quality rating 1 for observations
that satisfy the criteria (a) and (b).
Step 2. Latest Revision. The WIID1 was updated to construct the new WIID2 database,
which is the most recent and updated revision.
Step 3. Area covered refers to the whole country (variable AreaCovr = All).
Step 4. Basic statistical unit is the household (variable IncSharU = household, instead
of tax unit, person or family).
Step 5. Unit of analysis is the person (variable UofAnala = person): in this case, the
needs of different sized households have been taken into account 24.
Step 6. Equivalence scale has been adjusted (variable Equivsc = householdpercapita).
Since the different sized households have been taken into account, in the equivalence scale
the adjustment has been made for the different sized and composed households.
Step 7. Icome definition is disposable income (variable IncDefn = Income,Disposable).
This classification is similar to the one from the Canberra Group on Household Income
Statistics with the United Nations Statistics Division 25.
Step 8. Information on currency is available (variable Curref with available information).
Step 9. Income definition is income (variable IncDefn = Income, ..).
Step 10. Income definition is gross income (variable IncDefn = Income,Gross).
Step 11. Equivalence scale used was the household (variable
Equivsc = Householdeq, OECDmod).
24In the case in which the unit of analysis is the household, the size of the households and the needs of
different sized households have not been taken into account.
25The final report and recommendations from the Canberra Group on household income statistics can
be found at http://www.lisproject.org/links/canberra/finalreport.pdf
3.B. DATA APPENDIX 85
This methodology leads to 72 unique Gini coefficients (72 countries) 26. For countries with
missing information for the year 2000, I follow the same steps described above for the years
1999 and 2001, respectively. In this way, the final methodology leads to 98 unique Gini
coefficients (103 countries) 27. When I combine the Gini coefficient with the firm-level
data, I exclude destination countries with less than 3 observations in the sample28.
3.B.3 Data on foreign ownership status
For the robustness checks conducted to control for intra-firm trade, we use information
on the foreign ownership status of Brazilian firms, compiled by Poole (2009). All foreign
investments are registered with Brazil’s Central Bank (Banco Central do Brasil) and, thus,
available in the dataset. Some assumptions were made to construct the dummy from the
FDI information. As explained in Poole (2009), an establishment with positive foreign
investment stock in t=2001 and positive flows in t− 3 and t− 4 is classiffied as a foreign-
owned establishment through the whole period. If the establishment has no stock in t=2001
but positive inflows in other years, the establishment is classiffied as foreign-owned only
for the years with positive flows. And, if the establishment has a positive stock in t=2001
but no flows in the years before, it is classified as foreign-owned for the whole period.
Two dummies for the foreign ownership status were created, where the main difference
is that one of the dummies refers only to the foreign ownership status of the firm, and
the other assumes that also subsidiaries of firms receiving inflows are foreign-owned (even
if the subsidiary is not classified as having received inflows or with a stock of foreign
investment). Throughout this paper the dummy used is the second one. Both dummy
variables were constructed using three main data sources from the Brazil’s Central Bank:
plant-level inflows information from 1996 to 2001, plant-level stock information in the year
2001, and (incomplete) information on the holding company corporate structure. If there
was no information on FDI stocks by year, the data allowed for a procedure to infer which
establishments were at least partially foreign-owned for each year; see Poole (2009).
26Only for Finnland there were still duplicate values for the year 2000 after all the steps. In this case,
the observation was saved if the currency avaialble was in euros curref == ”EUR02/year”
27The raw data available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/.
28Countries with less than three observations are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Laos, Lesotho, Moldova, Uzbek-
istan, and Georgia.
86 CHAPTER 3. INCOME INEQUALITY AND EXPORT PRICES
3.C Robustness checks
Table 3.9: Robustness checks: rule out region effects
Dependent variable: Without US Without Argentina Without EU Without Mercosur
ln(uprice)fcg (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ginic 0.00352*** 0.00409*** 0.00351*** 0.00409*** 0.00360*** 0.00425*** 0.00336*** 0.00360***
(0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00120) (0.00121)
ln(CGDP )c 0.0328** 0.0339** 0.0458*** 0.0461*** 0.0703*** 0.0744*** 0.0458*** 0.0460***
(0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0175)
ln(Dist)c 0.0467*** 0.0248* 0.0209 -0.0104 0.0713*** 0.0507*** -0.00641 -0.0364
(0.0138) (0.0146) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0147) (0.0153) (0.0238) (0.0247)
ln(GDP )c -0.0291*** -0.0249*** -0.0182*** -0.0102 -0.0348*** -0.0303*** -0.0189*** -0.0112
(0.00659) (0.00662) (0.00703) (0.00714) (0.00676) (0.00680) (0.00716) (0.00727)
Mktsharefcg 0.128*** 0.142*** 0.132*** 0.137***
(0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0296) (0.0298)
Constant 2.642*** 2.672*** 2.603*** 2.642*** 2.237*** 2.217*** 2.982*** 3.019***
(0.222) (0.222) (0.223) (0.222) (0.219) (0.220) (0.303) (0.303)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 74,361 74,361 68,460 68,460 72,587 72,587 59,572 59,572
R-squared 0.928 0.928 0.929 0.929 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931
Table 3.10: Robustness checks: foreign ownership status
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(uprice)fcg
Ginic 0.00350*** 0.00409*** 0.00278** 0.00268** 0.00305*** 0.00350***
(0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00115) (0.00116)
Ginic ∗ FDIf 0.00672*** 0.00553*** 0.00604*** 0.00669*** 0.00671*** 0.00516*** 0.00556***
(0.00155) (0.00176) (0.00177) (0.00185) (0.00185) (0.00177) (0.00177)
ln(CGDP )c 0.0277** 0.0413** 0.0436*** 0.0261 0.0255 0.0390** 0.0408**
(0.0128) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0162)
ln(Dist)c 0.0371*** 0.0472*** 0.0258* 0.0461*** 0.0471*** 0.0711*** 0.0466***
(0.0119) (0.0135) (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0169) (0.0135)
ln(GDP )c -0.0182*** -0.0206*** -0.0154** -0.0265*** -0.0274*** -0.0261*** -0.0204***
(0.00559) (0.00596) (0.00603) (0.00667) (0.00663) (0.00624) (0.00597)
Mktsharefcg 0.129***
(0.0263)
ShareImpc,s -1.611
(1.091)
ShareExpc,s -0.447
(1.023)
ln(Nfirms)cg 0.0230**
(0.0106)
Sigmac,s 0.000148
(0.000218)
Constant 2.665*** 2.430*** 2.422*** 2.690*** 2.703*** 2.325*** 2.435***
(0.144) (0.206) (0.206) (0.223) (0.223) (0.212) (0.206)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 82,716 82,716 82,716 82,716 82,716 82,716 62,055
R-squared 0.926 0.926 0.926 0.928 0.928 0.926 0.926
NOTES:
1. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
2. The R-squared reported refer to the LSDV estimator, which includes the firm-product FE.
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Table 3.11: Variation in export prices within firm-product pairs across countries for the
developed and developing countries
Dependent variable: Developing country Developing country Developed country
ln(uprice)fcg Below median CGDPc Above median CGDPc Above median CGDPc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ginic -0.00140 -0.00120 0.00666** 0.00732*** 4.90e-05 0.000448
(0.00253) (0.00254) (0.00285) (0.00281) (0.00605) (0.00602)
ln(CGDP )c 0.199*** 0.203*** 0.0440 0.0222 0.200 0.191
(0.0455) (0.0457) (0.0989) (0.0981) (0.124) (0.123)
ln(Dist)c 0.0512 0.0203 0.0657*** 0.0501* -0.111 -0.119
(0.0386) (0.0409) (0.0253) (0.0273) (0.155) (0.156)
ln(GDP )c -0.0761*** -0.0714*** -0.0472*** -0.0465*** -0.0192 -0.0121
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0243) (0.0244)
Mktsharefcg 0.111** 0.102 0.0982
(0.0502) (0.0685) (0.0750)
Constant 2.333*** 2.431*** 2.496** 2.757*** 2.643 2.612
(0.575) (0.574) (1.017) (1.009) (1.690) (1.691)
Firm-product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 26,075 26,075 35,789 35,789 20,852 20,852
R-squared 0.944 0.945 0.957 0.957 0.959 0.959
NOTES:
1. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.
2. The R-squared reported refer to the LSDV estimator, which includes the firm-product FE.
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Chapter 4
The Effect of GATT/WTO on
Export and Import Price Volatility
4.1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Rose (2004), many researchers have questioned the role of
GATT/WTO for trade promotion and the advantages of adhering to the WTO princi-
ples.1 2 Besides trade promotion, membership in a multilateral trading system may act
as a device for a more stability-oriented price setting behavior. Membership may con-
strain members from introducing new trade barriers and help for policy transparency and
convergence in policy instruments in ways that promote stability.3 Moreover, multilateral
trade agreements may constrain firms from passing along their own production cost shocks,
which inhibits a markup effect and reduces the volatility of prices.4 A further firm-level
channel for the reduction of price volatility is access to markets. When trade policy is
1While Rose (2004) has not found a positive effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade promotion,
subsequent papers have readdressed the issue and found valuable effects of membership. See for instance,
the asymmetric effects of membership across countries in Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Gowa and
Kim (2005); the effects for the extensive and intensive margin of trade in Felbermayr and Kohler (2010a),
Felbermayr and Kohler (2010b), and Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008); and the effects for different
classification of countries in Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers (2005).
2According to the WTO rules, members are expected to follow several principles, as (i) lower barriers,
(ii) non discrimination (with two treatments of most favored nation MFN and national treatment NT),
(iii) transparency, (iv) certainty increase and (v) trade facilitation.
3See Mansfield and Reinhart (2008).
4De Blas and Russ (2012) study analytically the pro-competitive effects of trade and show that mul-
tilateral trade agreements reduce the volatility of prices.
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more transparent and firms have better access to foreign markets, firms can better react to
market-specific demand shocks by switching to alternative markets.5 Thus, membership
may play a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to external shocks. Even though the
channels towards more stability-oriented prices are clear, still little is known about the em-
pirical relationship between the stability of trade prices and multilateral trade agreements.
This Chapter presents first empirical evidence on the effects of multilateral trade agree-
ments, and in particular of GATT/WTO membership, on export and import price volatil-
ity. Using a large dataset covering annual bilateral trade flows and average prices by
country pair, product and year, we establish new stylized facts. We find a robust and
negative effect of GATT/WTO membership on price volatility for both import and export
countries. Price volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the natural logarithm
of price, and is computed over 4-year samples of data. The negative effect of membership
on volatility is robust to several specifications, magnified for countries that increased the
number of trade partners over time, and not driven by exchange rate shocks.
As an extension of our results, we also show the effects of GATT/WTO membership on im-
port and export price levels. In this case, results indicate that membership leads to higher
price levels for exporters (for importers, results are less robust, but negative). These results
are inline with the interpretation of our findings for price volatility, and support a recent
literature regarding prices in international trade.6
In a nutshell, we establish many new stylized facts: (i) GATT/WTO membership re-
duces price volatility of import and export countries. Similar results hold for Free Trade
Agreemeents (FTAs). (ii) The effect is magnified for countries that increased the number
of trade partners over time; (iii) GATT/WTO membership increases product price levels
of exporters. For importers the effect is less robust, but negative; and (iv) The increase
in export price levels is captured solely by differentiated goods. These effects are robust
controlling for several time-varying characteristics7 and are not driven by exchange rate
shocks.
Our results can be interpreted along the lines of various models of international trade,
5See, for instance,Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and Tenreyro (2011) and Vannoorenberghe (2011).
6For the results using price levels, our covariates follow the predictions from the price literature. See,
e.g., Manova and Zhang (2012) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2011)
7We add several controls for market size (GDP), income per capita (CGDP), measures of compara-
tive advantage, tariffs, openness, distance, common language, contiguity, income inequality, and further
variables.
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prices, and volatility. At the aggregate level, membership is coupled to the most favoured
nation treatment, retaliation rights, and anti-dumping rules. As argued by Mansfield and
Reinhart (2008), membership might constrain actions of members and, as a multilateral
institution, the WTO helps to influence policy and to integrate markets. Moreover, mem-
bership may inhibit a price multiplier effect when the economy is subject to price shocks.
As shown by Giordani, Rocha, and Ruta (2012), under inefficient trade policy, unilateral
export restrictions in times of high prices create a multiplier effect that pushes prices even
further up. This argument is inline with the results found by Anderson (2009). Using
data for world food prices, he shows that most food price spikes are driven by major policy
shifts, such as subsidies and tariffs. Thus, by enhancing transparency and convergence in
trade policy instruments, membership might inhibit the multiplier effect and serve as an
important mechanism device for more stable prices.
Our results have also a firm-level interpretation. De Blas and Russ (2012) study an-
alytically the pro-competitive effects of trade in a model with heterogeneous firms and
endogenous markups under Bertrand competition. They provide distributions of markups
that are sensitive to the market structure and show that multilateral treaties reduce the
volatility of import and export prices. Under multilateral trade agreements, firms can no
longer pass along their own production cost shocks, which reduces their market power and
inhibits a markup effect, reducing the volatility of prices. Thus, our empirical results for
GATT/WTO and FTAs add to their theoretical predictions.
Moreover, we find that the effect of WTO membership on volatility is captured by coun-
tries that increased the number of trade partners over time. This result indicates that firms
may react to shocks in one market by adjusting sales in the other, reducing the volatile
of export prices. Vannoorenberghe (2011) shows firm-level evidence that an increase in
the export share leads to lower volatility of exports, while leading to higher volatility of
domestic sales. The explanation for this result is that, with market-specific demand shocks
and convex production costs in the short run, exporters may react to shocks by substitut-
ing markets (Vannoorenberghe 2011). In this way, firms may absorb part of the external
shocks. Thus, membership may play a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to external
shocks, and this effect is driven by those economies that increase the number of trade part-
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ners over time.8 In line with this argument, Buch, Döpke, and Strotmann (2009) find that
sales of exporters are less volatile than those of non-exporters.As a further mechanism, at
the firm level, membership may cause a selection effect and may shift the lower bound
of productivity and the product quality range. This mechanism, in line with the Melitz
(2003) model and the moving window effect from Sutton (2007), implies a reduction in the
range of export prices and, thus, a reduction in price volatility over time.
Trade diversification is an important channel to explain reduction in volatility, which we
find to be more important for countries that increase the number of trade partners over
time. Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and Tenreyro (2011) study the effect of openness on the
volatiliy of a country’s income. On the side of importers, Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and
Tenreyro (2011) argue that when final producers can source from suppliers from a variety
of countries, shocks to domestic suppliers (or external country-specific shocks) are easily
absorbed by switching to alternative partners. Through this mechanism countries can re-
duce the volatility of import prices. On the side of exporters, a similar mechanism may
opperate. Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and Tenreyro (2011) argue that, when exporters have
multiple trade partners, an external demand shock has smaller effects on volatility when
producers may ship their products to further trading partners. This mechanism could de-
crease the volatility of export prices.
Concerning price levels, our results are in line with the empirical evidence using price data.
We find a positive and significant effect of membership on export price levels. This result
can be interpreted along recent evidence on export prices, which attributes higher export
prices to higher product quality and/or to higher markups.9 GATT/WTO membership
may facilitate access to better technologies and shift the product quality range, leading to
an increase in export prices. Empirically, the effect we observe for price levels holds only
for differentiated goods, which have scope for quality differentiation, and only for export
prices. For import prices, the effect is not always significant, but negative. We discuss the
results thoroughly in Section 4.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section
8Rodrik (1998) finds that more open economies have bigger governments. This empirical regularity is
explained by the risk-reducing role of the government in economies exposed to more external shocks.
9Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Hallak (2006) find that exporters with higher income per capita
sistematically export products at higher prices, and attribute the higher prices to higher product quality.
A similar evidence and interpretation are found at the firm level by Manova and Zhang (2012) and Bastos
and Silva (2010b).
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3 discusses the empirical strategy for price volatility and for price levels. Section 4 shows
the main results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Data
In this section we briefly describe the data used to construct our sample. Evaluating
price volatility over time requires average price data with a sufficiently large time-series
dimension, and a data that provides enough variation in prices and in membership status at
GATT/WTO. We use 16 years of data and a period in which many countries joined WTO
(between 1984 and 1999 40 countries joined WTO). The final sample has four dimensions:
product k, exporter i, importer j and time t.
GATT/WTO membership: To construct the main explanatory variable, GATT/WTO
membership, we use the official information from the WTO website. We construct two
dummy variables WTOct, for countries c = i, j. The dummy has value one starting from
the year t in which a country c signs its membership agreement10, and zero otherwise.
Trade flows and average price data: We use the NBER-UN trade flows data con-
structed by Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)11 to construct a measure of average
prices and price volatility. For the period 1984-1999, the trade data contains information
not only on trade values, but also on quantities and unit of measurement by country pair,
year and product (4 digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), revision
2)12. Whenever available, trade values are taken from importers and are, thus, import
c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) prices (see Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)).
Adjustments in the original data are described in the Appendix A1.
Products are classified in homogeneous, differentiated and reference priced goods, accord-
ing to the standard Rauch(1999) classification of goods, and identifyed through the 4-digit
SITC. Countries are identifyed through the unique United Nations (UN) 3-digit classifica-
tion of countries.
Sectors are classified according to the comparative advantage dummy (CA) proposed by
10The data comes from http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm. As of 2008, there
were 153 WTO members.
11See Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005) for a full description of the data.
12Although the data covers the period 1962-2000, the information on quantities, which is necessary to
construct the measure of average prices, is available only from 1984 onwards.
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Mayda and Rodrik (2005). The CAsct dummy is 1 if sector s has a comparative advantage
in country c in time t.13
Country characteristics: Yearly country c characteristics such as income per capita
CGDPct, population Popct and exchange rates Xratct come from the Penn World Table
version 6.2.14
Time invariant bilateral data: Bilateral variables as distance Distanceij, common
language Comlangij and contiguity Contigij come from the Institute for Research on the
International Economy CEPII (2005).15
Tariff data: The tariff data from 1988 to 1999 is supplied by UNCTAD-TRAINS, via
the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS). The data is reported for two types of tariff,
the Applied Effective Tariff (AHS) and the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff. The data
provides the percentage of tariff imposed on a product k of an exporter i by an importer j
across time t. Product codes are 4 digit SITC, the same used in the NBER-UN data. We
make use of the AHS and conduct robustness checks using the MFN tariff data.16
Free Trade Agreement (FTA data): We use the FTA data from Baier and Bergstrand
(2007) and construct a dummy variable FTAijt that is one if the country pair ij belong to
the same FTA in year t.
Developing country status: The developing status information is provided by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 199917. We create a dummy
13Similar to Mayda and Rodrik (2005), the dummy CAsct is constructed as follows:
CAsct =
{
1 if Msct −Xsct − λctMsct < 0
0 if Msct −Xsct − λctMsct > 0
in which Msct and Xsct are the corresponding import and export values of sector s of country c at time
t, λct is the adjustment factor (for country c at time t) which is used to adjust for the imbalance in trade
(positive for trade deficit and negative for trade surplus). λct is calculated as follows: λct =
∑
s
(Msct−Xsct)∑
s
(Msct)
.
The sector s of country c at time t will have comparative advantage if CAsct = 1, meaning that the import
value doesn’t exceed the sum of export and the adjustment from imbalance in trade.
14For further informaton about the data, see Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006).
15For further information, see Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
16Some tariff cases needed adjustment. For instance, for the observations of European Union (as
importer), we need to expand the data, since all EU members apply the same tariff level provided by
the Union (with exception of Sweden, that does not follow the European Union tariff schedule). Thus,
observations will be expanded by 12 times for all years from 1988 to 1994, and 14 times from 1995 to 1999.
The information on EU membership is taken from the official website of the European Union, available at
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index en.htm.
17The data comes from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/data
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DEV INGct which is one if country c is classified as a developing economy in year t. If
information is not available from the IMF, we use the data from the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Fact Book.18
The United States’ import data: As a robustness check for our results, we use the
import data (for the period of 1989-1999) from the United States19, which offers information
by exporter i, importer j, time t at a highly disaggregated product level k. Products codes
are classified at the 10 digit Hamonized System (HS). As a drawback of this data, it is
unilateral and specific for the United States.
4.3 Empirical strategy
The volatility of prices over time is measured as the standard deviation of the log of prices,
computed over 4 years of sample.20 Using the NBER-UN trade data, we generate the
yearly average prices as Pkijt = VkijtQkijt . Vkijt is the export value and Qkijt the quantity
exported of product k, by exporter i to importer j in year t. With information on yearly
average prices Pkijt, we construct the volatility of export prices over 4 years of sample.
The standard deviation of prices σkijτ is measured as the standard deviation of the log of
Pkijt, and computed for every four years period τ , for each country pair ij and product k,
as follows:
σkijτ =
√
E[log(Pkijt)− µ]2
where, µ = Eτ [log(Pkijt)] is the expected value of log of Pkijt, for a four year period τ , for
each country pair ij and product k.
The empirical strategy follows the adapted version of the gravity model, proposed by Rose
(2005). Since we have 16 years of data (1984-1999) and compute the standard deviation
σkijτ over 4-year periods, we generate 4 periods τ . Thus, for the explanatory variables, we
calculate the expected value of every period of 4 years. The main empirical specification
follows a fixed effects model (FE), shown in equation 5.1.
18This is the case of Andorra, Bermuda, Faroe Islands, Holy See, Liechtenstein and Monaco.
19This data is assembled by Feenstra under the grant from National Science Foundation to the NBER.
The information used for value (import value) is the customs value information.
20The empirical strategy used is similar to Rose (2005). Rose (2005) examined the effects of
GATT/WTO membership on the volatility of trade flows using an adapted version of the gravity model.
We follow a similar methodology to estimate the effects for the volatility of trade prices.
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σkijτ = αiWTOiτ + αjWTOjτ +Xkijτ + δτ + ωkij + kijτ (4.1)
where k denotes the product, i is the export country, j the import country and τ the 4-year
period.
? σkijτ is the standard deviation of prices over the period τ ;
? WTOiτ = Eτ [WTOit], for WTOit a dummy variable with value of 1 if country i
is a GATT/WTO member at year t and 0 otherwise. The same for country j;
? δτ is a time-specific fixed effect;
? ωkij is a product, importer, exporter fixed effect, which controls for all k, i, j
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity;
? kijτ is a normally distributed error term;
? Xkijτ = Eτ [Xkijt] are 4 years average explanatory variables over period τ . This
vector Xkijτ is composed by the following variables:
LogGDP iτ is the average log gross domestic product of country i in period τ .
Same for j;
LogCGDP iτ is the average log gross domestic product per capita of country i in
period τ . Same for j;
FTAijτ is the average of FTAijt over period τ . FTAijt is 1 if both country i and
j belong to the same free trade agreement at time t and 0 otherwise;
Tariffkijτ is the average of tariff rate (AHS tariff) imposed on product k of
country i by country j at period τ ;21
CAsiτ is a the average over τ of dummy variable CAsit, which is 1 if traded
product k belongs to comparative advantage sector s of country i at time t.
Same for j;
LogNpartneriτ is the average number of partners of country i in τ . Same for j;
LogXratiτ is the average exchange rate of country i’s currency against the US.
Dollars at peirod τ . Same for j;
21We show the main analysis using the AHS tariff, and conduct robustness checks using the MFN tariff
data.
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nopegiτ is the average over τ of dummy variable nopegsit, which is 1 if country i
did not have an exchange rate peg to the dollar at time t. Same for j;
WTOnopegiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ nopegit]. Same for j;
WTOcaiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ CAsit]. Same for j;
WTOdevingiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗Devingi], where Devingi is a dummy variable that
is 1 if county i is developing (list of countries in Appendix A.1). Same for j;
WTOnpartneriτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ Log(Nopartnerit)]. Same for j;
WTOnsitciτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ Log(Nositcit)]. Same for j;
WTOdistiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ Log(Distij)]. Same for j;
WTOcomlangiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ Comlangij]. Same for j;
WTOcontigiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ Contigij]. Same for j;
WTOftaiτ = Eτ [WTOit ∗ FTAijt]. Same for j.
We also estimate a random effects model (RE) to account for time-invariant characteristics,
as follows:
σkijτ = αiWTOiτ +αjWTOjτ +Xkijτ +δτ +LogDistij+Comlangij+Contigij+kijτ (4.2)
where
? LogDistij is the log of the distance between country i and j;
? Comlangij is a dummy varible that is 1 if two countries i and j share the common
language and 0 otherwise;
? Contigij is a dummy varible that is 1 if two countries i and j share the common
border and 0 otherwise.
For both (1) and (2), the coefficients of interest are αi and αj, which measure the effects
of GATT/WTO membership of country i (export country) and country j (import country)
on price volatility. If the GATT/WTO membership helps countries stablize their export
and import prices (under the hypothesis), those coefficients are expected to be negative.
In addition to the fixed and random effects models mentioned in equations (1) and (2), we
also estimate the results using the non-linear pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator as a
robustness check.
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As an extension, we also estimate the effects of GATT/WTO membership on price levels.
In this case, instead of the volatility of prices σkijτ , we estimate the effect for 4-year price
averages, computed as: Pkijτ = Eτ [Pkijt].22 The results for price levels are estimated as
follows:
LogP kijτ = αiWTOiτ + αjWTOjτ +Xkijτ + δτ + ωkij + kijτ (4.3)
LogP kijτ = αiWTOiτ +αjWTOjτ +Xkijτ + δτ +LogDistij +Comlangij +Contigij + kijτ
(4.4)
Equations 5.3 and 5.4 correspond to the fixed and random effects models. The control
variables Xkijτ are the same used in equations 5.1 and 5.2.
Table 4.5 in the data Appendix A shows the summary statistics for the main variables of
interest. Further variables are summarized in Table 4.6.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Results for Price Volatility
The first results for the effect of GATT/WTO membership on price volatility are shown
in Table 4.1. Since the tariff data contains many missing values, the baseline results are
shown for two different samples. Sample 1 (Column (1) to (4)) contains all observations
and Sample 2 (Column (5) to (8)) includes only observations with information on tariffs.23
24 For each sample, we present results following equation 1 (fixed effects) and equation 2
(random effects). In all estimations, the identifier Id reported in the bottom of the tables
refers to the individual identifier i-j-k, for an exporter i, and importer j and product k.
The effect of GATT/WTO membership on price volatility is negative for both import and
export country, and robust to all specifications. This is the main result of this Chapter.
While highly significant, the link between membership and prices is not implausibly large
quantitatively. A one standard deviation increase in WTO membership is associated with
22Note that, for price levels, we could also use yearly information. Although, taking 4-year averages of
the data yields a sample of roughly 2 million observations, which is already computationally cumbersome.
Thus, we use the 4-year averaged data as the preferred specification. For the main results with price levels,
we confirm our findings using yearly data for samples of 10 years of data.
23Note that also for FTAijτ the information is not available for the complete sample. Columns (2),
(4), (6) and (8) contain only the observations for which FTAijτ data was available.
24In all cases, the tariff reported is the Applied Effective Tariff (AHS).
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a decrease in volatility of between 0.039 and 0.045 standard deviations for exporters (under
the fixed effects model), and of between 0.036 and 0.142 standard deviations for importers
(under the fixed effects model). Similar magnitudes are found for the effect of membership
on free trade agreements (FTAs) on price volatility. Since the interpretation and channels
that explain the effect of FTA and WTO membership on prices are similar, the results for
FTA represent an important verification of our results.
We add several control variables that might affect price volatility, as countries’ GDP, in-
come per capita and FTA membership. In the random effects model, we also control for
time-invariant country characteristics such as distance, common language and contiguity.
Table 4.2 shows the results for different groups of goods. Using the Rauch (1999) classifi-
cation of goods, the results are shown for differentiated and homogeneous goods. In fact,
despite for GDP and GDP per capita, the sign and significance of the variables do not
change across groups of goods. Using our preferred specification, the fixed effects model in
Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), the significance and magnitude of the effect of membership
on volatility is similar across groups of goods. Note that the estimations shown in Table
4.2 refer to the sample without tariffs. We check the robustness of the results using the
sample with tariffs, as shown in Table 4.14 in Appendix B. Results do not vary relative to
the results in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.3 presents some extensions from the baseline estimations. The Hausman test sug-
gests that the fixed effects specification is the preferred one in all cases from Tables 4.1
and 4.2. Thus, Table 4.3 shows only results controlling for product, importer, and exporter
unobserved heterogeneity.
One of the arguments used to explain the effect of GATT/WTO membership on price
volatility was that it helps reducing the impact of external shocks, as long as firms may re-
act to shocks in one market by adjusting sales in the other. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table
4.3, we look at the number of trade partners of importers (LogNpartnersjτ ) and exporters
(LogNpartnersiτ ). Column (1) shows that the effect of membership on the volatility of
export prices is captured by countries that increased the number of export partners over
time. This effect is shown by the interaction term WTOnpartnersiτ . Following Caselli,
Koren, Lisicky, and Tenreyro (2011), when a country has several trading partners and there
is a recession in one of them causing a demand shock, exporters may switch to alternative
destinations and absorb part of the shock, reducing volatility. For the import country,
Column (2) shows that a similar argument holds for countries that increased the number
of import trade partners over time: for those importers, it may be easier to hinder price
spikes due to external or domestic shocks.
Column (5) shows results controlling for exchange rate shocks. Since WTO membership
does not dismantle monetary protectionist measures, it is important to control for the ex-
change rate regime. Countries facing high fluctuations in exchange rates could be driving
our results of price volatility. In Column (5) we show that WTOi and WTOj remain
significant once we add a variable nopegiτ . This variable is one if the country did not have
an exchange rate peg with the dollar in period τ , and zero otherwise. If WTOnopegiτ
would capture the whole effect of membership in prices, this would mean that countries
that let currency fluctuate could be driving our results. Although, as shown in Column
(5), WTOi and WTOj remain significant. Moreover, in Table 4.12 in the Appendix we
show the robustness of the results for a sample of countries that had exchange rate pegs.
In Table 4.12 Column (1) we estimate the effects only for a sample of exporters that had
an exchange rate peg, and in Column (2) for a sample of importers that had an exchange
rate peg. In both cases, WTOi and WTOj remain significant. These results confirm that
exchange rate fluctuations are not driving the results.
Column (3) shows results for the interaction terms WTOdevingiτ and WTOdevingjτ : for
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102 CHAPTER 4. GATT/WTO AND PRICE VOLATILITY
both i and j, the negative effect of WTO on price volatility is captured by developing
countries. The list of countries defined as developing countries is shown in Appendix A.1.
This result is no real surprise, given that the countries that joined WTO in the period
under analysis are mostly developing economies.
Column (4) adds a measure of comparative advantage similar to Mayda and Rodrik (2005).
For exporters, the effect of WTO membership is enlarged for sectors in which the exporter
has a comparative advantage, as shown by the coefficient of the interaction term WTOcaiτ .
This effect could be a result of export countries diversifying the risk. For those products,
it may be easier for producers and exporters to absorb external shocks.
In Table 4.13 in the Appendix, we show estimations only for the intensive margin, for homo-
geneous and differentiated gods, using information for old partners. An old partner refers
to a country j with which country i was already trading before it enters the GATT/WTO.
Hence, exluding new partners, results only reflect the impact of the intensive margin in
the period 1984-1999. As shown in Table 4.13, the effect of WTO on price volatility is
also significant for the intensive margin. Although, for homogeneous goods, the effect of
WTO on volatility is not significant for old partners. This result suggests that the effect
for homogeneous goods refers exclusively to the extensive margin of (new) partners. While
for differentiated goods the intensive margin also helps explaining the effect of WTO on
price volatility, for homogeneous goods the extensive margin is the relevant one.
Thus, we establish the following stylized facts: (i) WTO membership reduces price volatil-
ity; (ii) this effect is stronger for exporters and importers that increased the number of
trade partners over time; (iii) the negative effect for differentiated goods comes both from
the extensive and intensive margin of trade, while for homogeneous goods the effect is ex-
plained by the extensive margin of trade partners; (iv) for exporters, the effect of WTO is
captured by the products in which the country has a comparative advantage; (v) not only
WTO, but also membership in a FTA reduces the volatility of trade prices; (vi) results
are not driven by exchange rate shocks.
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Table 4.3: Extensions from the baseline estimations for PRICE VOLATILITY
Full sample without tariff data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wtoiτ 0.0517 -0.0325*** 0.0183 -0.0328*** -0.0303***
(0.0362) (0.00461) (0.0134) (0.00418) (0.00328)
Wtojτ -0.140*** 0.0198 0.0218** -0.0330*** -0.0233***
(0.0116) (0.0270) (0.00854) (0.00362) (0.00251)
WTOnpartneriτ -0.0209**
(0.00865)
LogNpartneriτ 0.00674
(0.00749)
WTOnpartnerjτ -0.100***
(0.0240)
LogNpartnerjτ 0.119***
(0.0143)
WTOdevingiτ -0.0680***
(0.0141)
WTOdevingjτ -0.0587***
(0.00886)
WTOcasiτ -0.0109***
(0.00365)
WTOcasjτ 0.00157
(0.00452)
CAsiτ 0.00820**
(0.00332)
CAsiτ -0.00533
(0.00376)
WTOiτ ∗ nopegiτ -0.0336***
(0.00416)
WTOjτ ∗ nopegjτ -0.00107
(0.00375)
Loggdpiτ yes yes yes yes yes
Loggdpjτ yes yes yes yes yes
Logcgdpiτ yes yes yes yes yes
Logcgdpjτ yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Id fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 2,000,094 2,000,094 2,000,094 2,000,094 2,000,094
R-squared 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.590
Id 947,853 947,853 947,853 947,853 947,853
Notes: The dependent variable is σkijτ , the standard deviation of logarithm of price
(as a proxy for price volatility) of product p traded by exporter i and importer j at
period τ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***(**/*) is significance level
of t-statistics at 1% (5%/10%). The data is clustered at the sector level.
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4.4.2 Results for Price Levels
We extend the analysis to price levels. Following an increasingly growing literature on
prices in international trade (e.g., Bastos and Silva (2010b) and ?), we study the effect
of WTO membership on price levels. We expect membership to increase the price level
of exporters, if the channel is through export quality and better access to markets and
technology. Results follow specifications shown in equations (3) and (4).25
The main results are shown in Table 4.4. The results for GDP, GDP per capita, distance
and language are in line with the price literature (see Bastos and Silva (2010b), ?, Hallak
(2006), Hallak and Schott (2011)). For WTO, the results for the full sample are shown in
Columns (1) and (2). We find that membership increases the price level of export country
i, and this result is robust to several specifications. For importers, results are less robust,
but negative using the fixed effects model. Thus, membership increases export prices, and
decreases import prices.
One plausible explanation for the positive effect on export prices is better access to technol-
ogy and quality upgrading. Through better access to markets and technology, membership
may cause a change in the average product quality produced by the country and a shift
in the lower bound of the product quality and productivity range. This implies a shift
to higher quality products and, consequently, to higher prices (this quality-price relation
is well explained in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011)). If the product quality interpretation
is true, the WTO effect should be captured by differentiated goods, which have scope for
quality differentiation. This hypothesis is confirmed in Columns (3) to (6): results of WTO
on price levels are only observed for differentiated goods (Columns (3) and (4)), while for
homogeneous goods the effect is not significant (Columns (5) and (6)). This result supports
the hypothesis of shifts in the range of quality varieties after membership.
From the analysis on price levels, we establish the following stylized facts: (i) WTO mem-
bership increases product prices of exporters. For importers the effect is less robust, but
negative; (ii) the effect is captured solely by differentiated goods.
25The analysis is shown for the 4 years average data. Besides allowing for a direct comparison to the
periods used for the analysis of price volatility, other reasons for using the averaged data are: sample size
and few time variation for the main variables of interest (WTO and FTA). Although, using the yearly
data gives very similar results.
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4.4.3 Robustness checks
This section presents several robustness checks using different controls and estimation
strategies. Results are reported in Appendix B.
First, we estimate the main results using a non-linear pseudo-maximum likelihood estima-
tor. Table 4.15 confirms that the results are robust to the use of a non-linear estimator.
Second, we use a highly disaggregated product data from the United States. The data used
throughout this Chapter has information at the 4-digit product level. The United States
import data is available at the 10 HS-digit, which allows a richer analysis at the product
level. Although, this dataset is only available to the US as the importing country. Thus,
results for WTO membership are shown only for trade with the United States. The results
are shown in Table 4.16 in Appendix B. The negative effect of WTO on price volatility is
confirmed in our preferred specification (fixed effects model controlling for FTA member-
ship) for both samples (with and without tariff data). But the result is not robust to all
specifications.
Finally, we also control for different measures of tariffs. In the tables shown before, results
were reported using the Applied Effective Tariff (AHS). As a robustness check, we report
results in Table 4.17 using the Most Favored Nation Tariff (MFN). Comparing columns (1)
and (2) to columns (3) and (4) from Table 4.17, we see that there is very little variation in
the magnitude of the coefficients across the two measures of tariffs. Moreover, in all cases,
the tariff measurement choice does not affect the sign and the significance of the variables.
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4.5 Conclusion
This Chapter examines the effect of the multilateral trading system, and in particular of
GATT/WTO membership, on the price volatility and price levels of import and export
countries. Using bilateral trade flows from 1984 to 1999 for 190 countries (listed in Ap-
pendix A), we establish many new stylized facts. As our main result, we find a robust
and negative effect of GATT/WTO membership on price volatility for both importers and
exporters and similar results for FTAs. This result has important policy implications.
De Blas and Russ (2012) build a model on the pro-competitive effects of trade and show
that, under multilateral trade agreements, firms can no longer pass along their own pro-
duction cost shocks. Thus, by reducing their market power and inhibiting a markup effect,
multilateral trade agreements may reduce the volatility of prices. Moreover, with trade
diversification, multilateral trade agreements may play a risk-reducing role in economies
exposed to external shocks. This argument is confirmed by our result that volatility de-
creases more in countries that increase the number of trade partners over time.
Empirically, the question relating the effect of multilateral trade agreements on price be-
havior has been neglected by the literature. We fill this gap and show several new stylized
facts: (i) WTO membership reduces price volatility. Similar results are found for FTAs;
(ii) the effect of membership is stronger for exporters and importers that increased the
number of trade partners over time; (iii) the negative effect for differentiated goods comes
both from the extensive and intensive margin of trade, while for homogeneous goods the
effect is explained by the extensive margin of trade partners; (iv) for exporters, the effect
of WTO is captured by the products in which the country has a comparative advantage;
(v) results are not driven by exchange rate shocks.
For price levels, we find that (i) WTO membership increases product prices of exporters.
For importers the effect is less robust, but negative; (ii) the effect is captured solely by
differentiated goods.
We discuss several channels that explain our results and conduct various robustness checks
that confirm our findings. Results suggest that multilateral trade agreements may minimize
the adverse effects of demand and supply shocks on trade prices.
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4.A Data Construction
4.A.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4.5: Summary statistics - main variables (4 years average data)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pkijτ 31.105 664.417 0 537798.5 2462590
log(Pkijτ ) 1.356 2.045 -17.507 13.194 2462579
σkijτ 0.173 0.258 0 6.954 2462579
WTOiτ 0.858 0.347 0 1 2462590
WTOjτ 0.778 0.412 0 1 2462590
Loggdpiτ 19.695 1.504 10.898 22.944 2350701
Loggdpjτ 18.841 1.771 10.898 22.944 2337748
Logcgdpiτ 9.367 0.78 5.044 10.48 2350701
Logcgdpjτ 8.994 0.974 5.044 10.48 2337748
FTAijτ 0.192 0.389 0 1 1590892
Logdistij 8.154 1.069 4.088 9.891 2311657
Comlangij 0.165 0.371 0 1 2311657
Contigij 0.089 0.285 0 1 2311657
SimpleAHSkijτ 9.281 14.175 0 1650 742709
SimpleMFNkijτ 10.514 14.083 0 1650 729521
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Table 4.6: Summary statistics - additional control variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
CAsiτ 0.557 0.471 0 1 2355126
CAsjτ 0.406 0.463 0 1 2279642
WTOcasiτ 0.49 0.476 0 1 2355126
WTOcasjτ 0.347 0.451 0 1 2279642
Devingiτ 0.31 0.462 0 1 2462590
Devingjτ 0.524 0.499 0 1 2462590
WTOdevingiτ 0.219 0.412 0 1 2462590
WTOdevingjτ 0.338 0.47 0 1 2462590
WTOnpartneriτ 4.167 1.721 0 5.142 2462590
WTOnpartnerjτ 3.586 1.957 0 5.147 2462590
WTOnsitciτ 5.492 2.258 0 6.7 2462590
WTOnsitcjτ 4.936 2.632 0 6.617 2462590
LogXratiτ 2.173 3.198 -22.84 12.945 2356642
LogXratjτ 2.347 3.327 -22.84 12.945 2371883
WTOdistiτ 7.273 2.705 0 9.891 2311657
WTOdistjτ 6.502 3.399 0 9.891 2311657
WTOcomlangiτ 0.15 0.357 0 1 2311657
WTOcomlangjτ 0.134 0.34 0 1 2311657
WTOcontigiτ 0.076 0.264 0 1 2311657
WTOcontigjτ 0.071 0.256 0 1 2311657
WTOftaiτ 0.192 0.389 0 1 1590892
WTOftajτ 0.192 0.389 0 1 1590892
LogOpeniτ 68.607 53.103 0.847 391.565 2350701
LogOpenjτ 71.5 51.211 0.847 391.565 2337748
LogGiniiτ 3.5 0.234 2.934 4.352 1998084
LogGinijτ 3.551 0.263 2.934 4.352 1684468
Diff.good 0.569 0.495 0 1 2462590
Homog.good 0.102 0.303 0 1 2462590
WTOdiffkiτ 0.49 0.499 0 1 2462590
WTOdiffkjτ 0.437 0.494 0 1 2462590
LogNpartneriτ 4.774 0.456 0.693 5.142 2462590
LogNpartnerjτ 4.477 0.596 0 5.147 2462590
LogNsitciτ 6.355 0.502 1.04 6.7 2462590
LogNsitcjτ 6.295 0.344 0 6.625 2462590
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4.A.2 List of developed and developing countries
Table 4.7: List of developed countries
AUSTRALIA GREECE NEW ZEALAND UNITED STATES
AUSTRIA ICELAND NORWAY ANDORRA
BELGIUM IRELAND PORTUGAL BERMUDA
CANADA ISRAEL SINGAPORE FAROE ISLANDS
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG ITALY SPAIN HOLY SEE
DENMARK JAPAN SWEDEN LIECHTENSTEIN
FINLAND KOREA SWITZERLAND MONACO
FRANCE LUXEMBOURG TAIWAN PROV.OF CHINA
GERMANY NETHERLANDS UNITED KINGDOM
Table 4.8: List of developing countries
AFGHANISTAN DJIBOUTI LITHUANIA SENEGAL
ALBANIA DOMINICA MACEDONIA, FYR SEYCHELLES
ALGERIA DOMINICAN REP. MADAGASCAR SIERRA LEONE
ANGOLA ECUADOR MALAWI SLOVAK REPUBLIC
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA EGYPT MALAYSIA SLOVENIA
ARGENTINA EL SALVADOR MALDIVES SOLOMON ISLANDS
ARMENIA EQUATORIAL GUINEA MALI SOMALIA
AZERBAIJAN ERITREA MALTA SOUTH AFRICA
BAHAMAS, THE ESTONIA MARSHALL ISLANDS SRI LANKA
BAHRAIN ETHIOPIA MAURITANIA ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
BANGLADESH FIJI MAURITIUS ST. LUCIA
BARBADOS GABON MEXICO ST. VINCENT & GRENS.
BELARUS GAMBIA, THE MICRONESIA, FED.STS. SUDAN
BELIZE GEORGIA MOLDOVA SURINAME
BENIN GHANA MONGOLIA SWAZILAND
BHUTAN GRENADA MOROCCO SYRIAN ARAB REP.
BOLIVIA GUATEMALA MOZAMBIQUE TAJIKISTAN
BOTSWANA GUINEA MYANMAR TANZANIA
BRAZIL GUINEA-BISSAU NAMIBIA THAILAND
BULGARIA GUYANA NEPAL TOGO
BURKINA FASO HAITI NETHER. ANTILLES TONGA
BURUNDI HONDURAS NICARAGUA TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
CAMBODIA HUNGARY NIGER TUNISIA
CAMEROON INDIA NIGERIA TURKEY
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CAPE VERDE INDONESIA OMAN TURKMENISTAN
CEN. AFRICAN REP. IRAN, I.R. PAKISTAN UGANDA
CHAD JAMAICA PANAMA UKRAINE
CHILE JORDAN PAPUA NEW GUINEA UNITED ARAB E.
CHINA KAZAKHSTAN PARAGUAY URUGUAY
COLOMBIA KENYA PERU UZBEKISTAN
COMOROS KIRIBATI PHILIPPINES VANUATU
CONGO, DEM. REP. KUWAIT POLAND VENEZUELA
CONGO, REP. KYRGYZ REP. QATAR VIETNAM
COSTA RICA LAO ROMANIA YEMEN REP.
COTE D IVOIRE LATVIA RUSSIA YUGOSLAVIA, SFR
CROATIA LEBANON RWANDA ZAMBIA
CYPRUS LESOTHO SAMOA ZIMBABWE
CZECH REP. LIBERIA SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
CZECHOSLOVAKIA LIBYA SAUDI ARABIA
4.A.3 List of countries that are not in Sample 2 (sample with
tariff data)
The UNCTAD-TRAINS data contains a detailed tariff data at the product and country
level. Although, for some countries there is no information on tariffs. We list these countries
in Table 4.9. Importantly, the countries from Table 4.9 are all developing economies, which
implies that the sample with tariff data might be biased towards developed economies.
Therefore, we present the most important results for both samples, with and without tariff
data.
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Table 4.9: List of importers not in Sample 2 with tariff data
Afghanistan Fiji Lao P.Dem.R Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan Djibouti Liberia Slovakia
Armenia Gambia China MC SAR Somalia
Bermuda Kiribati Mauritania Syria
Bosnia Herzg Guinea Mongolia Tajikistan
Bulgaria Haiti Neth.Ant.Aru Togo
Burundi Iran Niger Untd Arab Em
Cambodia Iraq GuineaBissau TFYR Macedna
Dem.Rp.Congo Israel Qatar Uzbekistan
Croatia Jordan Senegal Samoa
Cyprus Korea D P Rp Seychelles Yemen
Benin Kuwait
Notes: These above importers are available in Sample 1, but not in Sample 2
with tariff data. Sample 1 covers observations with available data for GATT/WTO
membership, GDP, CGDP, time-invariant variables, exchange rate and openness.
4.A.4 Adjustment for United States import data
The 10 digit import data from the United States is subject to unit measurements correction.
In this data, many different unit types are used, what could bias average prices. For
instance, the unit type of Liter has the abbreviations L or LTR. The adjustments are
done based on Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements (AESTIR) (2004),
Appendix K - Unit of measurements (version1.0). Adjustments are listed in Table 4.10.
Finally, observations for which the country-product unit of measurement changed over time
are eliminated from the sample, to avoid bias in units.
Moreover, the data is corrected for country code discrepancies, according to the UN country
codes. The list of changes is shown in Table 4.11.
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Table 4.10: Adjustment for unit of measurements
Units Abbreviation Final (used) abbreviation
Cubic Meters M3 or CBM M3
Hundred HUN or HND HUN
Liters L or LTR L
Meters M, MTR or LNM M
Packs PK or PKS PK
Square Centimeters CM2 or SCM CM2
Thousand Cubic Meters TCM or KM3 KM3
Ton T or TON T
Table 4.11: Adjustment for country codes in the United States’ import data
Country name Initial code Adjusted code
ARMENIA 31 and 051 51
AZERBIJ 31 and 051 31
GERMANY 280 276
ETHIOPIA 230 231
N ANTIL 532 530
SAMOA 888 882
ST K NEV 658 659
TAIWAN 896 158
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4.B Additional results and robustness checks
Table 4.12: PRICE VOLATILITY and exchange rate shocks: Countries with exchange
rate pegs
Exporters with peg Importers with peg
(1) (2)
Wtoiτ -0.0330*** -0.0493***
(0.00793) (0.0159)
Wtojτ -0.0565*** -0.0390***
(0.0109) (0.00520)
Loggdpiτ , Loggdpjτ yes yes
Logcgdpiτ , Logcgdpjτ yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes
Id fixed effects yes yes
Observations 164,879 207,614
R-squared 0.750 0.68
Number of id 87,279 105,465
The dependent variable is σkijτ . Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ***(**/*) is significance level of t-statistics at 1%
(5%/ 10%). The data is clustered at the sector level.
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Table 4.13: PRICE VOLATILITY for the intensive margin: Old Partners
Exporter Importer
Diff goods Hom goods Diff goods Hom goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wtoiτ -0.0493*** -0.0119 0.00162 -0.0320
(0.00671) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0259)
Wtojτ -0.0288** -0.0421 -0.0451*** -0.0137
(0.0118) (0.0310) (0.00686) (0.00900)
Loggdpiτ -0.0652* -0.0555 0.0613 -0.0729
(0.0388) (0.0563) (0.0428) (0.0697)
Loggdpjτ 0.125** 0.0750 -0.174*** -0.182***
(0.0536) (0.0807) (0.0296) (0.0511)
Logcgdpiτ 0.0261 0.0781 -0.0830* 0.0704
(0.0469) (0.0634) (0.0449) (0.0742)
Logcgdpjτ -0.163** -0.136 0.0913** 0.150***
(0.0609) (0.0862) (0.0352) (0.0462)
Const. 0.124 0.228 1.841*** 2.731***
(0.470) (0.881) (0.496) (0.797)
Period dum. yes yes yes yes
Id FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 62,487 15,294 124,407 17,852
R-squared 0.608 0.614 0.606 0.627
Id 33,923 8,240 64,872 9,803
Notes: The dependent variable is σkijτ , the standard deviation of logarithm
of price (as a proxy for price volatility) of product p traded by exporter i and
importer j at period τ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***(**/*)
is significance level of t-statistics at 1% (5%/ 10%).
The data is clustered at the sector level.
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Table 4.15: PRICE VOLATILITY using pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation
(1) (2)
Wtoiτ -0.207*** -0.206***
(0.0176) (0.0207)
Wtojτ -0.159*** -0.172***
(0.00974) (0.0111)
Loggdpiτ 0.397*** 0.498***
(0.0393) (0.0443)
Loggdpjτ 0.0738*** 0.0970***
(0.0252) (0.0305)
Logcgdpiτ -0.725*** -0.842***
(0.0442) (0.0502)
Logcgdpjτ -0.333*** -0.388***
(0.0255) (0.0317)
Ftaijτ -0.167***
(0.00922)
Period dummies yes yes
Id fixed effects yes yes
Obs. 1,520,195 1,183,599
R2 519,041 385,749
Notes: The dependent variable is the standard deviation of prices
(as a proxy for price volatility) of product p traded exporter i
and importer j at period τ . Robust standard by errors are
in parentheses. ***(**/*) is significance level of t-statistics
at 1% (5%/ 10%). The data is clustered at the sector level.
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Table 4.16: PRICE VOLATILITY using the United States’ import data
Sample 1: Without tariff Sample 2: With tariff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wto 0.000187 -0.0190** -0.00489 -0.0205**
(0.00692) (0.00950) (0.00758) (0.00985)
Loggdp -0.00827 -0.00225 -0.0110 0.00356
(0.0363) (0.0376) (0.0385) (0.0401)
Logcgdp -0.123*** -0.101*** -0.135*** -0.126***
(0.0343) (0.0377) (0.0362) (0.0397)
FTA 0.0321*** 0.0180*
(0.00898) (0.00947)
Logdistance
Comlang
Contig
Tariff -0.000697 -0.000696
(0.000502) (0.000516)
Const. 1.603*** 1.325*** 1.786*** 1.456***
(0.430) (0.445) (0.460) (0.478)
Period dum. yes yes yes yes
Id FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 856,106 742,188 781,244 691,623
R-squared 0.661 0.656 0.673 0.664
Id 473,908 401,968 437,997 378,542
Notes: The dependent variable is σkijτ , the standard deviation of logarithm of
price (as a proxy for price volatility) of product p traded by importer j and the
United States in period τ . Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***(**/*)
is significance level of t-statistics at 1% (5%/ 10%). The data is clustered at the
sector level.
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Table 4.17: PRICE VOLATILILTY for Applied Effective Tariff vs. Most Favored Nation
(using fixed effects)
Applied Effective Tariff (AHS) Most Favored Nation Tariff (MFN)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wtoiτ -0.0392*** -0.0447*** -0.0409*** -0.0469***
(0.00493) (0.00618) (0.00504) (0.00628)
Wtojτ -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.143***
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0122)
Loggdpiτ -0.00774 0.0177 -0.0222 0.000648
(0.0377) (0.0398) (0.0378) (0.0396)
Loggdpjτ 0.0971** 0.0930* 0.0845* 0.0760
(0.0471) (0.0508) (0.0486) (0.0522)
Logcgdpiτ -0.0576 -0.101** -0.0442 -0.0847*
(0.0444) (0.0468) (0.0444) (0.0464)
Logcgdpjτ -0.229*** -0.241*** -0.223*** -0.232***
(0.0435) (0.0457) (0.0449) (0.0470)
Ftaijτ -0.0334*** -0.0332***
(0.00443) (0.00442)
SimpleAHSkijτ 0.000136 0.000155*
(8.16e-05) (8.51e-05)
SimpleMFNkijτ 8.56e-05 0.000106
(9.16e-05) (9.37e-05)
Const. 1.317** 1.416** 1.671** 1.861**
(0.635) (0.700) (0.651) (0.715)
Period dum. yes yes yes yes
Id FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 681,559 545,760 668,572 533,984
R2 0.723 0.013 0.7228 0.6889
Id 405,713 301,193 399,262 295,779
Notes: The dependent variable is standard deviation of logarithm of price
(as a proxy for price volatility) of product p traded by exporter i and importer j
at period τ . Regressions are implemented for two types of tariff (AHS and MFN)
using fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***(**/*) is
significance level of t-statistics at 1% (5%/ 10%). data is clustered at the
sector level. Period dummies are included in all regressions.
Chapter 5
Networks and Trade: Evidence from
the Jewish Diaspora
5.1 Introduction
Social networks operating across national borders might help to overcome the informal
barriers to trade and help to explain the “mystery of the missing trade ” (Rauch 2001) 1.
The effect of cultural proximity and networks on trade might be even higher due to the
diffusion of preferences across borders, as, for instance, when a group has a home bias or
particular preferences and disseminates its consumption habits overseas, as discussed in
Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005).
We study the effects of informal networks on trade in the Jewish community, a group that
exhibits a deep and abiding commitment to life in community and is known by its high
investment in human capital and high skills related to international exchange. The anal-
ysis of the Jewish Diaspora is particularly interesting since: (i) We build and uncover the
Jewish population data from publications of the American Jewish Committee from 1899
to 2005, allowing a rich analysis both in panel and cross-section; (ii) The creation of the
State of Israel establishes unique characteristics for the Jewish population and provides
us the opportunity to evaluate the effects of the migration and redistribution of Jews on
trade flows. Our results suggest a robust trade-creation effect of networks: in our bench-
1The mystery of missing trade refers specially to the results found by Trefler (1995), which shows some
mysteries (rejection by the data) related to the patterns of trade and the volume of trade predicted by the
theoretical models.
121
122 CHAPTER 5. NETWORKS AND TRADE AMONG JEWS
mark specification for the period 1951-2000, the jewish networks lead to a trade creation
of 0.85%, compared to 23.6% of trade creation due to free trade agreements.
We follow the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model to derive the gravity equation
and address theoretically two additional issues: 1. The preference parameter aij, in order
to account for home bias in consumers’ preferences; 2. Along with the standard Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) model, we compute the tariff equivalent using the Novy (2008)
model, recently applied in Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2010).2 The network among Jews
is measured by the product of the share of Jews in a country pair i j and is fully consis-
tent with the state of the art gravity literature (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) and Novy (2008)). As an outcome of the modifyed
gravity model, the proximity measure affects trade in two ways: through the reduction of
trade costs, τij, and the diffusion of preferences, aij.
Using the Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML) estimation as our main empirical specifica-
tion, we find robust trade-creation effects of networks. Moreover, our results suggest that
the omission of controls for multilateral resistance terms in the Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) gravity equation leads to overestimation of the network effect. When we divide the
sample into direct and indirect networks, we show that the direct networks capture most
of the trade creation effects of networks. Finally, we find no evidence of a decreasing effect
of networks over time.
The Chapter is divided as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on Jewish history
and provides a closer look at the data. Section 3 discusses the gravity model and the
empirical approach. Section 4 shows the main results. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
5.2 Stylized facts and data
5.2.1 Jewish Networks and Trade
Social interactions and informal barriers to trade have been recently used to explain trade
flows (see Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) and Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer
(2005)). Within informal barriers, ethnic proximity is one of the most tractable to be
2The Novy (2008) approach allows part of the goods to be non-tradable and also corrects for multilateral
resistance terms in a tractable way.
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theoretically modeled and empirically tested: Rauch and Trindade (2002) showed for a
cross-section analysis that Chinese networks can be easily proxied by the product of the
share of the Chinese population in two countries.
We study networks within a religious and cultural group which is particularly interesting
due to its characteristics. Jews exhibit a deep and abiding commitment to life in commu-
nity and build strong networks. In one of the most cited Jewish texts, the “Pirkei Avot”
3, Rabbi Hillel set a one line dicta that has characterized Jewish community for the past
2000 years: “Al tifrosh min hatzibur - Do not separate yourself from the community” .
The value to life in community and the membership in the same cultural and religious group
created a network externality and the possibility to impose sanctions, which, according to
Greif (1993), made it profitable for Jewish merchants not to leave their religious network
4. As shown in Temin (1997), Mokyr (2002) and Botticini and Eckstein (2007), cultural
values within the Jewish community and international exchange are closely related.
Jews also have a long tradition in high skilled activities and have long sought occupations
in crafts and trade (Botticini and Eckstein (2007)). Ayal and Chiswick (1983) raise the
discussion concerning the overinvestment on human capital by the Jews in the Diaspora,
which is reinforced by Botticini and Eckstein (2007): as merchants, the Jews invested more
in education, “a pre-condition for the extensive mailing network and common court system
that endowed them with trading skills demanded all over the world” 5.
Botticini and Eckstein (2005) also argue that jewish migration was “motivated by increas-
ing trade opportunities that enabled the Jews to reach standards of living comparable to
the upper classes in all countries where they settled” .
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the Jewish population through the twentieth century
3The Pirkei Avot means literally “Ethics of Our Fathers” and is composed of ethical maxims of the
Rabbis of the Mishnaic period. It is part of the Mishna, a major work of Rabbinic Judaism and the first
major redaction into written form of Jewish oral traditions.
4Greif (1993) reports that a Jewish trader, known as the Maghribi trader, “was associated with many
Maghribi traders residing in different trade centers, and it was customary to reciprocate in the supply of
trade-related information that was so crucial to business success. (...) These information flows within the
Maghribis traders group, as well as a merchant’s experience, circumvented to some extent the asymmetric
information between merchants and agents and enabled the former to monitor the later.”
5“The Jews who where engaged in long-distance trade had the highest human capital. (...), they
were envolved in complicated transactions (...) that required a sophisticated understanding of trade and
partnership rules with both Jews and non-Jews, and trade over many commodities in many languagues
in different countries. Some of these traders were also the religious leaders of the Jewish communities ”
(Botticini and Eckstein (2005))
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for some countries, selected according to the (highest) number of the Jews in absolute
numbers in 2006 6. Three structural breaks are worth mentioning: 1. The events of the
Second World War, which caused a massive redistribution of the Jewish population in the
world (and for which data for most countries is not available); 2. The event of the creation
of the state of Israel in 1948 and its particular migration inflow, not observed in other
countries in the world (see Figure 5.4 in Appendix A, for the Jewish population in Israel
since the creation of the state); and 3. The second wave of migration from developing
countries to Israel at the beginning of the 1980’s. The large migration flows and the spe-
cific characteristics of the Jewish community make the analysis of Jews living in Diaspora
and in Israel an interesting question in the trade literature.
Figure 5.1: Jews in the World (1899-2005)
6The two countries with a large Jewish population missing in this figure are Israel and Russia. Both
cases are plotted separately in the Appendix for their particular characteristics. There is data available
for 110 countries, but many missing values before 1950 for most of the countries.
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5.2.2 The creation of the State of Israel
The dreadful events of the Second World War and the creation of the State of Israel estab-
lish unique characteristics for the Jewish population in the years after War and provide us
the opportunity to evaluate the effects of the redistribution of Jews on trade flows.
The creation of the State of Israel is an important event not expoited in the economics
literature yet. There is no counterpart in the literature of such an abrupt and high inflow
of an ethnic and religious group to a country as is the case of the Jews to Israel. Our
dataset shows that, in the first decade after the creation of the State of Israel (1948-1958),
the Jewish population in Israel rose from 750 thousand to almost two million Jews. The
Jewish population data in Israel is found in Figure 5.4 Appendix A.2 (s. also Appendix
A.2 for further details on the data). Section 4.2 studies the effects of networks with Israel
on trade.
Since we have many missing values for the period before the Second World War, we inves-
tigate in particular the period after the creation of the state of Israel.
5.2.3 The Jewish population data
Jewish population data comes from the publications of the American Jewish Committee
- AJC (www.ajc.org). We build this dataset, available in the yearly volumes from the
“American Jewish Year Book ” from 1899 to 2005 for 110 countries, leading to a rich panel
data.7
The data yields an unbalanced panel: in each of the reports there are some missing values.
For our subsample from 1951 to 2004 (the most used in the estimations), we observe for
each year at least 75 countries, and on average 83 countries. When we take the share of
the Jewish population, this average shrinks to 76, since for some countries there was no
available information on the total population8. The descriptive statistics with yearly values
of Jewish population mean, median and number of observations for the monadic data is
7Note that the information observed in the data is the number of Jews in each country by year,
regardless the country of birth of the Jew.
8Countries (and cty code number) for which we could not match the Jewish population data with
the available total population data from IMF: Yugoslavia (cty 188), Afghanistan (cty 512), Gibraltar (cty
823), Turmekistan (cty 795), Uzbekistan (cty 927), Cuba (cty 928), Czechoslovakia (cty 934), Serbia and
Montenegro (cty 965).
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found in Appendix A.
An important concern is who is a Jew in the dataset. The AJC considers as Jews in their
data what they call the core Jewish population, which means, the numbers exclude non-
Jewish members of Jewish households and other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry. Appendix
A provides a full description of who is a Jew.
Historical estimates from AJC are based on several censuses and surveys, partly made
available by the source country and in some cases with duplicated values. Always when
feasible, the AJC provides a cross-matching of the different sources of data for the same
Jewish population, which increases the reliability of the data. The data for the period of
intra-wars (First and Second World War) is imprecise and in most cases was not reported.
Thus, we focus our analysis from 1948 on, when data was again reliable. Since the data
until 1948 is interesting to understand the migration flows and the links to social and cul-
tural networks, we still perform simple analysis in cross-section for this period, but do not
use it to infer our main results.9
See Appendix A for a complete description on the Jewish data and its collection.
5.2.4 Gravity data and descriptive statistics
We use trade data from the Direction of Trade Statistics - DOTS/IMF (www.imfstatistics.
org/dot) for the period 1951-2005. In the Appendix we also do a robustness check to the
Rauch and Trindade (2002) paper using the NBER-UN data coded by Feenstra, Lipsey,
Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005) (see Appendix C).
Data on GDP for the recent periods is taken from the World Development Indicators
WDI/IMF; for the population, we use the IFS/IMF data. Our dummies proxies for infor-
mation and trade costs come from CEPII - Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales. Finally, data for the existance of FTA (Free Trade Agreement) is taken
from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics for the years 1960, 1965, 1970,..., 2000 - the
same data source used by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Since in the panel data analysis
we take 5 years average of the trade data, i.e. 1966-70, 71-75, ..., 1996-2000, we always
9The arquives from the AJC deliver yearly reports containing information on the Jewish population
in the world. Although, the reports from the Second World War represent only estimates of the real data.
It became feasible for the AJC to compute data on the Jewish population again by the end of the 1940’s.
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include the FTA data from the former period, which means, 1965 for the period 66-70,
1970 for 71-75 and so on.
We report the summary statistics of the yearly data in Table 5.1 and the correlation matrix
at 1% significance level in Table 2.
Table 5.1: DOTS trade data and regressors, yearly data (1951-2000)
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Importsij 183,706 4,45 e+08 4,43 e+09 0 3,36 e+11
Jewish population i 183,706 189243 842388 20 6115000
Jewish population j 183,706 181886 823740.1 20 6115000
Total population i 183,706 4,21 e+07 1,26 e+08 231000 1,31 e+09
Total population j 183,706 4,62 e+07 1,38 e+08 223000 1,31 e+09
JSHi 183,706 0,0165861 0,1077659 2,24e-08 0,9064885
JSHj 183,706 0,0157032 0,104471 2,24e-08 0,9064885
JSHi ∗ JSHj 183,706 0,0000737 0,0008457 1,75e-14 0,0278173
GDPi 183,706 3,23 e+11 1,12 e+12 1,76 e+08 1,25 e+13
GDPj 183,706 3,15 e+11 1,11 e+12 1,04 e+08 1,25 e+13
CGDPi 183,706 8,944,461 12778,73 6,643,237 81003,84
CGDPj 183,706 8,747,356 12653,03 6,643,237 81003,84
Distance 183,706 7,751,093 4,755,023 5,961,723 19772,34
Contiguity 183,706 0,0334908 0,1799149 0 1
Common Language 183,706 0,1575364 0,3643068 0 1
Former colony 183,706 0,0271841 0,1626199 0 1
FTA 103,234 0,0608520 0,2390599 0 1
Table 5.2: Correlation matrix at 1% significance level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Importsij 1
2. Jewpopi 0.1184* 1
3. Popi 0.0774* 0.1427* 1
4. (GDPi ∗GDPj) 0.5614* 0.1683* 0.1016* 1
5. Distance -0.0628* -0.0225* 0.0460* -0.0069* 1
6. Contiguity 0.1554* -0.0019* 0.0136* 0.0231* -0.2391* 1
7. Language 0.0457* 0.1379* 0.0111* 0.0087 -0.1215* 0.1397* 1
8. FTA 0.3238* 0.0160* -0.0300* 0.1154* -0.2765* 0.1907* 0.0213 1
*** Denotes significantly different from 0 at 1% level.
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5.3 Model and Empirical Specification
5.3.1 Trade flows and trade costs: gravity revisited
We follow the Dixit-Stiglitz Krugman (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977); Krugman (1980)) mo-
nopolistic competition model, particularly the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity
equation, with a slightly modified utility function to account for home bias in consumers’
preferences aij 10 11. We omit time subscripts for simplicity.
Market clearing condition and the solution for the scaled prices (s. complete derivation in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004)) yield the maximization problem:
cij =
yiyj
yw
(
1 + τij
aij
)1−σ
(PiPj)σ−1 (5.1)
where cij is the demand of country j of goods produced in country i (c.i.f. value of im-
ports), σ the elasticity of substitution between varieties, aij the preference parameter, yi
and yj income in countries i and j, yw total world income, and τij the standard ad valorem
iceberg-type trade costs, with τij > 0 ∀ i 6= j.12 13
Pi and Pj account for the multilateral resistance terms depicted by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), countries i and j “resistance to trade with all other countries ” . This
reflects the fact that trade is determined by relative trade barriers. For a given bilat-
eral barrier τij, an increase in barriers from i and other trade partners causes a reduc-
tion in relative prices of goods from j and an increase in imports from j 14, such that
10Due to the preference parameter aij , varieties do not enter symmetrically the CES-Utility function
but are weighted by aij . Agents maximize Uj =
(∑I
k=1(akjckj)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1 subject to the budget constraint∑I
k=1 pkjckj = yj , where I is the number of countries.
11We also test our hypothesis using the Novy (2008) model in section 4.3.
12This implies that only a fraction 11+τij arrives at the destination. Without information on trade
within regions in a country, we also assume that τii = 0 and τij > 0 ∀ i 6= j.
13Crucial assumptions for utility maximization are, besides the market clearing condition and the budget
constraint, the assumption that τij and aij are symmetric, i.e., τij = τji and aij = aji (see Feenstra (2004)).
14In the monopolistic competition model, Pi represents a consumer index and depends on all bilateral
resistances τij . Although, as shown in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), this is not a proper interpretation
for Pi more generally. For instance, in the existance of different consumption preferences among countries,
Pi no longer represents the consumer price index, since the border barrier includes a home bias. Thus,
the authors refer to Pi as the “multilateral resistance terms ” bilateral trade, after controlling for size,
depends on τij relative to the product of Pi and Pj . Note that Pj = (
∑
i a
σ−1
ji yip
1−σ
ji )
1
1−σ .
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P 1−σi =
∑
j
yj
yw
aσ−1ij P
σ−1
j (1 + τij)1−σ.
5.3.2 Trade costs and the proximity channel
Transportation costs τij are composed of physical and political transport costs Tij and of
information costs INFOij, as in Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005). The physical
component of Tij is composed of the distance between countries, Dij, and their contiguity
CONTij. As a political component of Tij we use the existence of a free trade agreement
(FTA) between countries i and j. Thus, Tij = eδ¯(1−FTAij)+γ(1−CONTij)Dλ¯ij.
We use the network channel as a proxy for informal trade barriers, which is in our spec-
ification a component of the information cost INFOij. There is no consensus regarding
the way through which networks affect trade patterns; we follow Rauch and Trindade
(2002) and use the product of the share of the Jewish population in a country pair, i.e.,
JSHij = jewpopitotalpopi ∗
jewpopj
totalpopj
, as our proximity measure.
Information costs are given by INFOij = eϑ¯(1−LANGij)I(JSHij), where the function I(JSHij)
decreases the greater the magnitude of the network. Thus, trade costs are defined as:
τij = eδ¯(1−FTAij)+γ(1−CONTij)Dλ¯ijeϑ¯(1−LANGij)I(JSHij).
The second channel through which networks affect trade is the preference parameter aij.
For a representative agent, aij = ϕ¯I(JSHij)euij , with ϕ > 0 and uij a random component
15. The literature on trade and networks (e.g. Head and Ries (2001), and Rauch and
Trindade (2002)) shows that the effect of migrants is not consistently higher for imports
than for exports, as also argued by Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005). This implies
that one should be cautious about the empirical relevance of the preference channel. Thus,
we do not aim to disentanble the two channels (trade costs and preferences). Moreover,
since our sample is large compared to the number of observations which include Israel as
a trade partner, we can in some cases abstract from the preference channel;16 Thus, we
expect trade costs to capture most of the effect of networks on trade. The preference chan-
nel might be especially interesting when we analyse trade only with Israel and the direct
networks to Israel.
15Consumers might have a home bias and prefere locally produced goods, which happens, for instance,
due to persistence of consumption habits.
16It is less intuitive to think of similar preferences from Jews living in the US and in Germany, for
instance. In those indirect networks, the information cost channel is expected to be more relevant.
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5.3.3 Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation
Our gravity model follows equation (5.1). A stochastic version of equation (5.1) can be
written as:
cij = (yiyj)ψ¯aϕ¯ijeδ¯(1−FTA)+γ(1−CONTij)Dλ¯ijeϑ¯(1−LANGij)I(JSHij)ς¯eγ¯idi+γ¯jdjij (5.2)
where di and dj are the dummies representing Pi and Pj that control for multilateral resis-
tance terms, γ¯i and γ¯j the respective parameters and ij an iid error term s.t. E[ij|c, P, y, a, τ ] =
1.
We use different ways to control for multilateral resistance terms and use the pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PML) estimation as our main econometric strategy. We assume that
trade costs can be log linearized, as shown in Henderson and Millimet (2008). The equation
to be estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood follows:
cij = exp
{
ψ¯ln(yiyj) + ξXij + (ς¯ + ϕ¯)I(JSHij) + γ¯idi + γ¯jdj
}
+ ij (5.3)
where Xij is the vector of variables in τij other than the network variable, ξ the vector of
coefficients and I(JSHij) the measure of networks, which contains both the information
and the preference channel. Note that ς¯ = (σ − 1)ς, for σ the elasticity of substitution.17
The correct specification of the conditional mean, i.e., E[cij|Z] = expz′iβˆ for z a set of
regressors, is the only assumption required for consistent estimation of equation (5.3) (a
result shown in Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) and Wooldridge (2002)). Note
that cij does not need to have a Poisson distribution: the estimator is a Poisson PML
estimator which solves maxβ
∑n
i=1 li(β). The unique solution of maxβE[li(β)] is ensured
by rulling out perfect multicollinearity.18
We also estimate equation (5.2) using OLS and Tobit and check the adequacy of the
results (s. results in Appendix B and C). The Tobit model has an important advan-
tage over OLS for trade data: if there exists many observations on the threshold b, OLS
17Rauch and Trindade (2002) divide trade flows in groups of goods using the Rauch (1999) classification
of goods. Although, the interpretation of the coefficients of the network variable across groups of goods
relies on a strong assumption of equal elasticities σ across those groups. We discuss their results in
Appendix C.
18Note that the Hessian H(β) = −∑ni=1 exp(x′iβ)xix′i is negative definite for all x and β, what ensures
the uniqueness of the maximum. Some of the parameters might be not identified, as discussed in San-
tos Silva and Tenreyro (2010). Thus, the parameters which cause perfect multicollinearities and complete
separation are dropped to ensure identification of β.
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would lead to inconsistent estimators. For X the set of regressors and P (.) the condi-
tional probability, OLS estimates only E[cij|X, cij > b], while the Tobit model estimates
E[cij|X] = P (cij = b|cij)b + P (cij > b|cij)E[cij|X, cij > b]. Thus, OLS estimates only
the expected value of observations above the threshold b. Moreover, inconsistency of OLS
might result from a E[cij|X] non linear in X.
Despite this advantage over OLS for trade data, the Tobit model, used by Rauch and
Trindade (2002) among others, has been highly criticized in the most recent literature
dealing with the gravity model. In the presence of heteroskedasticity and nonnormal resid-
uals, Tobit leads to inconsistent parameters, which we can suspect to be the case of trade
data.19
Under heteroskedasticity, the Jensen’s Inequality, i.e. E(log cij) 6= logE(cij), implies that
the interpretation of the elasticities of the log-linearized model is incorrect and the model
should be estimated using the multiplicative form (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Hen-
derson and Millimet (2008)).20 This is true since the nonlinear transformation of the
dependent variable by log-linearization changes the properties of the error term: for X
the set of regressors, E[ln(ij)|X] depends on the shape of E[ij|X]. Results of the log-
linearized version using OLS are consistent estimates of E[ln(cij)|X] only if E[ln(cij)|X]
is a linear function of the regressors.21
5.3.4 Trade Creation
More important than to evaluate the outcome coefficient of the JSHij variable is to mea-
sure the magnitude of the trade creation effects of the Jewish population. In the Rauch and
Trindade (2002) study, a minority of countries capture most of the trade creation effects
of networks. We follow their strategy and divide our observations in two groups, with high
19For trade flows c and a set of regressors x, as E[c|x] reaches its lower bound, dispersion around
the mean tends to be small. The variance V [ci|x] tends to vanish as c → 0, while V [ci|x] is higher for
higher values of c (E[c|x] has greater dispersion). But there is also no reason to assume that V [ci|x] is
proportional to ci. Therefore, errors in trade data are generally heteroskedastic, as extensivelly discussed
in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
20The Tobit model proposed by Eaton and Tamura (1994) and used in Rauch and Trindade (2002)
solves the problem of observations on the threshold b. But, as in the OLS model, under heteroskedasticity
it leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters.
21Consider equation (5.2): the validity of the specification depends on whether ij is statistically inde-
pendent on all regressors.
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and low share of Jews. We take the median of JSHc, for c = i, j, and create a dummy
called DCORE, that equals 1 if both countries are above the median, and 0 otherwise.
Thus, we measure trade creation for two groups JSHSmallij = JSHij ∗ (1 − DCORE)
and JSHLargeij = JSHij ∗ (DCORE), corresponding, respectively, to the countries with
a large and a small share of Jews.22
The trade creation effect is measured as 100
[
exp(JEWSHARE ∗$m)− 1
]
, where JEWSHARE
is the mean of the JSHij in the two different groups and $ is the corresponding coefficient
estimated from the two variables JSHSmall and JSHlarge. When we use the complete
sample, we use the mean of JSHij to calculate the trade creation effects.
5.4 The effects of social networks on trade
5.4.1 Effects of JSHij on total trade flows
Results for world trade flows using the DOTS trade data and the PML estimations are re-
ported on Table 5.3.23 24 Further results using the NBER-UN trade data with the Rauch
(1999) classification of goods are reported in the Appendix C. We take 5 years average
of the data to minimize the problem with missing values and data heterogeneity, which
yields 10 periods: 1951-1955, ..., 1996-2000. It is computationaly cumbersome to estimate
a panel over 50 years for 110 countries using PML, given the high number of dummies to
control for time-varying importer and exporter fixed effects. Thus, besides missing values
and data heterogeneity, there is a computational advantage of taking five years average of
the data.
Table 5.3 shows the main results, using the PML estimation. The dependent variable in
this model follows equation (5.3). Columns (1) and (2) report results for the proximity
channel JSHij. We use the mean of the whole sample JSHij to calculate the trade creation
22Observations for the countries with small share of Jews are treated as an undifferentiated mass of ze-
roes. Thus, the coefficient from the regressor JSHij should be similar to the coefficient from JSHLargeij ,
as argued by Rauch and Trindade (2002).
23We also allow GDP per capita to enter our final model. With non-homothetic preferences, there
would be a natual role for per capita income in gravity equations.
24We reproduce the main results using SJEWij , the sum of the ethnic population in the country pair.
The information cost in this case yields INFOij = eϑ¯(1−LANGij)SJEWµij . Even though results are mainly
statistically significant, the use of the sum of Jews is less intuitive.
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effects attributable to the Jews (a comparison between the mean and the median for each
year is available in Table 5.6 in Appendix A). For the complete panel, the mean is 0.000068
and the trade creation effect is 0.84% and 1.42%. Using FTA for comparison, we observe
a trade creation effect of 23.6% by FTAs. FTA is always positive and significant, which
is the expected effect. GDP has the expected sign and magnitude similar to the usually
reported in the gravity models of trade. Period dummies are in most cases significant.
In columns (3) and (4), the countries are divided according to the criteria described in
section 3.4. We show that large countries capture most of the effect in terms of trade
creation.
The estimations with the fixed effects specification and period dummies reported in columns
(1) and (3) represent our benchmark results. One could argue that the 0.84% of trade cre-
ation we find is rather small comparing to the at least 60% trade creation found in the
Rauch and Trindade (2002) study for the Chinese group. Although, we argue that the
values of trade creation in Table 5.3 are plausible for the relatively smaller group under
study. Moreover, if we do not control for multilateral resistance terms, the trade creation
effects of the Jewish networks approximately doubles. The results reported in Rauch and
Trindade (2002) are subject to two concerns: 1. The estimators might be biased due to
the omission of the multilateral resistance terms; 2. Their Tobit gravity equation may be
subject to misspecification (see discussion in section 3.3.).
We report results for the log-linearized version of equation (5.2) in Table 5.8 (Appendix B)
as well as for the Tobit model in Table 5.9 (Appendix B). Both models confirm the results
from Table 5.3. The effect of networks on trade is higher with the log-linearized model and
the Tobit model, in comparison to the PML estimation.
One important concern with our model is sequential moment restrictions: past values of
JSHij might help to predict trade. If this is the case 25, we could solve the endogeneity
problem including lags in the model. Our results show that JSHijt−1 has a smaller effect
on trade then JSHijt, but the significance of the results do not change.
25zijt would be correlated with ijt.
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Table 5.3: Trade creation effects. Panel using PML.
Period 1951-2000 (five years average).
Dep. variable: cij (1) (2) (3) (4)
JSHij 122.2** 207.5***
(18.20) (55.66)
JSHLargeij 86.06** 144.6***
(42.74) (0.00621)
JSHSmallij 483.1** 772.0***
(190.8) (258.1)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.103*** 1.990*** 0.940*** 0.940***
(0.118) (0.0442) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) 0.393*** 1.233*** 0.396***
(0.113) (4.46e-06) (0.113)
FTA 0.236*** 0.329*** 0.239*** 0.371***
(0.0506) (0.0205) (0.0505) (0.0588)
Trade creation
(JSHij) 0.84% 1.42%
Trade creation
(JSHLargeij) 3.16% 1.87%
Trade creation
(JSHSmallij) 0.23% 0.14%
Trade creation FTA 23.60% 23.60% 23.90% 37.10%
Period dummies (P) yes no yes no
ij fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 22159 22804 22159 22159
Country pairs 3175 3175 3175 3175
Log likelihood -3.644e+11 -5.248e+11 -3.602e+11 -5.247e+11
Note: The trade creation effect in columns (1) and (2) are calculated with median (s. section 3.5.)
(ii) Mean of JSHLargeij and JSHSmallij , respectively: 2.16e-04 and 2.95e-06.
5.4.2 Direct versus indirect networks and the creation of the
State of Israel
We create an additional measure of direct and indirect links to study the relevance of
networks with Israel. Direct links are defined as networks in which Israel is either the
import or export country.26 The hypothesis is that direct links have a high impact on
trade, through both the preference channel and the information channel. The measure
of direct networks is created in a similar fashion to the two groups of countries shown
in 3.4. JSHdirij = JSHij ∗ (dir), for dir a dummy equal to 1 if i or j are Israel and
26As a robustness check, we also include the United States in the direct links, given the magnitude and
importance of the Jewish population in this country. The coefficients are slightly higher, but the trade
creation effect remains close to previous results.
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JSHindirij = JSHij ∗ (1− dir) otherwise.
Results for the direct and indirect links are reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.4. In
column (2) we control for multilateral resistance terms and results for the direct networks
with Israel yield a trade creation effect of 24%. Column (1) reproduces the same regression
model but with period dummies. In this case, the effect of the indirect networks vanishes:
one possible way to interpret this last result is to think that direct vs. indirect links could
help in a very crude way to disentangle the preference and the trade cost channels, and
that the preference channel of the Jewish networks dominates the trade cost channel.
In columns (3), (4) and (5), we look only at the direct links to Israel: we keep only the
observations for which one of the countries is Israel. As already mentioned in subsection
2.2., the creation of the state of Israel offers a quasi-natural experiment and, after its
creation, the high inflow of Jews might be responsible for the high effects of the direct
links found in columns (1) and (2).
Column (3) shows the trade creation effects of the direct links. In column (4), the network
variable is divided between strong (JSHLargeij) and weak (JSHSmallij) networks. Even
though the coefficient for JSHSmallij is higher, its mean is much smaller and, thus, the
trade creation effect of the group JSHLargeij is higher, as expected. Finally, in column (5)
we add a dummy to control for political relations with Israel. A closer look at the first two
decades after the creation of the State of Israel reveals that results from columns (4) and
(5) might be biased due to omitted variables: in particular in the first two decades after
the creation of the State of Israel, many countries participated in a boycott to Israelian
products. Thus, we include country votes at the United Nations as a proxy for political
relations with Israel. This dataset from the United Nations is available for all countries
in our sample and covers the complete period under study.27 Results for the UN votes
(5) are significant and positive, as expected, and the effect of the JSHij reduces with the
inclusion of the dummy.
For the specification reported in (1) and (2), we have also included [JSHij ∗ (1− dir)]2 as
a quadratic term, along with JSHdirij and JSHindirij, to capture diminishing returns.
Although, we found no evidence of diminishing returns.
27We have also created a dummy for the Arab Liga, the countries which leaded the trade boycott with
Israel. Although, using the UN votes offers a more complete analysis.
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Table 5.4: Direct and indirect links and trade with Israel. Dep. variable: cij.
Dep. Variable: cij World Trade Trade with Israel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.109*** 2.009*** 3.5721*** 2.917*** 2.881***
(0.119) (0.0441) (0.118) (0.131) (0.118)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) 0.401*** 1.252*** 2.5794*** 2.421*** 2.310***
(0.114) (0.0511) (0.113) (0.132) (0.113)
FTA 0.237*** 0.330*** -0.1051*** -0.206*** -0.190***
(0.0506) (0.0172) (5.74e-05) (5.74e-05) (5.74e-05)
UN votes 0.395***
(0.0952)
JSHdirij 119.3** 195.1***
(56.41) (35.40)
JSHindirij 1437 5065***
(1622) (1540)
JSHij 104.34*** 74.18***
(55.66) (46.43)
JSHLargeij 87.49***
(42.74)
JSHSmallij 519.6***
(258.1)
Obs. 22159 22159 723 723 723
Number of pairs 3175 3175 102 102 102
Log-likelihood -3.604e+11 -4.775e+11 -1.703e+09 -1.646e+09 -1.703e+09
5.4.3 The Novy (2008) model and trade costs over time
Novy (2008) proposes a tractable way to control for time-varying multilateral resistance
terms in a model that allows part of the goods to be non-tradable. The model was used in
Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008). We use it as an alternative specification to Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003).
Instead of the theoretical constructs Pi and Pj as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003),
Novy (2008) uses the tractable measure yi− xi (output minus exports) for countries i and
j to control for multilateral resistance terms, which is captured directly from the data. As
a drawback of the model, we need to use export data instead of import data because of
the measure yi − xi.
Details of the model are found in Appendix D.
We represent the Novy (2008) gravity equation in terms of the tariff equivalent, ψ, such
that ψij = 11−τij − 1 (see equation (5.9) in Appendix D). Under symmetry, τij = τji =(
xijxji
θi(yi−xi)θj(yj−xj)
) 1
2σ−2 , where θi is the share of tradable goods in country i.
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We set the values for the parameters θ and σ suggested in Jacks, Meissner, and Novy
(2008), i.e., θ = 0.8 and σ = 11, and write the tariff equivalent ψij as a function of all
trade costs τij :
ψijt = exp {β0 + β1JSHijt + β2LANGij + β3CONTij + β4COLij + β5FTAijt + β6lnDij}+ijt
(5.4)
where language LANGij, contiguity CONTij, colonial relationship COLij and distance
Dij are time-invariant regressors and ijt an error term.
In our data, the correlation between ψij and τij, at 1% significance level, is nearly 0.95.
Thus, using ψij or τij should leave the regressors unaffected, as is the case in Jacks, Meiss-
ner, and Novy (2008). Moreover, ψij is more intuitive to interpret than τij: the coefficients
are percentage point changes in the tariff equivalent in response to changes in regressors.
We show the results for the tariff equivalent following equation (5.4). The hypothesis is
that, the higher the proximity channel JSHij, the lower the tariff equivalent ψij.
We report results for World trade and trade with Israel in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, respectively.
P1-P10 refers to the 10 cross-sections for the 5 years averaged data: P1=1951-55, P2=
1956-60, ..., P10= 1996-2000. All results are reported with time-invariant gravity regres-
sors. We find significant results of the JSHij on trade over time, and find no evidence of
a decreasing effect of networks on trade over time. For JSHij, the effect on ψij is slightly
increasing. For trade with Israel there is no clear pattern once we control for political
relations.
Table 5.5 shows that the effects of the network channel persist over time and has always
a negative and significant effect on the tariff equivalent, confirming our hypothesis. The
control variables confirm the predictions from the gravity model: higher distance leads to a
higher tariff equivalent, while contiguity, colony and FTA lead to a lower tariff equivalent.28
Table 5.6 reports the results for the fixed effects PML model for trade with Israel. Not
controlling for political relations with Israel could lead to biased results, as already argued
for Table 5.4. Thus, we check the robustness of the results adding UN votes. The pattern
over time for JSHij in Table 5.6 is similar to the one observed in Table 5.5 when we do
not control for political relations. Once we control for political relations, the pattern over
28The only variable that deviates from the predictions is language, which is positive in the period 1950-
1970 and in two cases significant. From 1970 to 2000, the effect of language on trade costs has the expected
sign.
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time is unclear, even though one could argue that it has an inverted u-shape effect.29
Table 5.5: PML estimation for 10 periods (1951-2000). Dependent variable: ψij. WORLD TRADE
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
Dist 0.293*** 0.313*** 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.375*** 0.359*** 0.340*** 0.288*** 0.205*** 0.229***
(0.0195) (0.0175) (0.0203) (0.0212) (0.0191) (0.0203) (0.0207) (0.0239) (0.0274) (0.0190)
Cont -0.533*** -0.317*** -0.266*** -0.138** -0.0359 0.0998 -0.222** -0.269*** -0.400*** -0.211***
(0.113) (0.0919) (0.0900) (0.0676) (0.102) (0.122) (0.0863) (0.0587) (0.0600) (0.0455)
Lang 0.107*** 0.0196 0.150*** 0.00708 -0.106** -0.0950* -0.0175 -0.104* -0.200*** -0.0849**
(0.0406) (0.0392) (0.0455) (0.0450) (0.0467) (0.0531) (0.0544) (0.0606) (0.0511) (0.0421)
Col -0.803*** -0.763*** -0.838*** -0.683*** -0.619*** -0.485*** -0.618*** -0.489*** -0.403*** -0.298***
(0.114) (0.109) (0.0756) (0.0637) (0.0551) (0.104) (0.0971) (0.0606) (0.0552) (0.0479)
JSH -35.32*** -28.91* -53.39** -69.02*** -69.20*** -93.78*** -102.9*** -88.65*** -120.6*** -77.65***
(10.70) (17.18) (24.77) (15.58) (12.54) (15.37) (15.49) (12.65) (19.59) (14.18)
FTA -0.550*** -0.465*** -0.206 -0.400*** -0.478*** -0.497*** -0.687*** -0.298***
(0.0485) (0.0458) (0.185) (0.0932) (0.0572) (0.0546) (0.0461) (0.0387)
Const -1.387*** -1.520*** -2.113*** -2.231*** -2.329*** -2.233*** -2.040*** -1.780*** -1.062*** -1.631***
(0.174) (0.158) (0.183) (0.189) (0.167) (0.178) (0.184) (0.211) (0.243) (0.164)
Obs 2277 2832 2522 2334 2516 2620 2908 2158 2332 2350
Estimations with robust standard errors. Cross-sections for the 5 years averaged data.
*, **, ***, indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
29Rauch and Trindade (2002) have already speculated on the effects of networks over time. They
argued that better communication technology, the spread of English as the common business language,
and stronger international institutions could be explanations for a decreasing effect of Chinese networks
over time. Although, making use of only two cross-sections, they were not able to check the validity of
this hypothesis.
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Table 5.6: PML estimation for 10 periods (1951-2000). Dependent variable: ψij. TRADE
WITH ISRAEL
P1 P2 P3 P4
JSHij -56.85*** -91.33*** -35.87* -38.84** -52.03** -44.25* -65.24*** -60.55***
(15.43) (12.81) (19.36) (16.38) (26.23) (25.38) (18.86) (17.87)
UN votes -1.238*** -2.107*** -0.570 -1.189**
(0.376) (0.449) (0.590) (0.604)
Obs 91 63 102 86 96 88 92 88
P5 P6 P7 P8
JSHij -72.03*** -59.11*** -127.8*** -89.58*** -151.4*** -82.28*** -117.3*** -42.79***
(20.95) (18.29) (33.08) (22.86) (33.24) (20.17) (27.93) (13.61)
UN votes -3.103*** -2.337*** -2.023*** -1.744***
(0.663) (0.266) (0.247) (0.320)
Obs 96 94 98 96 106 104 90 88
P9 P10
JSHij -122.7*** -25.32 -102.6*** -13.18
(28.06) (20.88) (39.04) (22.77)
UN votes -1.571*** -1.719**
(0.278) (0.744)
Obs 94 92 96 92
Estimations with robust standard errors. Cross-sections for the 5 years averaged data.
*, **, ***, indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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For the estimations shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, we have set values for the parameters θ
(the share of tradable goods) and σ (the elasticity of substitution).30 In Figures 5.2 and
5.3, we perform a sensitivity analysis for different values of θ and σ and show that the effect
of the JSHij on ψij for World Trade (Table 5.5) remains robust to different perturbations
in the parameters.
In Figure 5.2, the effect of JSHij on ψij is stable even to unrealistic values of θ.31 In Figure
5.3, the effect of the networks on trade increases with the elasticity of substitution (the
higher the σ, the higher the effect on trade).
Note that the effect of JSHij on ψij is particularly high for the ninth period (1991-95).
This abrupt growth of the network effect might be related to the facts reported in Gandal,
Hanson, and Slaughter (2004). The authors exploit the sudden migration of high skilled
Russian Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel and the effects on factor endowments
in Israel. Such an abrupt inflow to Israel due to policy changes might affect the structure
of the Jewish networks and their effects on trade.
Figure 5.2: Sensitivity of the effect of JSHij on ψij to changes in θ.
30We set the same values suggested in Jacks, Meissner, and Novy (2008). The authors also conduct a
sensitivity analysis for these values.
31Note that θ is considered constant over time. Although, it is clear from the sensitivity analysis that
changes in θ over time does not overestimate our results for the effects of JSHij on ψij .
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivity of the effect of JSHij on ψij to changes in σ.
5.5 Final Remarks
This Chapter has shown the trade creation effects of a religious group using a theory-based
gravity equation. Results reveal important trade-enhancing effects of networks. In our
preferred specification, networks lead to a trade creation of 0.84%. We show that the non-
linear PML estimation with robust standard errors is immune to misspecification, while
the estimation using OLS and Tobit might lead to overestimation of the results.
We show that the countries with the majority of Jews capture most of the trade creation
effects. Using information on UN votes, we show that our results are robust controlling
for political relations. Finally, we find that, despite better communication technology and
stronger international institutions, there is no evidence of a decreasing effect of the Jewish
network on the tariff equivalent over time. Thus, our results show the importance of
networks for the integration of the world economy.
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5.A Jewish Population Data and Statistics
5.A.1 Who is a Jew in our dataset?
Despite ideologies, this is a crucial question in our study. As mentioned in the archives
of the AJC 32, the clear definition of the Jewish group is an important concept to provide
serious comparative foundations to the study of the Jewish demography. The three major
concepts of a Jew are: (i) the core Jewish population; (ii) the enlarged Jewish population;
and (iii) the Law of Return Jewish population.
The data from the American Jewish Committee considers in their numbers for the Jewish
population in each country only the core Jewish population, what does not include non-
Jewish members of Jewish households and other non-Jews of Jewish ancestry 33. In what
follows, we give a closer look at the definitions:
(i) The core Jewish population:
In most of the countries, the concept of the core Jewish population includes ”all persons
who, when asked, identify themselves as Jews; or, if the respondant is a different person in
the same household, are identified by him/her as Jews” 34. ”The core Jewish population
includes all converts to Judaism by any procedure, as well as other people who declare they
are Jew”. ”Persons of Jewish parentage who adopted another religion are usually excluded,
as are other individuals who in censuses or surveys explicitly identify with a non-Jewish
group without having converted out of Judaism”.
Until 2001, Jews who had other religious corporate identities were excluded from the def-
inition of the core. Since 2001, Jews with multiple religious identities are, under certain
circumstances, included as Jews 35.
(ii) The enlarged Jewish population:
32We refer here mainly to the notes on the most current book release on the Jewish data and methods:
American Jewish Year Book Vol. 107 (2007) and the chapter World Jewish Population and Clarifications
(2007)
33For instance, statistics from the AJC show that in 1980 there were 196 thousand Jews in Brazil, while
in 2006 this number decreased to 96 thousand. The break out in the numbers from the census suggest
considerable intermarriage with non-Jews, as suggests the AJC.
34This definition of a person as a Jew broadly overlaps with the Halakhah (the rabbinic law), but not
necessarily coincide. Although, in Israel, the personal status is subject to the rulings of the Ministry of
the Interior, which relies on the rabbinical authorities and thus relies on legal rules of the Halakhah.
35This change in the definition does not represent a problem to our sample, since we mainly use data
from 1950 until 2000.
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The enlarged Jewish population includes the core population and: a. all other persons
of Jewish parentage who are not Jewish at the date of the investigation; b. all of the
respective non-Jews with Jewish backgroud.
(iii) The Law of Return Jewish population:
According to this rule, a Jew is any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Ju-
daism, who does not have another religious identity. The Law of Return is significantly
larger definition than (i) and (ii) and represents the distinctive legal framework for the ac-
ceptance and absorption of new immigrants; awards Jewish new immmigrants immediate
citizenship and other civil rights.
The data collection for the definition (i) benefits from scholars and institutions in many
countries. Some of the countries that have delivered national censuses information on
Jewish population in the recent years are: Ireland, Czech Republic, India, Romania, Bul-
garia, the Russian Republic, Macedonia, Israel, Canada, South Africa, Australia, New
Zealand, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, Hungary, Croatia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia,
Poland, Moldova. For some countries, for instance, the United States, the censuses do not
provide infromation on religion. Although, other sociodemographic studies have provided
the AJC information on the Jewish demography, as for instance in the countries: South
Africa, Mexico, Lithuania, United Kingdom, Chile, Venezuela, Israel, Hungary, Nether-
lands, Guatemala, Moldova, Sweden, France, Turkey, Argentina and United States 36.
It is important to note that the AJC provides a cross-matching of the different sources of
data for the same Jewish population always when feasible, what provides a check on the
reliability of the data.
As we have already mentioned in the data description, the total population data comes
from the IMF. We use this data along with the AJC data in order to create our proximity
channel, the product of the share of Jews in the country pair i j, JSHij. A closer look on
the monadic data follows:
36For the United States, current information was provided by the National Jewish Population Survey
and the American Jewish Identity Survey.
144 CHAPTER 5. NETWORKS AND TRADE AMONG JEWS
Table 5.7: Mean values and median of the variable JSHi (monadic data)
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
1951 70 .0163063 .0972918 8.79e-06 .8162518 .0013453
1952 72 .0167620 .1062832 6.89e-06 .9041469 .0013941
1953 71 .0168085 .1073130 6.77e-06 .9064885 .0014178
1954 76 .0153116 .1006274 6.67e-06 .8792067 .0013658
1955 76 .0148763 .0974630 6.57e-06 .8515275 .0009280
1956 76 .0148020 .0973268 1.62e-06 .8503059 .0009036
1957 75 .0146855 .0985630 1.60e-06 .855409 .0008604
1958 70 .0152756 .1043689 8.16e-06 .8751267 .0010100
1959 76 .0150118 .1000505 6.19e-07 .8742632 .0011368
1960 77 .0144498 .0988162 6.08e-07 .8689687 .0010555
1961 77 .0141523 .0971825 3.73e-07 .8545454 .0007930
1962 77 .0139416 .0960317 3.66e-07 .8444396 .0007710
1963 74 .0141892 .0988747 2.87e-07 .8521776 .0007937
1964 78 .0136506 .0976660 2.81e-07 .8641129 .0007425
1965 77 .0137998 .0986647 2.74e-07 .867304 .0006986
1966 77 .0137982 .0992608 2.67e-07 .8724858 .0006765
1967 76 .0137779 .0994817 1.30e-07 .8686551 .0006008
1968 76 .0136351 .0981350 1.27e-07 .8568841 .0005839
1969 76 .0136717 .0987637 2.47e-08 .8623009 .0005675
1970 76 .0136308 .0986880 2.41e-08 .8616287 .0004849
1971 76 .0134450 .0983716 2.35e-08 .8587722 .0004279
1972 76 .0134636 .0981087 2.29e-08 .856492 .0004147
1973 76 .0134616 .0984294 2.24e-08 .8592616 .0004241
1974 74 .0137462 .0997310 3.30e-08 .8591549 .0004187
1975 74 .0134064 .0969983 3.23e-08 .8356164 .0004135
1976 76 .0130885 .0959711 3.18e-08 .83783 .0004241
1977 76 .0129544 .0957970 3.13e-08 .836307 .0004221
1978 77 .0129268 .0963544 3.09e-08 .8466648 .0004107
1979 77 .0127422 .0948677 3.04e-08 .8336043 .0003976
1980 75 .0129392 .0960488 3.00e-08 .8328906 .0003854
1981 78 .0127110 .0959517 2.96e-08 .8485007 .0003051
1982 69 .0140821 .1010704 3.96e-06 .8408555 .0004648
1983 69 .0138582 .0993647 3.87e-06 .8266684 .0004474
1984 67 .0143060 .1019554 2.83e-06 .8358434 .0005055
1985 67 .0140873 .1003149 2.76e-06 .8223982 .0005033
1986 67 .0141917 .1016309 1.80e-06 .8331414 .0004502
1987 67 .0139805 .1000699 1.76e-06 .820345 .0004410
1988 66 .0142216 .1017126 1.72e-06 .8275262 .0004133
1989 66 .0139457 .0995832 1.68e-06 .8102115 .0004063
1990 67 .0137183 .0988885 1.64e-06 .8105893 .0003556
1991 67 .0135094 .0973296 1.60e-06 .7978321 .0003790
1992 77 .0124185 .0929673 1.56e-06 .8171222 .0004975
1993 79 .0122993 .0928278 1.53e-06 .8264407 .0005254
1994 84 .0113922 .0888870 1.49e-06 .8158654 .0004940
1995 87 .0108263 .0863713 9.62e-07 .8066989 .0004399
1996 87 .0107456 .0859414 9.38e-07 .8026568 .0003760
1997 87 .0106827 .0857637 9.14e-07 .8009683 .0003921
1998 87 .0104533 .0840670 7.98e-07 .7850980 .0003825
1999 87 .0104584 .0846017 7.91e-07 .7900521 .0003478
2000 87 .0105674 .0859308 7.85e-07 .8024326 .0003251
2001 74 .0122113 .0924907 7.79e-07 .7966859 .0004037
2002 87 .0104079 .0847981 7.74e-07 .7918373 .0002885
2003 86 .0100516 .0811707 7.69e-07 .7536454 .0003303
2004 85 .0100884 .0810761 7.65e-07 .7483866 .0003744
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5.A.2 Jews in Israel - Migration Stock
Figure 5.4: Jewish Population (million) in Israel since the creation of the State (1948)
Figure 5.2 shows the increase in the Jewish population after the creation of the State of
Israel. The increase in the number of Jews in Israel shown in the figure might be due to
migration flows, population growth or Jews converted into Judaism (the dataset refers to
the Jewish population in Israel regardless place of birth). We compare the total population
in Israel (Jews and non-Jews) to the Jewish population and find that, with exception of the
years 2000-2005 (for which the difference is higher), in the other years the increase in the
Jewish population growth was appoximately proportional to the total population growth.
This can also be confirmed in the column called Max in the table of means, representing
Israel (which is the country with the maximum value of the JSHi); the share of Jews in
Israel does not change drastically. Thus, this confirms the litetarure, which argues that
most of the Jewish population growth in Israel can be attributed to Jewish migration 37.
37The AJC also raises the concern on the decrease of the Jewish population growth due to low birth
rates among Jews - they argue that the fertility rate of Jews is lower with respect to other religious groups
(AJC (2007)).
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5.B Results using OLS and the Tobit model
For the log-linearized OLS with fixed effects it follows:
lncij = γidi + γjdj + ϕX + ηij (5.5)
for di and dj the multilateral resistance terms, X the vector of regressors and ηij is the log-
linearized error term ij, lnij. We conduct the RESET test proposed by Ramsey (1969) [s.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)] in order to check whether the OLS model is misspecified.
In all cases reported in Table 5.8, the p-values of the RESET test are zero, what rejects
the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. The trade creation effect found using OLS at
least doubles in comparison to the results using PML (compare OLS results with Table
5.3).
Table 5.8: Results using the OLS model. 5 years averaged data. World Trade
Dependent variable: log cij (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
JSHij 303.8*** 434.3*** 156.9* 19.54 224.3***
(42.61) (51.81) (87.77) (79.18) (40.58)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.438*** 3.627*** 1.370*** 28.27*** 1.372***
(0.0182) (0.109) (0.0348) (4.755) (0.0213)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) -0.300*** -2.819*** -0.0761* -28.62*** 0.0406
(0.0237) (0.0910) (0.0457) (4.805) (0.0304)
Log distance -1.857*** 0 -1.610*** -1.759*** -1.956***
(0.0498) (0) (0.0985) (0.101) (0.0483)
Contiguity 0.0711 0 0.360 0.752** -0.164
(0.273) (0) (0.479) (0.377) (0.243)
Language 1.272*** 0 1.041*** 1.451*** 0.967***
(0.139) (0) (0.252) (0.223) (0.129)
Colony 1.318*** 0 0.612 -0.0338 1.467***
(0.305) (0) (0.595) (0.470) (0.273)
Common colony 1.025*** 0 0.202 0.667 1.888***
(0.246) (0) (0.511) (0.463) (0.229)
FTA -0.533*** -0.162
(0.174) (0.231)
Constant -36.33*** -115.7*** -38.39*** -1009*** -35.94***
(0.655) (3.769) (1.340) (177.1) (0.823)
Fixed effects estimation no yes no no no
Country fixed effects
Interacted with year no no no no yes
Importer and exporter
Fixed effects interacted with no no no yes no
Year (i*year and j*year)
Observations 40590 40590 11045 11045 40590
Number of pairs 6714 6714 1665 1665 6714
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The Tobit model for equation (5.2) for a minimum threshold b follows:
ln(b+cij) = [ψln(ci∗yj)+$JSHij+ϑLANGij+γCONTij+δFTAij+λlnDij+pii+νj+ηij, lnb]
(5.6)
Results using the Tobit model are reported in Table 5.9. We report results with [columns
(1) and (2)] and without [columns (3) and (4)] FTA, since data for FTA is missing for
some countries and is available only from 1960 on. Clearly, the omission of the multilateral
resistance terms overestimates the effect of networks on trade (compare columns (1) and
(2)). This is also the case of the OLS model: compare columns (1) and (6) from Table 5.8.
P-values of the RESET test are zero, which implies that the Tobit model is misspecified.
5.C A robustness check to Rauch and Trindade (2002)
For the main results of the paper, we have used information on aggregated world trade
flows, which has a longer time variation. In this Appendix, we use the NBER-UN data with
the Rauch (1999) classification of goods to compare our results to the literature. In a very
influential paper, Rauch and Trindade (2002) study the effects of the Chinese networks on
trade. They estimate a Tobit model in cross-sections for the years 1980 and 1990 and reveal
a trade creation effect of the Chinese networks of at least 60%. As in Rauch and Trindade
(2002), we expect that, more than the effect on trade costs, the existence of taste similarity
within an ethnic group should lead to a higher effect of networks on differentiated goods
in comparison to the effect on homogeneous goods. The empirical specification follows:
ln(bm + cijm) = [ψmln(ci ∗ yj) +$mJSHij + ϑmLANGij + γmCONTij
+δmFTAij + λmlnDij + pii + νj + ηijm, lnbm] (5.7)
where m = w, r, n:
w represents the homogeneous goods group;
n represents the differentiated goods group;
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Table 5.9: Results using the Tobit model. 5 years averaged data. World Trade
Dependent variable: log b+ cij (1) (2) (3) (4)
JSHij 345.4*** 296.4*** 239.6*** 205.2***
(40.21) (38.98) (64.02) (63.47)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.426*** 1.331*** 1.351*** 1.411***
(0.0184) (0.0238) (0.0256) (0.0281)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) 0.279*** 0.0948*** -0.0795** -0.179***
(0.0244) (0.0321) (0.0345) (0.0353)
Log distance -1.891*** -1.844*** -1.672*** -1.639***
(0.0507) (0.0507) (0.0716) (0.0704)
Contiguity -0.0174 -0.214 0.244 0.273
(0.277) (0.248) (0.348) (0.341)
Language 1.172*** 1.223*** 1.299*** 1.380***
(0.137) (0.131) (0.182) (0.179)
Colony 1.350*** 1.303*** 0.659 0.484
(0.308) (0.279) (0.432) (0.423)
Common colony 0.785*** 1.902*** 0.249 0.483
(0.242) (0.229) (0.373) (0.366)
FTA -0.825*** -1.042***
(0.131) (0.132)
Period dummies no yes no yes
Country fixed
effects no yes no no
Constant -35.78*** -33.00*** -39.64*** -44.62***
(0.663) (1.063) (0.977) (1.289)
Log-likelihood -111960.75 -110852.08 -59731.687 -59574.08
Observations 41207 41207 22804 22804
Country pairs 6618 6618 3344 3344
Period dummies were omitted in columns (2) and (4) for simplicity.
Except periods 6 and 10, they are significant at 1% level.
r represents the reference priced goods group.
Since, as already mentioned in section 3.3, the Tobit model is also subject to heteroskedastic
errors,38 we also show results using the PPML suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006).
38The heteroskedasticity may lead to inconsistent estimators (s. discussion on Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) in section 3.6.).
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5.C.1 Data and Descriptive statisticss: the Rauch (1999) classi-
fication of goods
Table 5.8 presents the summary statistics for the 5 years averaged data pos-1960. We use
the NBER-UN yearly bilateral trade data (www.nber.org/data), documented by Feenstra,
Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005), in order to compare our results to the ones found in
Rauch and Trindade (2002). We aggregate the trade data in three groups of commodities
according to the Rauch (1999) liberal classification of goods: (i.) w, homogeneous (orga-
nized exchange) goods: goods traded in an organized exchange; (ii.) r, reference priced:
goods not traded in an organized exchange, but which have some quoted reference price,
as industry publications; and (iii.) n differentiated: goods without any quoted price. The
NBER-UN trade data gives a more accurate measure of trade flows, since the values are
mainly reported by the importing country - which is a better measure due to the differences
between c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices (s. Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)).
Data on GDP for the recent periods is taken from the World Development Indicators
WDI/IMF; for the population, we use the IFS/IMF data. Our dummies proxies for infor-
mation and trade costs come from CEPII - Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales. Finally, data for the existance of FTA (Free Trade Agreement) is taken
from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics for the years 1960, 1965, 1970,..., 2000 - the
same data source used by Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Since in the panel data analysis
we take 5 years average of the trade data, i.e. 1966-70, 71-75, ..., 1996-2000, we always
include the FTA data from the former period, which means, 1965 for the period 66-70,
1970 for 71-75 and so on.
Table 5.9 presents a simple correlation matrix among the 5 years averaged core variables
of the model in the logarithmic form. Even if merely ilustrative, it is interesting to no-
tice that our network channel is positively correlated to the trade variables in the three
groups of commodities. GDP, GDP per capita, countries contiguity and existence of a free
trade agreement between i and j are positively correlated to trade, as expected. Com-
mon language is negatively correlated to the product of GDP’s and GDP’s per capita.
FTA and contiguity are not correlated at 1% significance level to the proximity measure
JSHi ∗ JSHj.
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Table 5.10: NBER trade data and regressors, yearly data (1962-2000)
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Reference priced goods 84.859 90661.73 543301.6 1 3.13e+07
Differentiated goods 96.023 289457.3 2496726 0 1.41e+08
Homogeneous goods 74.231 71267.17 433458.1 1 2.92e+07
Jewish population i 103.149 238277.4 949708.9 20 6115000
Jewish population j 103.149 228620.5 937812.8 20 6115000
Total population i 103.149 5.19 e+07 1.42 e+08 232000 1.27 e+09
Total population j 103.149 4.72 e+07 1.31 e+08 232000 1.27 e+09
JSHi 103.149 .0190686 .1159091 2.24e-08 .8724858
JSHj 103.149 .0167838 .1080378 2.24e-08 .8724858
JSHi ∗ JSHj 103.149 .0000858 .0008809 1.75e-14 .0246964
GDPi 103.149 4.16 e+11 1.25 e+12 2.33 e+08 1.25 e+13
GDPj 103.149 4.13 e+11 1.26 e+12 2.33 e+08 1.25 e+13
CGDPi 103.149 11178.1 12871.48 1.160.914 65134.23
CGDPj 103.149 10849.05 12707.47 1.160.914 65134.23
Table 5.11: Correlation matrix at 1% significance level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Ln (cijR) 1
2. Ln (cijN) 0.8440* 1
3. Ln (cijW ) 0.5913* 0.5321* 1
4. JSHi ∗ JSHj 0.0180* 0.0246* 0.0196* 1
5. FTA 0.3139* 0.3109* 0.2720* -0.0194 1
6. Ln (GDPi ∗GDPj) 0.7403* 0.7639* 0.6322* 0.0142 0.2308* 1
7. Ln (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) 0.5233* 0.6088* 0.4156* 0.1513* 0.3374* 0.6003* 1
8. Contiguity 0.1733* 0.1581* 0.1596* -0.0138 0.1917* 0.0296* -0.0089 1
9. Language -0.0062 0.0043 0.0374* 0.0679* 0.0026 -0.1596* -0.1212* 0.1478* 1
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5.C.2 Results using the Rauch (1999) classification of goods:
cross-section and panel data
First we show the results with the Tobit model used by Rauch and Trindade (2002) for the
cross-sections 1970, 1980, and 1990. We use a micro founded gravity equation and control
for multilateral resistance terms, omitted in the Rauch and Trindade (2002) gravity equa-
tion - many of our results that are not significant at 10% level turn to significant if we omit
the multilateral resistance terms (Pi Pj), which reinforces the discussion from Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) on the bias caused by the omission of these terms. Table 5.10,
5.11 and 5.12 show the results for three cross sections using the proximity channel JSHij.
The cross-section years, the data sources, and the classification of goods are the same used
in Rauch and Trindade (2002).
The hypothesis raised for the three groups of goods was that the proximity channel JSHij
would have a higher effect on trade for the group of differentiated goods, followed by the
reference priced goods. Effects on the group of homogeneous goods would be smaller.
Surprisingly, in these cross-sections presented, the greater effect on the groups of differ-
entiated goods can not be confirmed: except for the year 1970, we do not find significant
results for this group once we add the FTA dummy. Even though the variable FTA is
not significant in half of the cases, once we add it to control for the existence of free trade
agreements, the effect of the JSHij on trade vanishes in some cases which were signifi-
cant before. Again, results are more frequently significant (but misspecified) if we do not
include the importer and exporter fixed effects. Once we add these controls and add the
FTA dummy, there is no effect of JSHij on trade in most of the cases for the cross-sections
shown 39. Thus, results with these cross-sections are inconclusive in what refers to JSHij.
Concerning the other regressors, most of them confirm the expected signs: language and
distance are always, respectively, positive and negative, significant and assume the elastic-
ities expected in the trade literature; GDPi ∗ GDPj, as the measure of the mass of both
countries, is, with only one exception, positive and significant. CGDPi ∗ CGDPj is sur-
prisingly not significant in most of the cases; although, given the importance of low income
39We also check these same results for the cross sections 1962 (first year of our dataset), for which we
find significant results if we do not control for multilateral resistance terms. We also check for the cross
section 2000, for which there is no effect. As we will see later on, and what is by now only speculation, it
seems that the effect of Jews on trade is higher in the first two decades, what is stronger if we keep only
observations for trade with Israel.
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countries on trade flows (specially in homogeneous goods), it becomes difficult to see a
pattern for the GDP per capita - interestingly, CGDPi ∗CGDPj is usually significant and
positive in the cases of differentiated goods, what is intuitive: countries with higher GDP
per capita trade more in differentiated goods.
Table 5.12: Tobit model for 1970. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) equation.
Homogeneous Refer. Priced Differentiated
JSHij 116.1*** 105.8* 42.34 33.15 74.24** 79.58**
(40.25) (55.72) (31.67) (41.30) (30.19) (39.09)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.108*** 0.910*** 1.125*** 0.722*** 1.184*** 1.129***
(0.115) (0.0981) (0.0815) (0.0927) (0.0580) (0.0777)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) 0.0917 0.191 -0.0970 0.142 0.271*** 0.631***
(0.125) (0.137) (0.117) (0.0872) (0.0814) (0.116)
Log Distance -1.080*** -0.931*** -1.143*** -1.085*** -1.104*** -1.093***
(0.0661) (0.0795) (0.0517) (0.0614) (0.0470) (0.0557)
Contiguity 0.0153 0.0258 0.331* 0.212 0.494*** 0.447**
(0.237) (0.265) (0.194) (0.213) (0.181) (0.198)
Language 0.660*** 0.757*** 0.869*** 1.039*** 0.940*** 0.946***
(0.150) (0.175) (0.114) (0.131) (0.102) (0.118)
Colony 0.605*** 0.380 0.710*** 0.327 0.817*** 0.764***
(0.231) (0.311) (0.191) (0.252) (0.180) (0.237)
Common Colony 0.279 0.765*** 0.286
(0.320) (0.239) (0.212)
FTA 0.805*** 0.753*** 0.494**
(0.309) (0.252) (0.240)
Constant -43.11*** -34.65*** -39.31*** -25.32*** -48.26*** -50.06***
(5.471) (5.008) (3.560) (4.143) (2.949) (3.181)
Importer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exporter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1978 1549 2219 1731 2528 1960
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Table 5.13: Tobit model for 1980. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) equation.
Homogeneous Refer. Priced Differentiated
JSHij 65.74 42.37 68.39* 55.01 28.04 -10.48
(48.09) (94.21) (40.77) (68.70) (37.95) (68.71)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.022*** 1.208*** 0.946*** 0.863*** 0.992*** 1.296***
(0.0870) (0.222) (0.0926) (0.269) (0.0568) (0.289)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) -0.187 -0.0961 -0.229* 0.290 0.0729 -1.216**
(0.125) (0.386) (0.126) (0.548) (0.0864) (0.567)
Log Distance -1.258*** -1.113*** -1.487*** -1.438*** -1.328*** -1.360***
(0.0658) (0.111) (0.0524) (0.0818) (0.0460) (0.0793)
Contiguity 0.285 0.629* 0.240 0.265 0.196 -0.178
(0.237) (0.355) (0.203) (0.263) (0.187) (0.272)
Language 0.292* 0.471* 0.549*** 0.551*** 0.863*** 0.883***
(0.152) (0.251) (0.120) (0.174) (0.103) (0.172)
Colony 0.539** 0.170 0.274 0.172 0.614*** 0.421
(0.256) (0.422) (0.221) (0.307) (0.206) (0.318)
Common Colony 0.0993 0.525** -0.356
(0.339) (0.258) (0.221)
FTA -0.0711 0.376 0.169
(0.725) (0.552) (0.588)
Constant -29.27*** -43.77*** -22.49*** -27.84*** -31.18*** -25.76***
(3.916) (6.274) (3.848) (5.892) (2.627) (6.771)
Importer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exporter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -3874.69 -3170.31 -4275.30 -3301.86 -4795.15 -3591.34
Observations 1957 799 2329 936 2690 1021
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Table 5.14: Tobit model for 1990. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) equation.
Homogeneous Refer. Priced Differentiated
JSHij 97.62** 89.43 100.4*** 131.1** 30.64 2.569
(47.65) (77.77) (33.64) (53.42) (35.33) (56.19)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 0.268*** -0.0105 0.738*** 0.877*** 0.994*** 1.077***
(0.0763) (0.106) (0.0482) (0.0519) (0.106) (0.0663)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) 0.447*** -0.222** -0.0545 -0.0440 0.262*** 0.258***
(0.0978) (0.105) (0.0650) (0.0618) (0.0988) (0.0625)
Log Distance -1.096*** -0.993*** -1.185*** -1.121*** -1.012*** -1.000***
(0.0596) (0.0748) (0.0395) (0.0489) (0.0408) (0.0515)
Contiguity 0.209 0.227 0.398*** 0.452*** 0.646*** 0.673***
(0.202) (0.223) (0.140) (0.149) (0.148) (0.162)
Language 0.324*** 0.259* 0.516*** 0.529*** 0.788*** 0.753***
(0.125) (0.145) (0.0855) (0.0957) (0.0877) (0.102)
Colony 0.351* 0.373 0.236* 0.0732 0.314** 0.173
(0.194) (0.270) (0.134) (0.178) (0.142) (0.194)
Common Colony 0.175 0.294 -0.238
(0.364) (0.251) (0.267)
FTA 0.457** 0.418*** 0.0415
(0.190) (0.126) (0.135)
Constant -0.580 18.87*** -17.36*** -27.92*** -38.92*** -42.09***
(3.511) (4.603) (2.231) (2.336) (4.705) (3.400)
Importer fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Exporter fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -2797.99 -2286.30 -2514.56 -1997.35 -2874.95 -2305.68
Observations 1609 1301 1797 1444 1957 1559
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Even though we do not find satisfactory results for these cross sections, we look at a
broader picture: the NBER-UN trade data with the Rauch (1999) classification of goods
is available since 1962, allowing a rich panel data analysis.
Moreover, we are aware of the consistency, not only efficiency, problems in the Tobit model.
Thus, we estimate the effects using PML. Table 5.13 shows a positive and significant at 1%
level results for the group of differentiated and reference priced goods. Although, we find
negative and significant results for trade in homogeneous goods - which goes against the
hypothesis of trade creation effects of Jews (results are also negative using other controls
not added in Table 5.13). Period dummies are always significant and distance, GDP and
language have the expected signs. 40. In the case of contiguity, results are significant but
the sign is the opposite of what is expected - in this result, contiguos countries trade less.
Language has the highest elasticity for trade in differentiated goods and the lowest elas-
ticity for trade in homogeneous goods, which is in line with the argument that language
skills lower information costs and facilitate matching among buyers.
An important concern with the interpretation of the results using the Rauch (1999) clas-
sification of goods refers to the elasticity of substitution σ: there is no clear interpretation
of the coefficients in JSH for the different types of goods, for (σ − 1) ∗ JSHij the effect
estimated. The coefficient would be smaller for differentiated goods, once these have a
low degree of substitutability in comparison to homogenegous goods. Thus, unless one
sets values for the elasticity of substitution, which is not the case in Rauch and Trindade
(2002), it is hard to interpret the results for the different types of goods. In this case, the
analysis should be conducted for total world trade.
As a last argument, the classification between differentiated vs. homogeneous goods might
be stronger for the case of the Chinese population in Rauch and Trindade (2002), com-
paring to the case of Jews. In the case of the Jewish population, it is not as clear that
the effect on differentiated goods should be higher, since this is a religious and cultural
network, and not a migration group. Thus, it is more intuitive to study total trade flows,
regardless the type of good: following the argument that Jews are known for working in
40We performed the same results using the log-linearized equation (5.5). In this case, results are
significant only for homogeneous goods (the opposite of what we found using the PML). Although, under
heteroskedasticity, the log-linearization violates the consistency of the OLS estimator. We use the RESET
test to check whether log-linearized model estimated with OLS was misspecified and we reject the Ho
hypothesis that the additional regressor included was not significant. Thus, OLS is misspecified and we
opt out this specification.
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activities related to international exchange and for building and keeping strong networks,
which also reflects in business networks, we might expect that the effects of this group
on trade can be better explained with total trade flows. Although, if we instead use the
”percentage of the total number of observations” to divide the sample, following the per-
centage of total observations in each group in Rauch and Trindade (2002), we find very
similar ”trade creation effects” to what they have found (this selection according to the
percentage of observations would give us, approximately, a sample of 164 observations in
the group JSHLargeij). Moreover, Rauch and Trindade (2002) use only 59 countries in
their full sample, while we use 110 countries. Thus, the high values for trade creation found
in their estimations might be due to sample selection. Finally, the top five countries in
their sample are, respectively, Taiwan, Hong-Kong, China, Singapure and Malasia; those
countries might drive their results.
5.D The Novy (2008) model
5.D.1 The Novy (2008) gravity model
In Novy (2008), trade flows are decomposed into tradable and non-tradable goods. Country
i comprises the consumer range [ni−1, ni] and firms in country i optimize in this range. The
continuum [0, 1] comprise all consumers and goods. [ni−1, ni−1 + θ(ni − ni−1)] is the range
of tradable goods and [ni−1 + θ(ni − ni−1), ni] of nontradable goods. θ is the exogenously
given fraction of tradable goods. Consumption in country i follows:
ci =
[
I∑
k=1
∫ nk−1+θk(nk−nk−1)
nk−1
(
c
σ−1
σ
im
)
dm+
∫ ni
ni−1+θ(ni−ni−1)
(
c
σ−1
σ
im
)
dm
] σ
σ−1
(5.8)
cim denotes consumption of good m in country i. Note that ci is total consumption in
country i from all countries j 6= i including goods produced and consumed in country i, as
was assumed in ci in equation (5.1). Thus, we can write cij from equation (5.1), for i 6= j,
as:
∫ nj−1+θj(nj−nj−1)
nj−1
(
c
σ−1
σ
im
)
dm, where θj is the share of tradable goods in county j - in
equation (5.1) it is assumed that θj = 1.
Prices are denoted as pTij = (1 + τij)pj for tradable goods and pNTij = pj for non-tradable
goods, i.e., the c.i.f. (cost, insurance and fright) price is (1 + τij) times the f.o.b. (free on
board) price. Optimal firms’ behavior implies that pTim = pNTim = σσ−1 = lwi = pi. Thus,
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Table 5.15: Panel using Gamma-PML for JSHij, NBER-UN Data. Period 1965-2000 (five years average)
Dep. Variable: cij Org. Reg. Dif.
JSHij -127.6*** -626.6*** 12.12*** 99.13*** 102.2*** 124.6***
(0.170) (1.084) (0.252) (0.968) (0.131) (0.759)
Log (GDPi ∗GDPj) 1.077*** 1.513*** 1.560*** 0.812*** 2.510*** 0.261***
(0.000260) (0.000949) (0.000306) (0.000721) (0.000185) (0.000184)
Log (CGDPi ∗ CGDPj) -0.547*** -0.947*** -1.753***
(0.000311) (0.000355) (0.000217)
Log distance -0.453*** -1.472*** -1.629***
(0.0286) (0.0328) (0.0520)
Contiguity 0.0963 -1.511*** -4.411***
(0.161) (0.177) (0.303)
Language 0.575*** 0.916*** 1.336***
(0.0803) (0.0840) (0.140)
Colony 0.141 -0.592*** -2.559***
(0.172) (0.182) (0.302)
FTA 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.650***
(0.000491) (0.000292) (0.000344)
Constant -30.95*** -39.03*** -65.55***
(0.249) (0.283) (0.445)
Country fixed
effects interacted yes no yes no yes no
with year
Period dummies (P) no yes no yes no yes
Fixed effects estimation no yes no yes no yes
Observations 17936 6276 19698 7055 21679 7530
Number of pairs 4463 1261 4776 1325 5129 1407
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the mill price of a variety produced in region i is identical for all varieties.
In equation (5.1) we write trade flows in terms of consumption cij. In terms of exports from
i to j (xij), we can write cji (consumption in j from goods produced in i) as cji = (1+τij)xij,
i.e., the difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. prices 41.
Assuming symmetry among tradable goods produced in county-j over the range θj(nj −
nj−1), consumption in country i of goods produced in country j yields, for a country pair
i 6= j: xij = θj(nj − nj−1)qTji, where qTji is the range of tradable goods produced in country
j for county i such that: qTj =
∑J
k=1 q
T
jk (tradable output for each country k).
Firms produce a differentiated good m with output qTim for tradable goods and qNTim for
non-tradable goods. qTim =
∑I
j=1 q
T
ijm for all tradable goods. Equilibrium conditions imply
that qj = θjqTj + (1− θj)qNTj and qNTj = qNTii = qTii , where qii is total output produced and
consumed in country i. Country i GDP is yi = (ni− ni−1)qi and the number of consumers
in country i is given by popi = qi(ni − ni−1).
Intra-country total output yields: (ni − ni−1)qTii = (ni − ni−1)qi − θi(ni − ni−1)
∑
k 6=i qTik =
yi − xi, where xi = ∑k 6=i xi,k is the sum of goods produced in country i and exported to
k 6= i. Thus, the equilibrium solution of the model, imposing trade cost symmetry τij = τji
gives rise to the following gravity equation:
xijxji = θi(yi − xi)θj(yj − xj)(1 + τij)2−2σ (5.9)
This specification has some advantages for panel data analysis: instead of measuring mul-
tilateral resistance terms using theoretical constructs Pi and Pj as in Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), Novy (2008) uses the tractable measure yi−xi to control for multilateral
resistance terms, which is captured directly from the data 42. Moreover, in the Novy (2008)
model the assumption that all goods are tradable can be relaxed.
As before, the Jewish population share in both countries enters our model as a part of infor-
mation costs, such that INFOij = eϑ¯(1−LANGij)I(JSHij). The information costs I(JSHij)
decrease the greater the magnitude of the network, i.e., the higher the dyadic share of Jews
in the country pair.
41The choice to write equation (5.1) in terms of consumption cij was due to data concerns: we use
equation (5.1) to estimate trade flows using the NBER-UN yearly bilateral trade data, for which most of
the values are reported by the importing country (s. Feenstra, Lipsey, Deng, Ma, and Mo (2005)). In the
Novy (2008) model, although, we represent it in terms of exports instead of imports. The reason is the
measure (yi − xi) in equation (5.1), which must be represented in terms of exports.
42Imagine exports of country i with other countries but j increase, then xi increases and, ceteris paribus,
xijxji must decrease. In this cenario, trade costs from i with countries k 6= j must have decreased: this
implies that it is relatively more costly to trade with country j.
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The interpretation of equation (5.9)) using the I(JSHij) follows. A decrease in information
costs I(JSHij) between countries i and k 6= j causes an increase in trade between i and k.
It is relatively less costly to trade with country k than with country j; thus, xijxji must
decrease.
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